BRITAIN'S STRENGTH.

Taranaki Daily News, 19 August 1916, Page 9

BRITAIN'S STRENGTH.

HOW WILL IT BE USED? (B\ Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Grace, in Auckland Herald). The German Chancellor's most recently reported speech prepares the German people for the retirement of ITiridenburgs armies from their advanced line, which stretches from the Dwina to the Pripet marshes. Without saying it iu so many words, lie admits the fact, apparent to the world at large, that thd Teutons cannot hold their extended bat-tle-fronts with the number of troops at their disposal, especially if the Powers of the Great Alliance' exert the full force which they have at their command. Dr. Von Bethmann-Hollweg's actual words are not given us. but lie is reported to have "hinted that it might be increasingly difficult to maintain, the present line .... especially if Britain threw in the whole weight, of her armies."

But recently one of France's leading statesmen hag told us that Britain has in France at the present time two huge armies, which, when they are reinforced to the full extent possible to the British leaders, will form in the aggregate the greatest military force in tlie west. One of these armies, we know, is lighting under Sir Douglas Ilaig. Where is the other? Doubtless it is in reserve, at what point is not of any great consequence. At the beginning of the war the French armies totalled four million troops. It it probable that in addition two million troops have been added to those armies. France has lost enormously, and it is probable that today she lias not so many as four million troops with the colors. However that may be, Britain is able to do more than .make good her gallant Ally's losses and, there is nothing to prevent the French and British from concentrating against the German armies, which totai seven or eight million troops. The question arises: What would be the best way in which to employ such huge aggregations of force?

WAITING .FOR THE GREAT BLO\V. The four-liundred-niile battle-front, stretching from Switzerland to the sea, is held possibly by about three million troops—that is 011 the basis of four men to every yard of frontage. The rest of the Allied armies are in reserve, some at strategical points from which tiey can be moved with facility to the support of the battle-line, others in general reserve. It therefore becomes evident that it is possible for the Allies to i use their enormous surplus power iu

great aggressive movements at such point or points of the enemy's fronts as may be determine'd. That enemy has at last reduced himself to sneh a state of depletion that he no longer has at command armies of reserve with which to maintain the offen>ive; graduallv his defensive line in tile west is growing so thin, that it becomes possible for it to he brokon, in the .-amo manner as it is being broken in the east; Mori- very lo"n may expect to see General -lollVe strike such a blow at the. invaders of his country as shall hurl them back from those regions of Northern! France arid Belgium which they have so ruthlessly despoiled. The growing strength of the Allies ot' the west and the Teutons' acknowledged helplessness to maintain the requisite armies in the field, warrant this statement. The only questions which seem in doubt are: When the great blow will be struck, from ■whence will it be struck, and at what point or points of the German line it will be struck?

MAIN AGCRESSIVK XOT VF.T BEGUX. Sir Douglas Tlaig's army is undoubtedly attacking with a fury which is not only comparable witli the Germans' assault ou Verdun, but with a success which did not accompany the stupendous ainl prodigal efforts of the German Crown Prince. But though the success of Sir Douglas Haig's offensive is undoubted, and though it may result in a decided modification of the German line of resistance in Northern France, it would seem that it is not intended to be the main aggressive movement of the Allied armies acting under the command of General .Toffre. Such an aggressive may be made for the purpose of holding the enemy, to the assaulted front and of causing him to concentrate' on that front vast reinforcements and war supplies; and it would seem that, if by such operations the Teutons were induced to concentrate the bulk of their stiength against Sir Douglas llaig's line, in order to prevent the recovery of Belgium, then the vast surplus reserve armies of the Allies might strike a decisive blow elsewhere at the weakened German battle-front, .lust prior to the German assault on Verdun the French had concentrated at Bar-de-Duc an army with which some such attempt was probably to have been made. As things fell out, that army was employed for the defence of the Frencli line at Verdun, not for offence. lint the smindlicss of the strategy contemplated by General Joffro remains to-day, and it is quite possible that the plan of attack, though frustrated for a time, may he carried out iu its entirety at a later date. i

ALLIES' AGGRESSIVE FORCE. It would appear possible that in the west the Allies can concentrate, after providing for the maintenance of their entire battle-front, a striking force of something like three million troops. There seems to be nothing to prevent them from suddenly hurling at the German line, at selected points, as many as -10 army corps, in addition to the vast armies of French and British already attacking the Germans along the whole length of their line: and this great operation could be carried out without interfering iu any way with the local reserve armies which arc stationed behind the battle-front, and without, reducing the general reserve, armies in France below the figure of one million troops. It would seem excellent strategy to draw the largest possible number of German troops to the British front in Northern France and then to hurl these forty reserve army corps at the German line in Lorraine, or at some other section of the line

, FINAL RESULT ASSURED. Tlie unexpected, however, often happens iu war, and it may be that the British offensive in I'icardy and Artois may result in such disorganisation of the Germans in those parts as may lead to the disruption of their battle-line which is imposed between the Allied armies and Belgium. ]n such a case it might, of course, happen that the opportunity would be and that the great blow would be struck in the northern section of the battle-front. It does not matter where success comes, so long as it comes. But these observations are made for the purpose of preventing 1 any apparent failure of Sir Douglas Ilaig to obtaiij decisive results being interpreted by the public as a. miscarriage of the general aggressive operations of the Allies in the west.

One thing is certain. The German Chancellor may be quite certain that Britain will throw the whole weight of her armies against his accursed nation. Where that weight will be used, how and at what time, are questions which cannot be answered. With certainty it may be said that it will be used by the sworn enemies of Germany in a way best calculated to break her armies, at a time when they will be powerless to recover from the defeat which will be the result of the terrific blow which will be delivered