BRITAIN STRIKES.

Taranaki Daily News, 25 April 1917, Page 6

BRITAIN STRIKES.

jk THE GREAT OFFENSIVE, ALLIES ON WEST FORCE HUNS TO HOPELESS EFFORT. " The following interesting forecast of the war, made in February, is well worth reading, for the light'it throws-, on many things, civil and military, and particularly on the question of the coordinate Allied command, ' which still presents difficulties unknown to the masterful Hindenburg, who has reduced the commanders of Germany's allies to the position of obedient servants who have the honor to obey his order. Not the least interesting part is the obsession (fully shared by the writer of the letter) which held all men at the time of his writing, of the supreme importance of Germany. ■ Like all the rest, this critic seems to think that Outside- of Germany there is no initiative. The whole outlook is. concentrated on Hindenburg. What will the great man do. where will he strike, how long will his big blow endure? As for British and French commanders, it is out of the question to expect any of them to do anything but wait for the "crash." As for the British, Tommy Atkins will pull them through whatever happens. But the happening will be. dictated by Hindenburg. Our readers will vividly realise that the great offensive came after all from Britain, and is being maintained by the British and French armies, while Hindeciburg is constrained to a, hopeless and halting defensive. In thirj light our readers will greatly enjoy this excellent and otherwise most' informing letter.

THE COMING CRASH. Everyone feels that wc are approaching tho critical hours of the war. A few days ago we heard the first premonitory rumblings of the doming storm. The Germans were attacking violently in the Champagne, and there was activity at many points along the. entire British front. These signs .and portents have died down under the influence of a renewal of wet, misty weather, but no one forgets that it was 12 months ago this week that the Crown Prince, launched his attack on Verdun. It may he the enemy's experience then will sound a warning against a too early launching of the offensive this year. For the Crown Prince, after his first successes, was cheeked and delayed by the advent of fog and fum, despite'the fact that nt Verdun he was operating on comparatively hard ground.

That the Germans will again endeavorthis year to seize the advantages that accrue from .getting in the first blow may be regarded as certain. It- is true that the enemy are now. generally on the defensive. But von Hindenburg is a firm believer in the military maxim that the blow constitutes the best parry. People in this country await the coming crash with steady confidence. They have faith in the British private, who is the real hero of this war. There may be bickerings in the High Command, generals may fail us or be removed from their posts, but Tommy Atkins goes indomitably on his way, asserting always a moral ascendancy over the enemy. When you talk to soldiors home from the front of this or that regiment haying done well they are indignant. They tell you at once they all do well, and that regiments whose names have never got into the newspapers go "over the top" and charge across Dead Man's Land every bit as steadily as the vaunted heroes of the most historic units in the British army,

:■ HINDENBURG'S PLANS. It is significant of the calm oonfidence that is felt not less in the generalship of Sir Douglas Haig than in the powerful instrument .which the nation has forged and placed in his hands, that no one anticipates that von Hindenburg will endeavor to launeh an offensive against the British front. NorJs it any reflection on our splendid French.Allies that in seeking to anticipate the enemy's first blow, eyes are turned expectantly on certain sectors of the line for which General Nivelle is now responsible. While'we have been gathering strength week by week and month by month, France, by general consent, was called iipon.to sustain the main burden of the war Western front. Germany sought to crush France and exhaust her reserves before Great Britain was ready, and though she did not succeed, the strain that was imposed on General Joffre was tragically, severe and long-drawn-out.

But apart altogether from the fact that France must now <be regarded as the weaker partner of the Allied combination in the West, the natoe of the terrain on the French front is better suited to winter operations than the mud-clogged sectors for which the Brit-, ish are responsible be»wcen the Somme and the sea. This was one, though not the sole, determining factor in the selection of Verdun for the German offensive last year. But it is unlikely that the attack on Verdun will be resumed. The very, name of that ill-omened spot has become synonymous with failure in the German mind.

There remain Champagne and the lino of the Aisne. Most of the Champagne country has a chalky subsoil, which dries rapidly. But the terrain is treacherous and ea,hnot be depended on. It follows that if local conditions are to determine the choice of ground, the line of the Aisne is most likely to witness the first crash of arms in the West. It is from the Aisne that Pam gets much of her granite, and the waterlogged conditions do not prevail there to the same extent as elsewhere. From the German point of view it has a further recommendation of offering the nearest road to the* French capital. It was before Nancy that the Kaiser was hurled back just before the battle of the ifarne, the Emperor's defeat giving us the first promise of the success that General Joffro was afterwards to achieve. •' ; ■ . 1 CO-ORDINATION IN THE WEST. It is perhaps something of a reproach to our conduct of the war that there should be any question ofc one part of the Western front being stronger than another.''.But, as lias been shown before in this ; column ' this question of coordination is one of infinite difficulty. Thero are very real practical obstacles in the way of that "single control of a single line" which the masterful Hindenburg has contrived to establish in the case of the Central Empires. We seek to get over these difficulties by periodical conferences, which are.useful in their way, and have done excellent work, but are handicapped in th&ir efficiency by the fact that they are periodic only and cannot necessarily remain in continuous session. Perhaps the ideal plan would be the establishment of something

General Joffre or some other commander at its head, assisted by a British, French, and perhaps an ItJl'ian genera). But even this plan might be destructive m some degree of the initiative of the generals at the front. i The problem is assuredly; not tone which any person ought id dogmatise about who is not familiar with all the arguments which can be adduced for or against any change in the existing arrangements. And those arrangements, after* all, have gone through the testin" fire of trial. Nor is there any desire that any change whatever should be made which would tend to increase political influence in the war.' We saw the danger of these influences in the agitation, mainly by politicians, to divert out military strength from the Western to the Balkan theatre of operations, a policy which would have increased, enormously the strain which is beinrr imposed on our shipping 1 . The soldiery put down their foot on that proposal, -and there can be little doubt that the Soldiers were right. .','-'

EAST OR WEST? These matters do not perhaps greatly interest tho general public. It may even be humbly suggested that they do not always* receive that attention and consideration from the public that they deserve. The man in the street is much more eone'erned about results than he is about means and methods. He leaves these to be worked out by the soldiers and the politicians, with a strong predilection, pwhaps, in favor of the sol, diers, and a mental reservation iafc the Jess the generals at the front'are interfered with by the people at Home the better for everyone; concerned. With his eyes fixed on results, he wants to knowall that can 'be told about the plans of the future.

The plans of the Allies must necessarily be treated aS a sealed book, and though' Sir Douglas Haig has recently given us a glimpse, into its pages in his much-discussed "intorvicw" with the French journalist, the subject is not one on which any discussion is to be encouraged! But the plans of the enemy are a fair subject of speculation. * ■' As already indicated, the belief is that von Hindenburg will seek to anticipate and embarrass the coming great Allied offensive by striking a defensive-oft'en-sivo 'blow somewhere on the French front. But no one imagines that such an offensive can bo very long maintained. Reports indicate that Germany's policy is to "throw everything in" this year, in the hope, if not of achieving a victory, of maintaining at least the. existing stalemate. Wc may expect, therefore, a great show of strength on the enemy's front during the opening weeks at least of the great offensive, but Germany's military resources are now limited, and when, with tho advance of spring, the Russian- armies come into play, new problems and difficulties will immediately confront the enemy's higher command.

PETROGRAD AND ODESSA'. The common-sense view of the situation seems to be that von Hindenburg will then turn his eyes to the East. He has always belonged to the Eastern Echool of German strategists. Surveying the serried Allied line in the West, and especially the overwhelming Brittish forces between the Somme. and the sea. now stated officially to number approximately tw.o million men, he may well despair of obtaining anything jn 'the nature of a military decision between Ostend and tho Swiss frontier.

It is in the East, rather than in the West, that he will look for big results. Ho may strike for Petrograd in the North or for Odessa in the South, or he may strike for both at once. If, while maintaining just sufficient men to maintain a retiring fight in the West, he can send sufficient reinforcements to Mae-

kensen in Eoumania that brilliant general would be nblo to resume his efforts to batter a way through to the Black Sea port. The advance on Petrograd would be a nuch more considerable operation, but von Hinderiburg has always been credited with a belief in its practicability—a belief founded in large measure on the lack of strategic railways behind the Russian., lines'. But the success of such a plan will depend entirely on the pressure which we arc able to put on the enemy's front in the West.

. Veto Hindenburg may be prepared t* give ground to some extent. From tho military as apart from the political point of view, he would stand td gain rather than to lose by drawing back his armies on to the shortened line of the Mouse or the Rhine. But there are limits to such a retirement beyond which be dare not go, and if the German armies were driven back on to the Rhino wo should uncover rich mining districts on which the enemy is largely dependent for raw material with which to carry on the war.