THE U BOATS.

Taranaki Daily News, 6 March 1917, Page 6

THE U BOATS.

their present progress, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS. STRATEGICAL EFFECTS. COMING NAVAI: BATTLE. (By Criticus). Shipping losses from the submarine campaign continue heavy. Owing to the incompleteness of the lists and the contradictory character of cabled assertions, it is not by any means clear what the actual rate cif tonnage losses amounts to. According to the Manchester Guardian we lost 100,000 tons during the first week of February, in addition to smacks, trawlers, and vessels sunk by mines. Another cable asserts that the sinkings for the last three days amount to 53,994 tons, compared with (10,000 tons for the previous week. Nothing can be made of such inconsistent statements. The lists cabled under date February 10 total nearly 20,011) tons; but it is by 110 means certain that the lists for that day are complete, and the sinkings fluctuate so much from day to day that it would not be safe to take the above figure as an average, even if it is substantially correct. The average of a month's sinkings will furnish the best guide as to the amount of danger we run. Present figures suggest an average of ■ about 100,000 tons per week, and if that is maintained we shall have to work hard at replacing losses. It will be well to remember that a vast proportion, and probably the greater part, of the losses is falling upon neutrals, especially the Norwegians, and that we sometimes lost nearly 80,000 tons of British shipping alone during a single week in the earlier submarine campaign. Thus, during the week ended August 20, )015, we lost 7G,627 tons, as well as fishb.g vessels; while during the week ended September 15, 1915, we lost 7f1,51S tons. Therefore it is probable that the present British average is not much greater than the losses suffered during the hottest periods of previous campaigns. The distinguishing features of the present attack are its sustained charav-w und the heavy losses of neutrals. But previous campaigns 'petered out in face of the energetic defensive measures of the Admiralty, and the present one will probably meet the same fate when the still more energetic measures now being adopted have had time to make their influence felt. Mr. Pretyman, a Vicrnber 01 the Admiralty Board, pointed out in a recent speech that a serious submarine menace at the beginning of the war wap defeated, and expressed the hope (hat nobody would think that the Admiralty had the slightest fear, or would doubt its ability to defeat the pr»:ont onslaught. And Admiral Baco;; advises the public not to worry overmuch about the submarines. The Admiral, it may be mentioned, was our foremost submarine expert when the submarines were first being developed into efficient instruments of war, and he is now in command of the Channel patrol. AN INHERENT WEAKNESS. ~ JX ° distinct notes are conspicuous in the German comments. One is that of the man in the streets, who is impressed by the imposing figures of tonnage sunk, and, having no sense of proportion and no real grasp of the military significonce of things, believes that Britain must be brought to her knees within a month or two. The other is that of the leading men and t>>e more sober of military and naval wri f :rs, who realise that the total shipping tonnage of the world is gigantic; that a fast output of new ships is largely, if not completely, replacing losses; and that a merely slow reduction in the world's shipping total will avail them little. They realise, also, thnt the Allies are developing comprehensive defensive measures, so that if they are to succeed they must succeed quickly. Hence the cautions and rather disappointed tone of their comments. Besides, there is probably a dim fear at the back of their minds that 'any day may bring forth the invention which v.'ill deprive the submarine of its one really potent weapon—its power of evasion—ani thus smash the whole campaign at a stroke. It has always been held here, ir. contradistinction of those critics who hold that the submarine must ultimately drive the big surface battleship from the ocean, that, the exact reverse result must ultimately be brought about, whatever the effects of the present campaign. The submarine is an inliLivntly weak weapon, far inferior in figiitiua value to a surface vessel, and it owes its potency entirely to its powers of evasion. Ton for ton it -mat always he much slower and weaker than a surface vessel. To practically drive it from the ocean iUis only n'.-sugary to rob it of its powers ci evasion by inventing some s.ire and jertain means of detecting its presents under water. When that is done the submarine will be doomed, because, once detected, it will be 100 slow to f,et away from the swift destroyers and too weak to fight th;*ir, successfully. A considerable amount has already been done, towards the accomplishment cf this end in the Fesseadcri oscillator and similar inventions, whiea are practically adaptations of the mi-Tophone to the purpose of detecting tie vibrations of the submarine's machinery whin submerged. Some day the various lines of research now being followed by thousands of clever inventors are hnnid to meet in the production of an invention which will destroy the powers 0; evasion now possessed by the submarine, and render its doom certain, • EFFECTS ON STRATEGY. In some ways the prffsent campaign, if not got under quickly, may affect our strategy on land. It may lead to an (jarlier offensive in the first place. Apart from the danger of being anticipated by Marshal Hindenburg, the Allies have everything to gain by waiting another couple -of months before taking the of' fensive. They are, no doubt, rapidly ' piling up guns, "tanks," and other offensive weapons, and they will he much better situated during the heat and dryness of Summer than during the mud of early spring. Dust is a discomfort, hut not a serious handicap to an offensive, and even facilitates attack by concealing the attackers, whereas mud is a terrible clog. But we may have to accept the disadvantage of attacking I the mud if the menace becomes really I dangerous. It may also affect our j strategy in the Balkans. Normally it would be the soundest policy to crush 'l Bulgaria first, after Roumania is reconquered. But Bulgaria is not an important submarine base, and it may be con l

sidercd advisable to merely keep her in play with a relatively small force in the north and General. SaiTail's forces from Salonika, jirhile the Central Powers are crushed first. When Germany falls the submarine campaign falls also. Though the above strategy is not the best, the submarine question apart, it may be followed if our strength renders it possible and the submarines render it necessarv. THE COMING NAVAL BATTLE. From Washington there came on Saturday a report that oflicials in close touch with the British Embassy believe that there is no question that the German fleet will shortly come out and tight. If the British officials really believe that, it is probably because they also believe that Germany's position is desperate, either in the matter of food or in a military way. There need be no mystery about the time when th 3 German fleet will fight. It will only be when a naval battle is clearly Germany's only hope. At present site controls the Baltic through her fleet, and that control is far too valuable to be lightly thrown away. There will be 110 battle until the submarine campaign has been proved a failure. But if it does fail, and Germany is threatened with starvation, or her lines are broken in east or west, then there will come a cry from the German public for their '•'victorious" licet to go out and repeat its virtorics and save German?. Then the unlucky German naval men may have to steel their nerves and steam cut (0 destruction. In the meantime the apparent ta <rness of the German fleet is very puzzling, for by greater activity it could render invaluable aid to the submariros. We depend mainly on and other light craft for fighting them, and a vigorous policy of raids by the German light squadrons, backed up by threats rf action by the main fleet, would probably compel us to mass more light vessels in order to guard the North Sea. The South Atlantic raider shr.vs what may be done in that line. There are probably scores of cruisers searching for her yet there comes 110 definite news of her destruction—nothing but untrustworthy rumors. There is a report, by the way, that a British cruiser has put into Pe'rnambuco, on the South American Atlantic coast, after a fight with a submarine; but it is doubted if the U boats are wandering so far afield.