THE SUBMARINE PERIL.

Taranaki Daily News, 3 May 1917, Page 7

THE SUBMARINE PERIL.

WHAT THE NAVY IS DOING. •10 ENCOUNTERS IN 18 DAYS. London, Feb. 27. Sir Edward Carson's frank statement, on tli e submarine peril, and Mr. Lloyd George's equally plain pronouncement concerning the urgent necessity for a drastic pruning of our imports, have undoubtedly had an excellent tonic effect on the nation at large. These two statesmen'have talked to lis as men to men. Tliej' have shown that they are noi afraid to trust the people, and the people have proved once again that the trut l 'does not scare them—that, indeed, the harder the truth the firmer they will set their teeth on the resolve to "go through vrtih the thing." If there is one thing that is calculated to shake the nerve and determination of the average Englishman as I have known him during this war, it is the suspicion that the Government is not dealing honestly with him. His motto is. "Let's know the worst," and if you only let him know what he is really "up against" he braces up quickly to face what is to come, It is the tophole in folly to sugar-coat the Englishman's war pills. The Prime Minister and the Fifst Lord of the Admiralty have apparently now arrived at that conclusion, and intend for the future to act upon the principle that the only way to lead Englishmen and get the best out of them is- to tell them the worst and to explain to them what is required and why. On these terms the country is prepared to do anything and put up with anything that may be necessary in the process of outslaying and baffling the designs of the enemy. In dealing with the submarine peril •Sir Edward Carson used no flatterln* unction, but at the same time his speech contained nothing to shake our confidence in its eventual defeat. Our losses, as he said, are bad enough and dangerous enough, but the fact reihains that during the first 18 days of Germany's "intensive frightfulness" per submarine, nearly [ 12,000 ships entered or cleared from United Kingdom ports, whilst the total of all British, Allied and neutral vessels sunk by the enenr" during the same period was 134. - Those figures provide a striking commentary on the German boast, sent the world over by wireless, f-o the affer-t that "the submarine scare has been thrown against the English rwilh -.ralysing effect, and the whole sea is being swept clear at one blow." Sir Edward Carson's comment on this "blatant and extravagant bravado," a quiet "I have not heard of one British sailor who has refused to sail." Later he paid a deservedly warm tribute' to the coolness and courage of the merchant service. In these things are embodied tho kernel of our resistance to the submarine. Our seamen have with one accord looked death and devilry in the face without dismay. It is a picture :f heroism never excelled in history, and it should fill the whole nation with pride in its TF.ee. and with gratitude to those who stand between it and starvation. The realisation of what our merchant navy faces unflinchingly in every hour of its duty should banish the last hint of discontent at the small discotaforts and embarassments which we safe at home may be called upon to endure.

FIGHTING THE SUBMARINE. Possibly the most interesting portion of Sir Edward Carson's speech was his description of how "U" boats are being dealt with. Tho German submarines are not having it all their own way. They are being constantly harried by patrol vessels, destroyers, airships, and seaplanes, and they did not all return to ,their home ports. Sir Edward did not isatisfy our curiosity as to the number of submarines that had been accounted for during the 18 days aforementioned, and he gave the reason why he adhered to the policy of reticence favored by his predecessors at the Admiralty. As that policy has been widely questioned, it may be well to give the First Lord's explanation:— , "In the first place 1 have no doubt myself that the policy of silence about the losses of enemy submarines is the policy that the enemy dislikes most. A submarine starts out on its campaign of murder, and the enemy knows that it does not return home. What has happened is a complete mystery. You cannot tell whether the submarine was lost owing to some defective construction or design—a very important matter—or whether the loss was due to one or other of the methods which the British Admiralty have adopted for its destruction, The second point is, if wc immediately announce the certain destruction of tho submarine the enemy would at once dispatch another submarine, if available, to operate against our ships. I would rather leave them imagining that It was there. As it is, the enemy cannot know for some time the exact number of submarines that have been operating at any particular moment.

"YOU NEVER CAN TELL." "But the strongest argument is that the Admiralty do not know whether a submarine has or has not for certain and in fact been destroyed. All we know is that reports come to us of engagement,s with enemy submarines, and it follows that the results range from certainy through the probable down to the possible and improbable. It is in the case of the submarine only absolutely certain when you have taken prisoners. A submarine dives when it is Wounded, no doubt never to come up again. We cannot tell. The degrees of evidence in relation to the sinking vary to the most enormous extent. You may say if I am useful for nothing else at the Admiralty I might be able to weigh the evidence. I can assure yot it is not an easy matter."

CERTAINTIES AND OTHERWISE. Sir Edward proceeded to point his remarks with illustrations culled from accounts received at the Admiralty concerning no less than forty encounters with submarines which took place during the first eighteen days of February. The fact that bur craft were able to get to grips with enemy submarines so frequently is in itself a remarkable achievement, and' certainly gives solid ground for confidence in our Navy's ability' to cope successfully with the peril. Sir Edward gave his illustrations in the order of probability as regards fhe destruction of the enemy craft: — (I) One of our destroyers attacked an enemy submarine. They hit the submarine, and killed the captain. The submarine dived. If it had remained below it 'Would have been an uncertain case. As a matter of fact she was injured only so much as that she was compelled, but ablet, to come to the surface. She Avas captured, and her officers and 'men were taken prisoners. That

is an absolute ease. How different it might have been if tiie submarine had been bo injured that she was unable to come to the surface, and had remained at the bottom of the sea!

(2) A report was received from ono of our transports that she had struck an enemy Submarine, and that she herself was damaged, but she was confident that the submarine had been sunk. A further report was received later that the obstruction Unit was thought to lie the sunken submarine had been located. That is a claim to which attached a degree of; probability amounting almost to certainty. The injuries to the damaged ship correspondent to injuries which would- have been caused when ramming in the way described.

. I*-*) Two of our patrol vessels engaged two enemy submarines and sank them both. There were no casualties on the patrols, and no survivors from the submarines.. A fuller report showed that one of the submarines was sunk, hut leaves a degree of uncertainty about the second. .

(4) 'One of our destroyers reported that she had heavily rammed an enemy submarine' which was awash. There was no doubt that the destroyer struck the submarine a severe blow,' but it is not possible to establish that the submarine was sunk',' This might be described as a case of strong probability. (5) A submarine being damaged by two of our patrol vessels was subscw fluently assisted by two destroyers. The result is reported as doubtful, although it is certain that' one of the destroyers was slightly ■ damaged in running over the con'ng tower of the submarine. (5) In another case one of our patrol vessels reported striking a submerged object after engaging a submarine. An examination led to the belief that the obstacle struck was a submarine, Ibut it is quite clear that in this case there is a considerable degree of doubt. Sir Edward gave three more instances in which the claims made range from possibility to improbability. A patrol vessel reported that she had been in action with a submarine, thai, the fifth shot hit the submr fine's conning tower, and that it was believed that the submarine was sunk. One of the smaller airships sighted a submarine on the surface, and dropped a bomb, and the submarine dived. Lastly, a seaplane attacked an enemy submarine, when in the act of diving. The submarine was not seen again, and the result is quite unknown