DEFENCE OF VERDUN.

Taranaki Daily News, 6 July 1916, Page 3

DEFENCE OF VERDUN.

"A PACE OK HISTORY." ■l'li'lcr the (iUm.;,,, of u lhtorv ,.. the Pari, Matin pu!ili,l,c ; , a remarkable article on the buttle of Verdun, which tl'i'ows much light on circumstances ' which had hitherto been somewhat obscure. "H will be remembered," said the .Matin, "that the month of February was marked throughout by a series of loeal offensives over the whole front, with the exception of the Verdun ~oclor, and it was obvious that these (defies were intended to prevent any concentration of rreneh reserves. General Petain's army winch was being held by the High Command in preparation for certain important operations, was not then in (he Ver'lmi region, and was not taken there ,iiitil'tho battle liad actually lasted several days. The Herman tactics did not, however, deceive many of the French generals, though there were two distinct currents of opinion in the General Staff, some officers believing that Verdun itself was the German objective, while others maintained the contrary. Our L'ont was held mainly by Territorials and African troops, and on General Henasking for reinforcements, the Twentieth Army Corps was placed at his disposal : though not actually sent forward. "It was in these conditions that the great attack of February 21st was made, and it was only when our retirement became noticeable that t)ie gravity of the situation was realised. Wc were struggling with three divisions aaainst live army corps. No railway had been constructed in the Verdun region, and wc had the use of only one line fir moving our troops. It was thought prudent to arrange at once for the evacuation of the right bank of the .Meuse, and our curtain of lirst-line troops had orders to retire while holding back the enemy as long as possible. ''These orders had letiialjy been received when General Casteln'au arrived on the scene, lie examined the situation, made up his mind, and then, on his awn initiative, having as majorgeneral the delegation of full powers', he decided to take steps exactly contrary to those arranged, and, cost what, it might, to hold firmly to the Douaumont plateau. The task offered immense difficulties, but General -Petain was entrusted with tlie duty of carrying it out. "The first act which was to have a great influence upon the course of the subsequent operations was the utilisation of motor-wagons for the transport of troops and munitions, and no fewer than 4700 such wagons were brought into use. Thanks to these the Twentieth Army Gorps was moved in 10 hours from Bar-le-Duc to Douaumont, and while it had not l«ft until 7 o'clock on the evening of February 2'th, it participated in the action of the 23th, at 10 o'clock in the morning. The same motor-wagons made possible the transportation of the '.vhole of General Petain's army during the next few days, and continued for the following two months to lie of invaluable assistance in bringing up provisions, munitions, and fresh troops, as well as in evacuating wounded. The orders cancelled by General Castelmut had, however, to be carried out at certain points.'' The details of the battle at the end of February were particularly confused, and the facts now given will, said the Matin, make it easier to appreciate the conditions which actually operated.