THE YEAR 1916.

Taranaki Daily News, 5 January 1917, Page 6

THE YEAR 1916.

STRATEGICAL REVIEW. UPS AND DOWN 3. MISTAKES OX BOTH SIDES. NET RESULT GOOD. (By "Criticus." in Dunedin Star) 1 lie close of the year offers a suitable opportunity for a brief strategical review of the past 12 mouths. Only the broadest outline of events, of course, can be touched upon The end of 1015 saw the overrunning of Serbia by the Central Powers and Bulgaria. Things looked very gloomy for the Allies, and to superficial observers it appeared as if the fate of Serbia had been a disastrous blow to them. In reality, tlio turning aside of the Central Powers from the upon Russia in order to pursue a minor issue in the Balkans was the salvation of the Allies. It gave Russia time to recover, and she made good use ot it. Strenuous efforts wore made to overcome the deficiency of ammunition and guns, and in the spring, instead of fighting a continuous series of rearguard actions, she was able to delivei a mighty "blow, in the very nick of time, in Galicia. In the meantime, the German High Command under the direction of Marshal Von Falkenhayn, a great organiser, though an inferior strategist, made strenuous efforts during the winter in developing Germany's resources. By spring the enemy were in a position to hold their own on all fronts, and had a large striking force available in addition, which they could make use of. owing to their possession of the inner line, to deliver a blow at any of the Allies; while

the Allies themselves, though their position on the whole had enormously improved, were still very backward in the development of their resources ft-s compared with the Central Powers VERDUN It required a great strategist to use that striking force wisely. But the abandonment of the ehance to cripple

Russia in order to overrun little Serbia had led in the inference that Von Falkenhayn's insight into grand strateftj was dubious, to say the least. This inference soon received striking confirmation. He proceeded to mass the great-

est artillery combination ever seen and the whole of Germany's available striking forces against the fortress of Verdun—about the strongest point both by nature and by art on the western line, and the point where he had the smallest possible ehance of success and the smallest measure of advantage in the event of success. He was attempting to beat in the French line at 4

point where every step of progress could | only have made that line bhorter and stronger. Critics have cudgelled their brains in vain ever since in order to find some shadow of justification for this move, but- without the slightest success. Nevertheless, it was persisted in for over four months, from February to July, at a tremendous cost ol life, with no •result, to show save the capture of a few square miles of ground and a limited number of prisoners and guns. Had the enemy captured Verdun itself they would have gained nothing beyond a very transient moral advantage. In the meantime, the Allies were making use of the precious months of respite this accorded them to complete their organisation.

THE TREXTIXO. While the Germans were engaged in a venture which was absolutely criminalin its stupidity, tlrtir allies, the Anstrians, decided to engage in a little gamble of their own. The main Italian offensive for the summer was to be delivered on the Isonzo front, and the Austrians determined to spoil it and \jpset all the Italian plans by taking the initiative and striking from the Trentino at their communications in the endeavor to cut them off in the Venetian salient. This was far more excusable strategy than the German attack upon Verdun. In the last analysis it was an error, but it was a first-rate plan if considered only as local strategy. As was pointed out here at the time, it was excellent strategy if considered only as an argument between Austria and Italy, but it involved the weakening of the eastern front, and thus exposed the Anstrians to a sudden blow from the Russians in fialicia Apparently. however, the Austrians did not see that. They proceeded with their plan and struck their blow. The Italians were taken by surprise and caught with their Wain concentration on the opposite, side\of the Venetian salient. The Austrians' captured position after position, with numbers of prisoners and guns, and for a time "all went merry as a marriage bell" for them. But then came the Nemesis which always follows a blunder in grand Strategy. GALICIA.

While they had weakened their front in Galicia in order to provide the men for their Trentino gamble, the Russians f were massing their main body ot men and guns for a blow in that very quart- ' er. The Rovno-Lembcrg line had long ; been foreshadowed here as the true dir- 1 ection for the chief Russian stroke, and ' upon that centre—just as the triumphant Austrians in the Trentino were nearing the Venetian Plain —the chief blow ■ fell. The Austrians paid a bitter price for their strategical error. While they had captured their thousands in the Trentino. the Russians captured their ■ tens rf thousands in Galicia. A gieat ; breach was made in the Austrian lines on the Rovno front, and lesser breaches were made 011 the Strypa and on the Bukpwina front. All told, the Russians captured over 400,000 prisoners in their great drive, with many huntlreds of guns and still greater numbers of machine guns. A great part of Galicia was overrun. and on the Bukowina front General Letchitsky. who had started under the great strategical and tactical disadvantage of having to operate against a very short front which could not be turned, broke through the eueniy, overran the whole of Bukowina. extended the length of the front again-,!, vhich he could operate to several hundred miles, and won preicless strategical advantages and opportunities. The imnrcssion upon Roumania was profound, arid this made itself apparent later But one of its effects, al*e, was the appointment of Hir.denlnirg to the supreme command 'over whole eastern front, ard after that the Kusitan advance graduslly;Bl# e " -01P- \ r:,- -v.. Mea,ih;li''' '!< be?r. hard at'wo|\M'-; , : 't ■, : army and developir.t ail k; < * Pre - "!' also, had 'beef. Ji'Ji'v ...'" * ;ui VTowards the' fe?' -''V ■; •;* J I ... A „ i Jte

by the British artillery and the initiation of raids along the whole front announced to the world that big things were about to happen. But where the blow would fall and whether it was to be our real big "effort were still matters of conjecture, for no one knew what :>tage of development the British preparations had reached. On the first day of July the Anglo-French began a grand combined offensive on the Somme. The first comment made in these notes upon that offensive was that it was not om main attack, because it wiu wrongly directed for that; and that if it was our main attack it was almost as bad a strategical blunder as the German attack upon Verdun, is no need to argue the point now It has since been officially stated more than once that the attack was not expected to break the German line, but to assist our Allies generally, and, in part'<"iiar, to 'ease the pressure upon Verdun. For the Germans, as if determined to carry obstinacy and stupidity to their last term, still persisted in the attack upon the fortress, even while their allies were being routed in Galieia. Both the objects of the Somme offensive were gained. The Germans were compelled to send huge forces of men and guns to the Somme, and the attack upon Verdun collapsed; while since then the French have recaptured all the lost Verdun forts and restored the main defensive belt, so the enemy have practically nothing to show for theii ill-omened venture. Little move need to be said about the Somme offensive, as the number of square miles regained and the number of prisoners and guns captured have little strategical importance. ROUMANIA.

, Up to the entry of Roumania in the wai things were going extremely well for tlie Allies. A series of strategical blunders or the part of the Central Powers and the steady development of our own superior potential resources had given us the upper hand and the initiative. Everywhere the enemy were pn the defensive, and the Allies had ihe advantage. Doubtless these were the facts which determined Roumania to act at last, and with her entry at the end of August it seemed as if the doom of Bulgaria and Turkey and then of the Central Powers was sealed. Roumania was a wedge between the Contrl Powers and the Balkans, and she brought us the assistance of nearly a million men and 1500 gun? against a hard-pressed enemy. All the allied General Staffs were full of confidence. So was the writer. So was everyone else except the enemy, and that little body of people On our own side who arc always troubled with a sinking senstion in the regioif of

the stomach, which, on the rare occasions on which it turns out to be justified. they mistake for foresight. What was there, to he anxious about? Russia had a unique opportunity, which only required to be properly handled to ensure success. That it would be properly handled her strategical record during the past few months seemed to adequately guarantee. And the Russo-Roumanians had had two years in which to study the position and prepare. How it should be handled seemed obvious enough, anil was many times sketched out by the writer and illustrated with maps. Having prepared her eommunictions with Roumania before that country came in. Russia should have transferred the bulk of her forces to the Roumanian front.

liave struck across Transylvania from Moldavia with her left flank, and beliini' the shield thus formed have attacked Bulgaria in conjunction with the bull, of the Roumanian army. Transylvania could have been seized while it was undefended, and had this been done Rou-

mania would have been covered by the Russian left flank, and the enemy's advance upon Brasso would have been impossible. But none of those things wort done. Communications with Roumania were not improved, and utterly inadequate forces were sent to that country. Worse than that, instead of shifting the main weight of her forces to the Roumanian

fronts "Russia persisted in the endeavor to deliver her' main offensive along the Rovno-Lemberg line. This blindness continued for nearly two months after Roumania had declared war. Jn the meantime, Hindenbug had. succeeded Falkenhayn at the head of the Ger-

man armies, and at once proceeded to show himself a great strategist by send-

ing his ablest "lieutenants—Mackennen and Falkenhayn—and every available

man and gnn to the true point of decision—the Roumanian front. Having completed his preparations, hr began to teach the Russians the elements of strategy. Falkenhayn's advance upon Brasso revealed both to the Russians and to the world at large what they should have done but had omitted to do. They had then to set to work to reshuffle the whole of their forces at the. very crisis of the operations. Napoleon said "Ask me for anything in war except time," and he used to work all night in times of stress in order to economise hours. But the Russians wasted months, and their attempt to recover the lost ground at the eleventh hour proved to be too late. There is no need to recapitulate

the consequences, with which we are all but too familicr. Let it suffice to say that the greatest opportunity of the war has been thrown away, and that we have got to start over aeain rtratogicallv. Yet, in spite of all, such has been the development of the strength of the Allies during the past 12 months that the end of the year finds our posiinu stronger than ever, and the cnenij desperately anxious for peace.