THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

Taranaki Daily News, 10 March 1917, Page 5

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

REPORT OF COMMISSION. TOO MANY CONTROLLERS CLUMSY AND INEFFICIENT MACHINERY. Received March 0, 5.5 p.m. London, March 8. The Dardanelles report b-.vtes that from the commencement of the war until November Ai, 1014, no change was Unade in the machinery for the superior conduct of naval anil military operations. This machinery consisted of the Cabinet, assisted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, with the War Office and Admiralty. It must have been obvious from the first that it was far too numerous to control-effectively the eonduct of the war. It is regrettable this rudimentary fact was not recognised immediately after the outbreak of war. Thus, for four months, when events of the utmost importance were occurring, the machinery for higher operations wa» both clumsy'and inefficient. Eventually an improvement was effected. CABINET WAR COUNCIL. The Cabinet, it appears, had been generally informed of any important decisions taken by the War inmncil, but not until executive steps had been taken to give whole or partial effect to the Council's decision. This is what happened over the naval and military operations at the Dardanelles. Some members of the Cabinet did not wish to be informed of what was going on. Mr. Churchill, during his examination, said: '•'l often heard Cabinet say it did not wish to hear this secret matter, as the fewer knowing it the better." The report adds that these members were very rightly content to delegate the full powers of the Cabinet to their colleagues on the War Council. Mr. McKenna, in his evidence, confirmed this delegation. DISTINGUISHING RESPONSIBILITY OF MINISTERS AL.., EXPERTS. A distinction has to be made' between the real responsibility devolving on the several Ministers who were members of the War Council. Mr. Lloyd George, Viscount Grey, and Lord Carew exercised undoubtedly a very legitimate influence, but the main responsibility rested on Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Mr. Churchill. . The last-named, in his evidence, said: "In its early stages the war was carried on by Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and me, but I was on rather a different plane. I had not the same authority as Mr. Asquith or Lord Kitchener. If they said this or that should be done, that settled it." The commission finds that this description of the working of the machine is substantially correct, save that Mr, Churchill probably assigned himself a more unobtrusive'part than he actually played. It was the distinction between the War Office and the Admiralty. General Sir James Wolfe Murray stated that Lord Kitchener acted ver'v much as his own Chief-of-Staff. He (General Murray) was never asked to express any -opinion. At the Admiralty it was different. Mr. Churchill was not an expert, and Lord Fisher and Admiral Wilson acted as experts. Lord Fisher explained that neither he, General Murray, nor Admiral Wilson were members of the War Council. They were experts, who only opened their mouths when told. They were never anything about the Dardanelles Admiral Wilson confirmed Lord Fisher's statements.

LAXITY OF .METHODS. * Mr. Churchill in his evidence declared that his naval colleagues had the right .and power to correct him, or dissent from 1* views, and were fully cognisant of. their rights. Viscount. Grey stated that the War Council went entirely, in naval and military matters, by the opinions expressed by the two Ministers. Mr. Balfour gave hiß opinion, and if the experts did not express theirs he would infer they assented. He did not think'they should remain silent if they did not agree to the propositions. Military experts stood on a difl'erent footing, because Lord Kitchener was an expert. He (Viscount Grey), however, thought the member of the Cabinet, presiding should have facilitated the experts' assent or dissent by asking them. Lord Haldane said that he would expect Lord Fisher, *MJ IC had objections, to have stated them. IHe did not concur in Lord Fisher's view of tlie War Council. Lord Crewe thought the political members of the Council did too much talking, and experts too little. Mr Lloyd George also disagreed with Lord Fisher's view.

JUNIOR SEA LORDS NOT CONSULTED. None of the Junior Sea Lords were consulted about the Dardanelles. Commodore Lambert expressed the opinion •at the Dardanelles was a proper iubJect for Admiralty Board discussion On November 22, 191.5, the Junior Sea Lords submitted a minute to Mr Balfour that the principle that the supremacy of the First Lord is complete was unassailable had been pushed too far and tended to imperil national safety.' ATTACK SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONJOINT. The majority of the Commission finds that Mr. Churchill initiated the project of an attack on the Dardanelles to the War Council on November 24, 1!)14, as an ideal method of defending Egypt and Russia, as Lord Kitchener declared the troops were not available for the nurpose. The War Council's acceptance of this statement was unfortunate l'--.atiso investigation would have revc i' efl '''the*, wise. Thus naval action, or vine ,[ to be decided. Admirals \ :\\l f'-nr and Sir A. K. Wilson. bo<l of vm.., did not express their dit-scr '• ' i imposed naval action ulnr- 'oi' m<. expressed their view if t! i" project was navally >' They did.not object. 1 w . , they regarded the ope -...-. mental only. The < i ■' ' there was an oblijm Churchill, next on Xr on the other mentbrr cH, to insist on r expert opinion on naval action alone

of a surprise amphibious attack offered such great military and political advantages that it was mistaken and illadvised to sacrifice thorn by a hasty, purely nival attack, which could not of itself secure the desired objects. THE BOMBARDMENT A MISTAKE. Dealing with the narrative of the Dardanelles events, the Commission concurs with Admiral Jackson that the November 3 bombardment was a mistake, being calculated to place the Turks on the alert. The order emanated solely from, the Admiralty, and the War Council was not consulted. On the 25th Mr. Churchill suggested the attack on Callipoli, which would give control of the Dardanelles and enable the Government to dictate terms at Constantinople. He admitted that the operation was a difficult one, and would require a large force. Lord Kitchener agreed that it might be necessary to make a diversion by attacking the Turkish communications, but the moment had not arrived. RUSSIA ASKS FOR A DEMONSTRATION. On January 2, 1915, the Russians were somewhat hard pressed in the Caucasus, and Russia asked for a demonstration against the Turks in order to relieve the pressure. The Foreign Office sent a felegram, drafted by the War Office, stating that' a demonstration would be made, though it was feared that any action would not seriously affect the withdrawal of enemy troops from the Caucasus. Mr. Asquith and Mr. Churchill did not see the telegram, though the latter thought Lord Kitchener's reply was the outcome of a conversation with him. LORD KITCHENER'S ACTION. Lord Kitchener, writing to Mr. Churchill, said he hadn't any troops to land anywhere, adding that the only place for a demonstration was in the Dardanelles, but, he said, we will not he ready for anything big for some months. The Commission is of opinion that although Lord Kitchener pressed for demonstrations, it did not necessarily involve an attempt to force a passage. The proper conclusion seems 'to be that when the demonstration appeared necessary, Mr. Churchill thought it possible to convert it into an attmept to force, the passage, as Lord Kitchener's new army was ready, and, that as he had to provide for home defence, he was not willing to withdraw a single main from France. Mr. Churchill's views as to th,e success of a purely naval operation were more optimistic than was warranted by the expert's opinion, therefore Lord Kitchener grasped too eagerly at the proposal to use the fleet alone, but the responsibility rested rather on Mr. Churchill. The latter alleged Hie marvellous potentialities of the Queen Elizabeth, whose astounding effectiveness would revolutionise naval warfare. FORCING THE DARDANELLES NOT FEASIBLE. Admiral Cnrden, replying to a telegram asking whether it was practicable to force the Dardanelles by shipa alone, said he did not think it could be rushed, but it might be,forced by extended operations with a large number of ships. Mr. Churchill replied: "The high authorities concur in your opinion." Admiral .Carden' supposed the high authorities meant Lord Fisher and Admiral Jackson. The former did not see fire* reply, and the latter could not remember whether he was consulted. Admiral Carden suggested a methodical destruction of the Dardanelles Narrows defences and an advance into the Sea of Marmora. He estimated that it would take a month to carry out. Admiral Jackson agreed to an attack on the outer forts, but considered it was not feasible for the fleet to get through the Dardanelles alone.

THE CRITICAL STAGE. Tlie decision on February IS, 1915, to mass troops in the neighborhood of the. Dardanelles, marked the critical stage of the whole operation, the Commission considers, inasmuch as time was allimportaut. No compromise was then possiile between the making of an immediate vigorous effort to ensure success by a joint nava! and military occupation, or failing back on the original intention of desisting from a naval attack if the experiences gained during the bombardment were unsatisfactory. Lord kitchener decided oh February 20 that the 29th Division, part of tho troops which, by the decision of the 16th, wore to have been sent eastward, should not then be sent, and Colonel Fitzgerald, by Lord Kitchener's order, was instructed, as director of naval transports, that transports for that division and the rest of the expeditionary force would not b*e required. This was done without informing Mr. Churchill. I The consequent delay of three weeks in the despatch of troops gravely compromised the possibility of the 'success of the original Attack by the land forces, and materially increased the difficulties of the final attack. WHERE THE BLAME LAY. The Commissioners consider that, in view of the opinions of the naval and military authorities on the spot, the decision to abandon the naval attack ifter the bombardment' on March 18 was inevitable. They point out that there was no meeting of the War 'Council between March 19 and May 14, while important, land operations ware undertaken. They think that before such operations were commenced the War Council should certainly have reconsidered the whole pis'ition, and they are of opinion th'it the Premier ought to .have summoned a meeting of the War Council for that purpose, and, if not summoned, the other members of the War Council should have pressed for such meetings. They think this was a serious omission, and are of opinion that Lord Kitchener did not sufficiently avail himself of tho services of his Genera! Staff, with the result that he undertook more work than it was possible for one man to do, thus causing confusion and want of efficiency.

LORD FISHER'S SILENCE". The Commission are unable to conc.i:r in Lord Fisher's view that it was his di'.ty, if he differed from Mr. Churchill, to maintain silence at the Council or resign, or hoth. They think that the :>(l'i|>< ion of any such principle generally would impair the efficieiWy of the jmbli'c ■'■<.'!•>. ic-cs. THE CAIN AND THE LOSSES. I Alihonsli the main object was not at-i-'-"d, certain important political ad".■intapes were secured by the expedition, '■nr. whether those advantages were rih the loss of life and treasure in- • ilved must iwnuin si mutter of ODiiiion.

NAVAL BOARD SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED'

The Commission is convinced that had the naval members of the Board been regularly and collectively consulted on the large questions of the war policy during the present naval campaign, some, at least, of the events which the Empire is bitterly deploring would not have happened, and that until the authority and responsibility of the Sea Lord?: is enlarged and defined there will lie no adequate assurance that similar disasters will not recur.

Mr. Churchill agreed that the four Sea Lords should be fully consulted, but Admiral Prince Louis of Battcninirg and Lord Fisher did not favor this. The Commission found that Mr. Asquith was ill informed as to the way in which the Admiralty business was conducted when he told the Commission that the War Council was entitled to assume that any view submitted by the First Lord was considered as the opinion of the Admiralty Board. LORD KITCHENER'S METHODS. Regarding War Office administration, the Commission thinks it regrettable that the devolution of authority and responsibility whereon the , War Oiiice was based was ignored by Lord Kitchener. All the evidence points to the fact that "Lord Kitchener did not consult his subordinates, gave orders over file chiefs of departments, and centralised the whole administration in his own hands. When an Order-in-Couneil, at a later stage in the war, restored the power of the Chief of General Staff, Sir Reginald Brade (Secretary to the War Office) was of opinion that this was du«J to Lord Kitchener's not asking, or disregarding, the advice qf the General Staff. Lord Kitchener pushed centralisation to extremes, and though it proved eminently satisfactory in the Soudan, it was unsuitable for large scale operations, and threw work on the hands of one man with which no individual could successfully cope. Admiral Oliver thought that by the time the fleet had overcome the initial difficulties a military force would have been ready. Generally speaking, the Admiralty staff preferred a joint operation. The Commission thinks the War Council, in its action, was probably governed excessively by the fact that an entry into the Dardanelles had a profound effect on the course of the war, and had therefore neglected to consider whether it was advisable to undertake a purely naval enterprise. It is highly probable that if Lords Kitchener and Fisher had objected upon technical grounds the project would have been abandoned. Mr. Asquith stated that Lord Fisher's main objection was not based on the naval merits or demerits of the Dardanelles operation, but upon the fact that he ■preferred another objective.

LOED FISHER'S RELUCTANT. ACQUIESCENCE. The Commissran states that the evidence confirms the accuracy of, Mr. Asquith's Btatement that Lord Fisher reluctantly acquiesced in the Dardanelles operations as long as he thought they would not seriously interfere with his plans elsewhere. It may be he was convinced that the demands made on the fleet for the Dardanelles prejudiced his alternative schemes, so he resigned. Although Lord Fisher, in his evidence, said he' was dead against naval operations alone, he did not at- the time express any such decided opinions. THE FATEFUL DECISION. The actual decision arrived at by the War Council on January 13, after "hear* iug Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill, while Lord Fisher, Admiral, Wilson, and General Murray remained silent, was couched as follows: The naval expedition, in February, will take Gallipoli, with Constantinople as the objective. STRICTURES ON THE WAR COUNCIL The Commission adds that it is impossible to read all the evidence and papers without being struck with the ■atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which characterised the War Council's proceedings. It is almost inconceivable that anyone, whether military, naval, or civilian, could have imagined that Constantinople could ho captured without military help on a somewhat large scale. In the case of the Dardanelles, the reduction of the forts presented difficulties more hazardous tlian did Port Arthur or Wei-hei-Wei, while the narrow waters lent themselves to be defended by mines and torpedoes.

CHURCHILL'S OPTIMISM. Referring to Mr. Churchill's presentment of the enterprise to the War Council, the Commission, without impugning his good faith, considers it clear that, 'he was carried away by his sanguine temperament and firm belief in the undertaking. The evidence shows that he obtained exports' support to a less extent than he imagined. It is also clear that Admiral Carden greatly urder-esti-niated the Turks' opposition, and that Lord Kitchener held the opinion that once the ships were through, the position at GallipoK would cease to be important. Moreover, he and others, including Viscount Grey, confidently anticipated a revolution at Constantinople when the fleet entered the Sea of Marmora. 'DRIFTED INTO MILITARY ATTACK. Then the idea of a purely naval operation was gradually dropped, and as prestige and argument! grew we drifted into a big (military'attack. Lord Kitchener, on May 14, said lie realised that if the fleet failed tho army would he needed to help the fleet through. On February 10 he informed a meeting of Ministers that he had decided to despatch the 29th Division. Acute discussions took place at the War Council, Between the 10th and 20th Lord Kitchener's views underwent a change. Theft; was now no chance of breaking off the Dardanelles attack. A sharp difference occurred on tho twentieth between Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill, owing to the decision not to sand the 29th Division. Lord Kitchener 'lield that a naval division with Australians and New Zealanders from Egypt would be adequate. Lord Kitchener still thought the fleet would get through. General Hirdwood, on March 5, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that he was very doubtful whether the navy could force the passage mfassisted, and that in any case it would take a considerable time, the admiral's forecast being too sanguine . Then Lord Kitchener decided to despatch the 29th Division, but three weeks of valuable time had been lest.

LORD KITCHENER AT FAULT. Lord Kjtohener was mainly responsible for Ms decisions, althoueh. if he were.

alive, he might threw new light upon them. It seems strange that the actualities of the situation should not have been more fully realised by Lord Kitchener and his colleagues, i There were only two alternatives, either to face the loss of prestige by abandoning the Dardanelles, or boldly face the risU which would have been involved elsewhere by a determined effort; to force the Dardanelles by a rapid combined attack in great strength. VACILLATION AND DELAY. . Unfortunately the Government adopted neither. For three weeks the Government vacillated, and the moment for action lapsed, for the Turks had been enabled to -formidably strengthen their position. Mr Churchill was justified in attaching importance, to the delay in despatching the 2!Jth Division. Even when General Sir lan Hamilton, on the eve of his departure from London, conversed with Lord Kitchener, it was abundantly clear that the scope of opcL.tions had not fully been decided. Sir Kin Hamilton, in his evidence, dwelt strongly on the absence of information by the War Oflice stall'. No scheme was drawn up. anr no water supply arrangements were »... tie. There was also a great want of staff preparation. Lord Kitchener still clung to getting through without military aid, and Sir lan Hamilton went out with that impression. He took Lord Kitchener's telegram that the passage of the Dardanelles must be forced as a peremptory order.

COUNTING ON REVOLUTION AT CONSTANTINOPLE. i Admiral do Robeclc, in his evidence, said-he realised it was only possible for tiie fleet to stay in the Sea of Marmbr.i if a revolution broke out at Constantinople, otherwise it would have to come out again. It would have been difficult anyway for transports to follow up the straits. The Commission thought it clear that Admiral de Robeek's opinion was greatly influenced by political considerations and loss of prestige if the attack were abandoned. SIR lAN HAMILTON'S WARNING. Sir lan Hamilton, on March I!), telegraphed 'to Lord Kitchener that he was reluctantly convinced that battleships were unlikely to force a passage, and that if the army was to participate in the operations it must not assume the subsidiary form anticipated. Owing to Sir lan Hamilton's and Admiral de ».obeck's presentations, on March 23 the operations'were postponed until adequate military forces were assembled. ONE OBJECT GAINED. The, Commissioners found that though the attempt to force the Dardanelles was a failure, it, in failing, was successful in relieving the pressure on Russia, while it delayed an earlier entrv of Bulgaria into the war, and kept a large force of Turks for a long while unmobilised. SEPARATE MINUTES. Mr. Andrew Fisher attached a minute dissenting from the view the report takes., He disagrees with the view that the naval Advisers should have expressed their views to the Council, whether asked or not, if they the Council's project was impracticable navally; also with the Commission's inability to concur in Lord Fisher's view that he should maintain silence or resign. He also expresses the opinion that it would seal the fate of responsible government if State servants shared ,tho responsibility of Ministers. Sir Thomas Mackenzie, in a minute, declares it is premature for the report to express an opinion on general results, as sufficient evidence was not taken to enable a decision on the objects attained. It was necessary for a complete inquiry to he made into the subsidiary operations so as to secure a true perspective. He agrees with Mr. Fisher respecting experts giving views unasked. The report was signed by a'll the others except Mr. W. P.*Roch, M.P.

AUSTRALIA. DISSOLUTION AND ELECTIONS. Melbourne, March 8. Mr. Hughes has announced that the House of Representatives dissolves on March 26, and that nominations will close on ApriJ 5 and the polling day will be May 5. FINANCE AND TAXATION. Melbourne, March 0. Mr Poynton, during the debate on the financial statement, said the loan just floated would only carry the Government till the end of next year. The indebtedness to the Imperial Government had been understated by seven millions before he took office. Had he known lie would have raised the hist loan to 25 millions. The total increase in taxation would amount to .Clf ,299,000. Australia's war bill at the present rate would, at the end of 1918, amount to 125 millions. ABSENTEE VOTES. Received March 9, 5.5 p.m. London, March 8. Australians temporarily residing in Britain are preparing a requisition for power to vote at the elections the same as soldiers. CHINA, PREMIER IN RETIREMENT. London, March 8. The Morning Post's Pekin correspondent states that the Premier, after tendering his resignation, 'retired to the Italian concession at Tientsin, refusing to see all interveiwers.. The President is endeavoring to persuade' him to return, offering to ratify the rupture with Germany and to assent to Cabinet's further decisions. It is uncertain whether the 'Premier will accept it, and it is regarded as certain that a rupture will occur almost immediately, and that the declaration of war will follow in a few davs.