WAITING FOR THE RUSH.

Taranaki Daily News, 23 March 1917, Page 7

WAITING FOR THE RUSH.

WEARING DOWN THE ENEMY'S LINES. (Wellington Times Correspondent). London, Jan. 27. We are passing through what in many respects is the most trying period of the war. Everyone is waiting with bated breath for the hour to strike when operations will he started on a grand scale. But in the meantime weather conditions impose a comparative lull. On the Western front it is comparative only, for infantry action is confined to deadly little raids, designed to serve tne treble object of harassing the enemy, testing his line and destroying his local defences, the artillery bombardment continues all along the front. Shells are Ueing poured upon the enemy which destroy his trenches, break up his wire entanglements, and shatter the nerves of the German soldiery lurking in the dark, unhealthy recesses of their dugouts. All this will tell in our favor when the time for the spring offensive' arrives. Incidentally it adds to the wastage of the enemy forces. In some sectors the Germans apparently are seeking to minimise this wantage by virtually denuding their front trenches of men. This is a prcbablo explanation of the curious experience of one of our raiding parties recently, when three lines of German trenches -were found practically deserted, and our men simply went in and destroyed dug-outs and earthworks without molestation. It is not wise, however, to attach too much importance to incidents of this kind. Nevertheless, it is clear that these winter operations are imposing a tremendous strain on the enemy. And all the time while we are whistling for a wind and praying for the ground to dry up so as to permit of the movement of infantry and heavy guns, preparations on a gigantic scale are being made behind our lines for operations on a scale unequalled by anything yet witnessed in the war. No doubt the same may be said of the Germans opposed to us. It is known that they are making feverish efforts to overtake the supremacy we have established in the air and in the matter of heavy guns and munitions. But a supremacy of this kind, once it is established, will not be easily wrested from us. And there is one particular in which the Germans have lost an advantage which they can' never regain. The armies they can put into the field are now inferior alike in numbers, equipment, training and morale to those of the Entente Powers. NO ILLUSIONS. T Happily the r.aticn is ur.der no illusions as to the nature of the task which lies before it. London is still subject to recurrent waves of optimism and pessimism, the one being generally as unjustified a3 the other. But there are evidences that the country as a whole takes a perfectly pane view of the military position. Even the rather loose talk of Mr Lloyd George at tie Guildhall about "Victory in 1017" has not had *he effect Trhicb. might have been feared "f crgeHering on undue confidence which night, not be realised. Everyone hopes that Mr Lloyd George may be right, and unless all the promise "of the moment turns out to be illusory 1917 '"'.ight ttfquestioningly to provide something in the rature of a military decision. But even if the best happens, and the Germans are beaten in the sight of all the world, and recognise themselves that they are beaten before the summer draws to a c'ose, the peace terms of the Allies as outlined in their Note to President Wilson will not readily be accepted in Berlin. To that extent the theory that the eicmy may "take the winter to think over it" still finds much acceptance in what may be described as official circles in London. The possibility of this is one which ought steadfastly to be borne in mind. Because it has to be remembered that by the autumn of this year Germany will temporarily have got over her food troubles. A fresh crop of potatoes will have become available, and f-lic unfortunate people, whom she has enslaved will be busy in the fields getting in the harvests of 1917. At the worst, then, she will have enough food to carry on with ufltil the spring and early summer of 1018, unless her* resources should prove inadequate to last her through the coming summer. And this last is a possibility which no one ought to count upon, even though a great portion of the grain resources of Roumania were destroyed before they fell into the enemy'.? hands. THE WESTERN FRONT. This brings us back onco more to the axiom laid down by all the leading authorities that it is the military and not the economic factor which must determine the end of the war. And evidence aecuir.jlates that it is on the Western f-nnt that that military decision is to be sought. Already we hear from various neutral sources that the Germans are beginning to mass big forces in the West. Presumably some of these reserves have been withdrawn from the Roumanian theatre of the war. But Hindenburg will be getting reinforcements also from men of the latest class called to the colors as well as of men who have had the opportunity during the winter of having their wounds patched up to fit them to take then p'.acc once more in the tiring line. Whilst reports from neutral sources always liave to be received with some reserve, it is not withoat significance I hat the enemy's main concentrations appear to he in the northern sectors of the Westem front. Everyone recognises,, of course, that these concentrations are defensive rather than offensive in character. The Germans have attempted no serious offence against the British line since their reverses at Ypres. and they are not likely to attempt anything r.f the kind now when our position is infinitely stronger than it was in those earlier 'nionths"of the war, and when even the newspapers had been allowed to announce that the forces under Sir Douglas Haig numbered something between a million and threequarters and two million men. One who is perhaps the ablest, and certainly the best-informed, of the military writers in this country has bepii at' pains to point out that these figures are illusorv, since it is not the total that counts' but the number of bayonets that a force is able to put into it's fighting line. But this is a contention which applies equally to the enemy, and unless the organisation of our armies is radically bad and defective even total figure's must be regarded as vital for the' purposes of a comparison of the relativestrength of opposing armies. If there is a wastage of mini-power behind our lines the sooner that wastage is accounted for the letter-

THE WEAK LINK. The Germans at least appear to be under no delusion as to where the heaviest blow is likely to fall on them. Even last year when the Somme offensive was at its height they always maintained a powerful army in reserve in the north against the possibility that the British might attempt a break througn in the direcion of Lillo. This expectation was probably based on the manifest gain to be derived from any operations in the extreme north, which would have the effect of turning the German right flunk and forcing a retirement of their entire line. Possibly the enemy believe that something of the kind may yet be attempted, and this would explain the stories which reach us of fresh levies of troops being poured into Belgium and northern France. But military strategy is nevertheless based on experience. And no general yet has ever struck by choice at the point where his enemy has expected him to strike. For two and a half years we have been engaged in wearing down the enemy's lines by a process of exhaustion. We have the best reason for believing that this policy has been attended with a large measure of success. That the Germans still possess a powerful force for offensive purposes has been demonstrated by what has occurred in Roumania, but though this force is available to von Hindenburg in the winter, when weather conditions have the effect of demobilising to a great extent the Allied armies, it is extreme questionable whether it will continue to exist under summer conditions. The impression rather is that it will be swallowed up by .the enemy's requirements east and west, and that even then von Hindenburg will hardly have enough men to go round. In that case offensive operations by the Ai lies, conducted not at one, but at several points, must discover a weak link~ somewhere in the enemy's chain. And given aerial.supremacy the Allied commanders should not long be in doubt as to the direction in which weakness has developed. ===== vr