NAVAL STRATEGY.

Taranaki Daily News, 11 January 1917, Page 7

NAVAL STRATEGY.

heavy nKS'i'oxsrmrj'nKS of THE KLEIiT. Trillion, November !). Tin; exploit of n number of Herman destroyers hi making a ,las'!i into the Channel from their base at Zeebrngge and running amok among-t oui small auxiliary craft was not a very hnportanl incident in itself, but it" lias had the effect of rousing the latent unrest that existed in regard to our naval administration. Much of this unrest is duo to the ignorance of the conditions by which our naval policy is controlled. People who fail to appreciate tin extent to which submarines and mines have revolutionised naval warfare imagined before this war started that if wc ever came to grips with the German Navy one of two things would happen. Tile illusion was a perfectly natural one, and there is an old saying in the service that when there are two things that an enemy can do "ne alwavs elects to do the third! English people, suchled in the traditions of the Nelson school, were particularly prone to form a false judgment of what was likely to happen on the seas in the event of i declaration of war between Britain and (Jetmany . It was assumed that either the Herman licet would come out and he battered to pieces by our warships, ->■• else, if it funked a fight, that we should draw a cordon of our ships round all the enemy's harbors and effectually prevent either any merchantmen from going in ov any war vessels from coming out. It was a rather pleasing prospect, but it ignored other possibilities of wlilch it was open to the enemy to take advantage. There was, in the first place, the possibility, of which Germany only took advantage, that the enemy might dispose her fast cruisers along the trade routes of the world with the intention of sinking all the tonnage which came in their way, in the hope, if possible, of starving our island nation into submission. What would have happened if Germany had adopted this course on a comprehensive scale is now merely

a matter of academic inlcrest. She elected instead to keep her Grand Fleet intact and in being, depending primarily on her submarines for offensive action against our mercantile marine. A DOUBLE TASK, This policy of the enemy cast upon our own Admiralty i double task involving to some extent a division and dispersion of our available naval 'iieuglli. In the lirst instance, it wis essential that? we should protect and maintain our sea-borne commerce and our sea communications. In the second place, it was requisite that we should always have in readiness a composite naval force which should contain, and if possible bring to action, the enemy's main fleet. This is the force" which is under the supreme direction of Admiral Jellicoe and which is commonly known a 3 our Grand Fleet. If this fleet lould have blockaded the enemy's harbors after the <mannei of Nelson's time or could have pounded the enemy's coast defences and forced the German Navy to come out, the secondary purpose of the Navy, that of defending our commerce and sea communications, would have been greatly simplified. But coast defences are now so powerful that no admiral in his senses or who was not literally crazy would dream nowadays of attempting such an enterprise. We contain the enemy's Grand T< leot, but are forced by circumstances to contain it from a distance. It follows from this that the enemy is sometime* able, by taking advantage of dark and fogay nights, to make sudden raids from his "mine-strewn home waters which mako some querulous people wonder whether our naval supremacy is L'ally supreme and unquestionable as the reports assure as it is. The enemy's operations which resulted in the battle of Jutland belong to a different category. The only means by which the enemy can hope to strike a blow it our admitted control of the sea is by what is known as the process of attrition. What is being effected in this direction by submarine warfare has fallen far below Germany's expectations. In the Jutland battle therefore, we witnessed a great attempt by the enemy—an attempt wh'ch may be renewed—to use their Grand Fleet as a bait to diaw our own main fleet on to the German minefields and massed submarines. The attempt failed, and the rick which the enemy took to achieve their object allords the very best proof of the soundness of our naval strategy in the war. It may be admitted at once, and with the utmost frankness; that the activities of the enemy submarines against our seaborne supplies nave been much more successful than .those same activities directed against our warships; and because these activities have now entered upon a new phase they leserve ind ought to receive our anxious consideration. So Ion? as they attempted to operate in what may be called our home waters, the German submarines were in course o* being destroyed with a systematic, precision which "must-have struck a dull chill in the heart of every submarine commander 'who set, out from the Bight of Heligoland to prev on our merchant shipping. ■ his has resulted in a change of policy wlnehj could not have been foreseen unless we Had recognised that Germany in her extremity would be prepared to enact the role of the anarchist. Her submarine attacks on our own merchant shipping holdin- out no prospect of starving us into surrender, Germany has now turned her attention to the shipping of inoffensive neutral Powers. * . Thus a new and difficult >iphlem is opened up. Every neutral ship that is sunk reduces the available tonnage ol the world. With a great proportion of our own tonnage commandeered for naval mid military purposes our dependence on neutral shipping is greaiei now than it has ever been before. It follows, therefore that every neutral ship that is sunkstrikes us indirectly almost as severely as though a British vessel had been scut to the bottom. Norway is particularly helpless in the face of the attacks to which her merchant .service is being subieeted Experience has shown that the verv best protection of all against submarine attack lies in the arming of merchant vessels. Norwegian merchants do not of course, carry any guns, and their skippers would perhaps hesitate to use them ever if they did. A neutral is thus really on a more disadvantageous position 'than a belligerent, and the hope of the German Admiralty doubtlessly is that in tin- end Norway •uid other maritime nations will be intimidated to such an .•\-tent that thev will suspend commercial ■ehitions with Great Britain for the i)erml of the war. The menace is without •r<;ion n serious one, and at the mo- ;; the best method of combating it .»•: (» lie in the direction of speeding -. !he coiistriiei.iim of merchant vessels ■r own dock- to the utmost extent : J, compatible with the indispensable .-.'•.i-.ent? of the naval -'■"• building