THE BALKAN SITUATION.

Taranaki Daily News, 4 January 1917, Page 7

THE BALKAN SITUATION.

Writing in the Sydney Telegraph Colonel J. S. Lyster says:—lt looks black, I confess, but taking into consideration the general position of tlie Allies' forces in eacli of the five theatres of war, what more could have been done in the time to prevent Austro-Gernian, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops with railways at their disposal, from subduing Roumania? The Roumanian armies are not destroyed, wliich makes the position serious for the enemies, and forces them to hold additional territory when they are short of men. The answer is simple: The AUKt have been unable to organise armies sufficientb strong to act independently and seize and hold the railway between Belgrade and Constantinople, and hold Gallipoli until the Russian armies were ready to subdue Constantinople. If reinforcements could have been despatched to Sir lan Hamilton when 50,000 were required, there is little doubt, even according to the statement, of the Tuvks, that Gallipoli would have been in our possession to-day. It was the key of the situation, and of immense impoitonce to the Russian Caucasus Army, acting as it is to secure the relief, of (ho British Mcsopotamian Army, prior to an advance on Constantinople. With Gallipoli in our possession, the LYrkish armies could not haVe concentratr.l and could not render mutual assistance if a situation demanded it. The main Turkish army was forced to jjipo-e the advance of the Grand Duke's Russian Army in Asia Minor. Another Turkish army was held in Mesopotamia. The Damascus army was compelled to watch and oppose, if possible, the movements of the British Army in Egypt, and, lastly, an army of '200,000 Turks was holding Cfiilinoii with reserves in Constantinople. Wlmt an opportunity ;ost! Th« withdrawal from Gallipoli lias set free a Turkish ermv to assist the Austrj•Germans in Galicia, and to help both Germans and Bulgarians in Roumania. A distinct disadvantage to the Allies, which will not be removed until Die Russian armies are ready to subdue Constantinople, and we may well li'sk when will that be Our hope must be placed in the Salonika army. Until it overcomes the difficulties which surround it we cannot. look for any great success until next summer or autumn, but in the meantime the. hideous lmtehery in Roumania will continue, and by the time General Sarrail reaches the field of action, and is prepared to deliver a decisive blow for the possession of the BelgradeConstantinople railway, his opponents will probably have exhausted a good deal of their power, and will realise Hint every German and Austrian is required . to carry the smashing blows by superior forces in Flanders and Galicia. In addition, too, it may be that all eyes will be turned in the direction of Asia Minor, and will feed with relief on the operaof the Russian armies as they approach the Perimeter of Constantinople. The question is universally asked why the Salonika army has been unable to advance sooner and save the situation. The answer is that it was not powerful enough to act independently, and even if i't were, the question of being superior to the enemies at the point of contact involves the organisation of immense animal transport and the construction of roads in a mountainous country. The questions we ought to ask ourselves are more than one. (a) Why did we shut our eyes when experts warned ns that Iwe were in danger? (b) Now that we are in a tight place, why don't we send every available man to make a victory a certainty? (c) If it understood that if the war'drags 011 for years'we are accepting deprivation and self-imposed punishment? , (d) ' Who is respbnsible that sufficient reinforcements could not be.sent to Gallipoli and Salonika? Ana-: wer: The responsibility lies \yith ttye l?, p P le ' „ ■ .