RUSSIA'S EFFORT,

Taranaki Daily News, 16 November 1916, Page 10

RUSSIA'S EFFORT,

RECOVERY AFTER DISASTER, IMMENSE IXDUSTEIAL EFFOKT,

A brief official survey of the second year of campaigning, issued by th? Russian War Ministry, affords Colonel Repington a text on which to hang a very emphatic tribute to the spirit of the Russian army and people. The military correspondent of The Times regards the recovery after the disasters of last year as being almost without parallel in history, and incidentally he indicates his own belief that if the Germans had gone ahead- with their great offensive in the east they might have reached even to Petrogrsid. The Russians naturally have not taken the world into their confidence as to the conditions of their armies last autumn after the great retreat from Poland, but it is stated, and the story is generally accepted as correct. that the troops entrusted with the defence of the Dvina line included a very large proportion of raw levies, that there was a dreadful deficiency of artillery, and that even the infantry was inadequately armed and equipped. In these circumstances the failure of the Germans to push on is the more inexplicable; and in the circumstances, also, one must more emphatically than ever express admiration of tho magnificent qualities of the Russian infantry. ''We do not yet know why the German Command did not attempt tc complete its work during the winter, and to occupy the capital," Colonel Repington writes. "The extenuation of the German troops after the long pursuit, the want of good billets except in a few large towns, and the necessity for repairing the roads and railways and for bringing up food, ammunition, warm clothing, and materials for liuta inay have influenced the decision. The personal acquaintance of the German leaders with the immense distances and the terror inspjred by these wasted solitudes may havs affected nerves. We cannot say what the preponderating cause was of the determination to halt and stand on a fortuitous line. 700 miles in length, resting on no natural obstacles, arid to transfer weight to the west. But it was certainly not want of troops, as the Verdun operations soon showed, and, with the Russians, we must piously attribute the decision to a higher power which prevented the German Command from accomplishing its ends."

"When the German decision to transfer the offensive to the west became definitely known t9 us we knew also that- Germany had lost the war," runs the correspondent's comment. "We closed the book of doubt. We were sure that she could not beat us in tho west, and we were confident that the time necessarily given to the Russians to recuperate would be used, to the fullest advantage. But the losses of Russia, we also knew, had been very great. The Germans had claimed that they had captured 1,000,000 Russian soldiers and had taken some 3000 guns between May and September, 1915, and, whatever truth there may have been in this claim, we knew that the Russian losses in battla had been very severe indeed, and that many rifles are necessarily lost in retreats. We heard of Russian army corps greatly depleted in men, while with tilt captured Russian fortresses fttn had beet, taken an immense number of heavy guns not easily or soon to bo replaced. But we also knew—and this was our greatest consolation —that the determination of the CZar to continue the war was firmer than ever, and that the spirit of the Russian troops and the Russian people Remained unconquerable. We knew this, and wc reckoned upon the inevitable consequences." Colonel Eepingten declares that the history of the great retreat will be one of the most fascinating chapters in the history of war, and only next in interest, will be the account of the Russian effort which in the short space of eight months enabled the Russian armies not only to make defence secure, but to sweep over the Austrian armies in Galicia and overwhelm them. Tho story of the restoration of field strengths, the training of recruits, and the collection and construction of war material of ai! kinds, will be told of some da)', and the account of this great recovery will be very honorable to Russia, and will re main for ever inseparably connected with tilt reconquest of the liberties of Europe. "It is the rarest tiling in the world," lie says, "that an army so lieav ily smitten should be able to face the music of war again in the same campaign. Russia became a hive of warlike industry as England had already become, and in every allied and neutral country -there were turned out in profusion guns, rifles, ammunition, clothing, and equipment 5 ; for the new Russian armies. Germany, by transferring her energies—uselessly, as it turned out—to the west, allowed Russia her necessary breathing space, and it must have been gall and wormwood to the German soldiers in the Eastern theatre to see the fruits of their great labors thus thrown away." Discussing the future prospects, the correspondent of The Times says that the problem for Russia in the east, as fot Britain in the west, is mainly one of guns and shells. It was want of gun-, that prevented the Russians from opening an offensive along their whole front in June, and the same cause operated to limit the front on which the British were able to open and maintain a successful offensive. "We did not possess the heavy guns," he writes, "and Russia had lost many of hers, while Germany had not only an immense accumulation of her own but also the guns which she had captured—for example. 1290 at- Novo Gcorgievsk and 827 at Kovno. We had a great leeway to make up, and though, in a country like Russia, men are to be found' easily enough, it is different with rifles and guns and shells, and an army of men is of small service without all three. Genera, Kuropatkin, lately in command of the Northern Armies, in an interview published by I.e Temps, says that Russia

still has need of projectiles and heavy 1 guns, ami that each . cargo of shells which England and France send over tile sea saves the lives of thousands of brave Russian peasants. His further remark that it is necessary for the Allies to combine thfi two elements—men and guns—better than they have done hitherto is a word in season, and deserves our careful consideration. on the completion of our own orders,' we turn over to Russian use' our plant for the manufacture of heavy guns and shells, except such plant as we require for the current needs of our own armies, we can enable Russia next year and the year after to deploy such considerable and efficient armies that they will dominate the whole situation. But we can only do so if we limit the expansion of on" own armies, and these alternatives suggest a number of considerations which must weigh with anyone who allows himself to dwell upon them. Air that is necessary to say is that the combination sought by Knropatkin should not be boyond settlement by statesmanship." Both official and unofficial reports say that the Russians are now fully equipped with field guns, And that the supplies of shell for the smaller artillery are adequate. Whether this statement holds good in view of the fact that Rumania must be supplied to a great extent through Russia one can scarcely say. Both Russia and Roumania, lion--eycr, are certainly short of heavy guns, and it is a question whether their requirements will be met from Britain as speedily as was hoped. The anticipation in the west, presumably based in official statements, was that Britain's ou\ needs would be met by the autumn, and that then a surplus of production of bot)i guns and shelis would be available for th,> Allies and especially for Russia. Since that anticipation was published however, the Macedonian situation has changed, and it is possible that a veri? substantial increase in the artillery strength of the forces under Sarrail'command will he undertaken before the full shipments begin to reach Russin. This is pure surmise, of course, mentioned here only because these unexpected factors have always to be taken into consideration when one is discussing the probable course of events. There is ample consolation and compensation for any interference with the Allied plans in this respect in the known fact that the Central Powers are finding it difficult to maintain the supply of guns and shells. Numerous orders found during the. advance on the Sonnne make tiih point clear, the latest to be published , being a sharp official warning to the O'ennan gunners that economy of shells is imperatively necessary.—Lvttelton Times.