THE IRISH REVOLT.

Taranaki Daily News, 15 July 1916, Page 3

THE IRISH REVOLT.

REMARKABLE I!EVELATH>NS. EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION'. London, May 22. The Royal Commission, consisting of Lord Hiirdinge (chairman), Air. Justice Shearman and Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, lute f T iider-Secretary of the Home Department, set up by the Government ''to inquire into the causes of the recent outbreak of rebellion in Ireland and into the conduct and responsibility of the civil and military authorities," commenced its labors last Thursday in London. The first, and possibly the most important witness was Sir Matthew Nathan, late Under-Secretary for Ireland, who resigned his office along with his chief, Mr. Birrell. He unfolded a long story, in which he dealt seriatim with the earlv history of the Sinn Fein movement, rue ate?)? taken by the Trish Covernn- nt before the outbreak of the 'nsnrrcction last Laster, tlfe '"warnings" vviiicii preceded it and the actual incidents of the rebellion itself, winding up with some "general observations." From Sir Matthew's statements it is quite clear that the Irish Government, knew all along what was going on. It was aware of the importation of arms, of the drilling and exorcising of armed men, of the menace to the peace of Ireland involved; but it hoped that nothing would come of the conspiracy, and that the trouble would "blow over."

A POLICY OF WAIT AND HOPE. This "wait and hope" policy was, it appears, the result, of political influence. Sir Matthew Xathan frankly owned tint '■prominent .Nationalists were strongly against the general suppression of newspapers"—journals which openly advocated sedition—and the Irish Government acquiesced in this view. He himself had regular communications with Mr. John Redmond, Mr. John Dillon and Mr. Joseph Devlin. "I saw most of Mr. Dillon," he said, "and all the conversations were reported bv me to the Chief Secretary (Mr. Birrell)."

"Was it the habit of Mr. Birrell," Mr. Justice Shearman asked, "to consult the leader of the Nationalist party?" "I think it is for Mr. Rirrcll to an swer that question," was the reply; "I can only speak for myself." Sir Matthew believed, however, that the lenders of the Nationalist Party were regularly in eommunipation with thp Chief Secretary. Mr. Birrell was most ly in London, and the last occasion prior to the rebellion on which he visited Dublin was in the month of February. The Nationalists did not 1 lieve.fliat the threats of rebellion by the Sinn Feiners would come to anything, and they deprecated any action in the shape of an active inter .enep with the movement which might precipitate a most regrettable conflict Suppression of the Irish Volunteers. . . . were the mainstay of the Sinn 1' n- conspiracy, would have meant as a ' igical' sequence the supprcssii a alsi of the National Volunteers. aid it i*'as represented that this would !'"u to the alienation of the sympi'le -i Nationalists, who had raised S" POi Roman Catholics and Nationally r U, rs to fight with the Britis" Army ag list the Germans.

M/tNI vAW WARNINGS. Sir Matt!. - Nathan admitted thai Dublin Castle was warned from many quarters of tin langerous state of thing; existing in tlir 'nimtry. But it took 110 active step til Easter .Sunday—the day before the rel lion broke out. It was then known tit a German ship laden with arms had 1 ecu captured, and had been sunk, and that Sir Roger Casement and two other men had been landed from a German subma' : tie. '"This," said Sir Matthew, "seemed to establish a direct connection between the German enemy and the Irish rebels." Accordingly a decision was arrived at as the result of a conference on Easter Sunday. This was that the Sinn Fein leaders should be arrested under the Defence of the Realm Act. and deported to an internment camp in luigland. The Chief Secretary was telegraphed to in London for his approval. It came on Monday morning, but before it could he acted upon the insurrection broke out, and the rebel leaders who were to have been arrested and quietly deported had seized and held by lorce of arms the General Post Office and other public and private buildings in Dublin.

1)0-AS-YOU-LIKE LAND, Among the facts disclosed by Sir Matthew Xathan was that on August 5, INI4, the restriction on the import of arms and ammunition into Ireland was removed—this order was rescinded three month later—that no Irishman carrying arms was asked to pay license duty" that drilling of armed men was permitted to continue openly and continuously; that "camps of exercise" were held under the very noses of the police, and that one of the "movements" practised without let or hindrance was a sham attack i n Dublin Castle.

Mr. Justice .Shearman put some pertinent questions arising out of these admissions "Why," lie inquired, "was not the license to carry arms enforced in Ireland as it was in England?" "1 suppose,"' replied Sir Matthew, "that a 0 everybody who cared to was carrying arms in Ireland it was considered a trifling thing to attempt to enforce tho law as to licensing." "In I'.ngland.' said the Judge, "there is a law against drilling by armed men unless they belong to the forces of the Crown or have received a permit from the authorities. Is there no such law in Ireland."

"Well," said Sir Matthew, "I do not know if it applies to Ireland; but if it (locs it Ims not been enforced." The .Judge expressed astonishment, and asked ttie ex-Under-Seeretary whether he di;l not think !he sham fight representing an attack 011 Dublin Castle was "coming rather near home/' "Surely," he exclaimed, "Ihese men were drilling for the purpose of rebellion." Sir Matthew agreed that this was in the nature of an alarming symptom, and said it was reported to Mr. Birrell, who was fully aware of what was going on. The sham battle took place so long ago as October fi, 1015, but while the C'liief Secretary was aware of it Sir Matthew did not know that any special efforts were made to deal with the situation or to provide for the special protection of the Castle. "Did it not strike you as an extraordinary thing," inquired Lord Hardin,ge, "that this should be going on?" "Wc had been accustomed for some time," was the reply, "and we did not think that this mimic warfare presaged a real attack. It had been decided that unless then; was loss of life we should not interfere." "You hoped," commented Mr. Justice Shearman, "that the trouble would blow over, and you feared alienation of sympathy on the part of vile v -.on ).cc~!e if you took drastic action aga.nst the conspirators." Incidentally Sir Matthew Nathan stated that thera were known to be fully J GtOOQ ''disloyal volunteers"—in other

words, Sinn Fciners ripe, ov ripening for revolution in ibis bind of Do As Von Like. XON-IXTFJiYF.XTf' IX A DICLITHCIUTE I'OI.K V. The next wiltirss <■ x;imined wag the ex-Chief Sc'-rrl i'y for Ireland, Mr. Augustine liiiTcll. The examination of Sir Matthew Nathan hail taken a full day, and produced ncl a few drama- 1 revelations. Mr. IJirrell, wlni had le Id the reins of Iri.-h Government for im-io years and who ought to have had man,'"things to say" at; least as impovi;* ant, found so little to add to the eotfc prehens've slatein'mt of Sir Matthew, that his evidence was completed in about an hour and a quarter. But though comparatively brief the testimony lie had to oiler was full of significance, if for no other reason than it proved still furl her that the authorities were fully aware of the dangerous character, of the Sinn Fein movement. Mr. Birrcdl frankly avowed that the policy of non-intervention, while partly his own and arrived at deliberately, was founded oil the advice of the Xationalist leaders, Messrs. Redmond and Dillon, whom he regularly called into consultation. The German promise of assistance for Ireland, be declared, was at the hot' torn of the recent trouble. lint he had never believed that things would reach so serious a pass as ultimately was developed. Lord Flardinge, to make matters quite clear, asked the ev-C'liief Secretary whether the policy of non-intervention was a decision deliberately arrived at. Mr. Rirrell promptly and emphatically replied that it was. Mr. .Justice Shearman inquired whether any effort was made by consultation with all the parties in Ireland to procure disarmament of the various volunteer bodies. Mr. Birrell answered in the negative.

"There is another thing that puzzles me," said the Judge. "There was a pos--ibilitv that the Germans might have landed in Ireland. Yet these disloyal •people who afterwards broke out into open rebellion were allowed to carry arms, to drill, and to rehearse warlike exercises. Might not that overt art have '•pen suppressed?"

Mr. Birrell hesitated before replying; 'We thought it would have been di'fIcnlt to prove that the drilling of these :ieople was in any way associated w' Ihe enemy." He knew that overt acts ■ f tbiv character could b m-c lie r -o s;? pressed, "hut it would have been a ■challenge and it would have required the employment of soldiers to do it." , "These people," continued Mr. Justice Shearman, "were known to be disloyal and to be practising sham fights with a view to a certain eventuality; yet you did nothing?" Mr. Birrell shrugged his shoulders, and replied, "I quite agree it seems almost ridiculous. But to have commenced an attack on these men would have meant very serious trouble. . . It was all part and parcel of a policy. We adopted the same policy towards the arming and drilling of the Ulstermen. This was a decision taken by the Cabinet, in which, of course, I entirely concurred. The decision about the Sinn Feiners was not a Cabinet matter."

THE GROWTH OF SINN FEINISM. Mr, Birvell, to begin with, made a nioit interesting statement reviewing the objects and growth of Sinn Feinism. 'The spirit of what to-day is called Sh-ii Feinism," lie said, "is mainly composed of the old hatred anil distrust of tl.e British connection always noticeable in (11 classes and in all places, varying in <'egree and finding different ways of expression, but always there as the bac;;■i. iiml of Irish politics and character." i'lie spirit, "always dangerous," as he >vas at pains to emphasise, was kept dive despite all the beneficent changes brougM about in the administration of lrii.li affairs during the last twenty years an 1 the general improvement in the lot of the. people. There was :i period marked by a frontline literary Irish revival in prose, poetry, and the drama, with nothing in it suggestive of revolt or rebellion, "'except in the realm of thought." A little more time and—but for the •mtbreak of war—this new critical temper would, in Mr. BirreH's opinion, have fmUv prevailed, not to destroy national r-ent!'iicnt, but to kill by ridicule insensate revolt. Ar,long the causes which lately tended to excite the feelings of those ill-allected towards constitutional methods and to increase their numbers, the late Chief Secretary named the follow ing:— Growing doubts about the actual advent of Home Rule. The Ulster rebellion, gun-running at I.arne. the Covenant, the Provisional Government, its plan of warfare in Belfast, its armed volunteers and public drillings. Mr. Redmond's patriotic attitude on the outbreak of the war. A small minority in Ireland thought that he had thrown away a great opportunity, and that he should have, struck a bargain with the Crown ere he consented t<, become a recruiting onicer for it. Formation of the Coalition Govern-

meut with Sir Edward Carson in it. This step seemed to make an end of Efome Uule. The prolongation of the war, and, ■ according to Irish views, its dubious end. The war turned many heads and Jjpset prudent calculations. From Mr. Birrell's evidence it seems perfectly clear that the disloyal elements in Ireland were, completely deluded as regarded the real British, war situation. ''lrish criticism of the war and its chances," he said in his long preliminary statement to the Commissioners, "was not of the optimistic cast that prevailed in Britain." What he actually meant was indicated at a later stage, when he said, in reply to a question, "They all believed Kugland was surrounded by submarines and could not move, and that troops could not come

from Liverpool because of submarines. They all thought England was cut off." MR. BIRREIX CONTRADICTED. 11l bis evidence Mr. Ttiriv-U led the Commission to believe that lie liud asked die War O/liee to overawe (lie Dublin hiimi Feiners a month before the outbreak. According to the War Office, However, Mr. Birrell asked for lroo|is I f,ijr tli« solo purpose of encouraging /'■Whiting, and that so far as Uird Kit°ln«it:''s and Lieutenant-General Mac>v;id/. memories of their interviews »vitii Mi. Birrell serve them, 110 question iirose of sending troops for the purpose of overawing Sinn Feiners. And, tackled by the Commission 011 this point, Mr. Birrell did not challenge the War Office version, though lie intimated that lie liad the thoughts of possible trouble in his mind when he was suggesting the sending of troops to Dublin for recruiting purposes. Apparently, however, lie concealed his fears from the Army authorities. General Maeready, as AdjutantGeneral of the Forces, had, it seems, received a 'ettor from General Friend, Commander of the Forces in Ireland, some time before the outbreak, intimating that there were some prospects of trouble in the South of Ireland, and arrangements were at once made that a Reserve Brigade should be embarked if called for by the Irish authorities. This facts suggests that if Mr. Birrell had given the War Office any clear indication of what was in his mind beyond the encouragement of recruiting, Lord Kitchener would have arranged for the supply of ample troops for Dublin, where they would have supplied the incentive to recruiting and would have been available for any emergency. But Mr. Birrell seems to have kept his fears to himself, and the War Office was, apparently, indisposed to immobilise any large number of British troops simply in order to gain possibly only a few hundrefl recruits. So, when the trouble came, Dublin contained very few soldiers, and the rebels had for several hours practically a free field for mischief.

These tilings were made plain in letters read before the Commission, to explain which Mr. Birrell waß recalled.

SINN FEIN A JOKE. The next witness was Viscount Midleton, who hai-. ever since the early period of the war 'jeen •prominent in directing attention to the rebel menace in Ireland. Lord Midhton's evidence was a record of pertinaeicus (effort to bring home to the mind of .lie Executive the gravity of tin* situation in Ireland. His Lordship had gathered much valuable information and placed it before those responsible for the governing of Ireland, from the Prime Minister down to Sir Matthew Nathan. At every stage he found himself confronted with a deliberate policy which hoped for the best and refused to face unpleasant facts. In November, 1915, for instance, Mr. Birrell told him that there would be no rebellion, that the Sinn Feiners were an insignificant body of crack-brained enthusiasts and headstrong priests, and that for himself he "simply laughed at the whole thing." Lord Midleton drew attention to the fact that the result of the action of the Government has been to curtail greatly the influence of the Nationalist Party, led by Mr. Redmond. If there were a general election in Ireland tomorrow he doubted whether Mr. Redmond would be able to hold a single scat in the province of Munster. He added, amid some sensation, "I have been i (formed on the best authority that Mr. licdmond, whether he knows it or not, has beea in great danger of Lis life."

LORD LIEUTENANT 'A CYPHER Another witness was Lord Wimborne, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, representative of the King and nominal head of tho Administration, but on his own confession a mere cypher, whose powers have been, as he put it, entirely usurped by the Chief Secretary and the UnderSecretary. Lord Winiborne's position really seems to be one of complete irresponsibility, and he has no means of asserting bis views when they happen to conflict with those of his nominal subordinates. Lord Wimborne claimed that long ago lie arrived at the conclusion that Sinn Fein had become a grave menace, ard that he advocated the importance of immediate action in the shape of tho deportation or internment of the active leaders of the movement, whose names were well known to the authorities. He urged the raiding of "liberty Hall" and other arsenals of the Sinn Feiners and the arrest of the leaders on Easter Sunday night, because evidence v. us then complete that the Sinn I'Vim'iv. weiv in league with the German enemy. lie knew then that Casement hod been arrested, and expressed the hope that so far as that person was concorned "there would be no nonsense about clemency, and that he would be made an example of." He expressed this view in a communication to Mr. Bin-ell and added: "If you agree do write and ginger Nathar." (the UnderSecretary). Early on Easter Monday morning Mr. Birrell wired approval of tlie proposal to arrest the leaders. But it was too late.

In an analysis of the Irish attitude towards recruiting, the Lord Lieutenant said the real faction to compulsion on the part of •uuiy Irishmen simply was I hat they did not want to fight for England. The Sinn Feiners certainly were opposed to fighting for tho British Empire. They would only fight "for Ireland" as against Great Britain!, und proof of this was to be found in the recent rebellion. The Irish fanning classes genera'ly were apathetic and indifferent, though by no means hostile to Britain. In the towns, on the other hand, recruiting had been successful. Lord Wimborne further gave it as his opinion that 100,000 troops would have been needed to enforce a general proclamation against arming and drilling, applicable to all bodies in Ireland alike.

The Commission finished its sittings in London with Lord Wiinborne's evidence, and proceeded to Ireland to take evidence in Dublin.