WHERE GERMANY LOST.

Taranaki Daily News, 10 April 1917, Page 2

WHERE GERMANY LOST.

HUN HISTORIAN'S ADMISSIONS. "WAR PLAN COLLAPSED AT THE MARNE." The vigilant censor sometimes nods, and then articles slip into the press which makes up gasp when we read thorn. Such is the essay in the Frankfurter Zeituug of December 31, from the pen of 110 less a personage than Geheime llof-Kati Professor J)r. Friedrich Meinecke, of Freiburg University, one of the German historians of the first rank. The professor tells us thut the entire German war-plan ''collapsed at the gates of Paris in tlu! Battle of the Marne." This idea has iong heen current in the Allied press, but up' till now no Teutonic publicist of any standing has endorsed the view that the ''strategic retreat" at the Marnc and the failure to take Verdun must be counted as German defeats. Professor Meinecke has a new theory as regards the commencement of the conflict, for Uc tells us that "only in a political sense did Germany begin the war as a defensive war," while "in a military sense,'' it has been distinctly a "knock-out war." The professor writes:— "Our first object was to overthrow France rapidl.il, and to compel her to make peace. As it was our interest rapidly to reduce the number of our enemies, this peace would probably have been very lenient for France. If we succeeded, wc could then turn quickly, carry out the same military idea against Russia also, with the best prospect for success, and then, under favorable conditions, conclude the final peace with England, who would have been disarmed on the continent. This peace, also, like the first peace concluded with France, would have had to assume in high degree the character of a compromise, since we could not hope to overthrow England's naval supremacy. "This whole programme 'brilliantly begun, collapsed at the gates of Paris in the battle of the Marne. . This battle was not a tactical victory, but it was a great strategical success for the French. Perhaps our programme would not have collapsed if we Jiad carried through our original strategical idea with perfect strictness, keeping our main forces firmly together, and, for the time, abandoned East Prussia." Dr. Meinecke goes on to sketch subsequent developments, and says substantially: "We took to trench warfare, the enemy did likewise; we tried, and failed, to break through both on the Yser and on' the Bzura and Bawaka; the French tried, and failed), to. break through'in Champagne. People at home begim to argue that the war had finally developed into one of attrition. Then, in May, 1015, German .troops succeeded in bieakmg through in Galicia, but ultimately had to settle dawn again in defensive positions. The French and the I'.nglish tried again, and failed again, to break through in the West—in the battles of Loos and Champagne." The professor then passes to Verdun and the Sonime, and his comments run:— "The arguments used among us a year ago was that the decision mu°t be sought not in the intangible, distant East, but in the concentrated West, the nervu-eentre of £hc enemy's force. ' The decision,, however, must not be a decision in the old sense, aiming at a. breakthiough and rolling-up of the enemy resistance—for- such a decision was regarded as no longer possible here in the West, but a decision better adapted to the experiences of the war of position and to psychological calculations. We should, in fact, break in at a particularly critical position, destroy one of the most important French fortresses, and so prove to the French that they could no longer win, and that they would do better to end a war which had lost All prospects for them. That was the origin of our undertaking against Verdun. liut this time the new politiconuUtary idea led only to a heroic episode. 1

"'lf our original successes could have been pursued at the lS ame pace to their goal, our political purpose would perhaps have been attained. But meanwhile our enemies pulled themselves together for still more gigantic achievements. England learned from us unimilitary service md the. eonver sion 01 industry for the production of a mighty surplus of amis and ammunition. At the same time she loaned unon the industrial strength of Anierica, and so, while Japan helped also, she was able to equip the new Russian formations with the apparatus which we had smashed the year before. Tliust in June 1 i i n' lnl<! ' 11 ca,me to the great double oflensive of our enemies in east and west. The result was that we had to interrupt our operations against Verdun, and the enemy offensive also achieved partial success, especially in the East, although the real object—to break thiough and roll up our lines—could not be achieved, m spite of an intensity of attack and superiority in technical resources far greater than in our break tnough in Gaheia. Thw was due to the fact that we, m the interval, had still further developed the possibilities of trench warfare." Professor Ifpineckc sa y s that the Battle oi the Soinme. Ims led to the conviction m Germany that it is no longer possible for either side to arrive afa Itary decision «i„ the full peace-com-Pj " ■ H ' nso > that Germany's offer lRT SPs f . r ?," the idoa ti,at th « of ! l!: w dem, " , , dcil % the continuation the mi no longer bear any relation to the military results which can 5 fcin"i ( ' a 'i d th,lt " s tatcsmanlike intelligent, and .wise to abandon the intention of destruction, which, after all does not lead to destruction, and to seek a li,tollable compromise."