ENEMY TERRIFIED.

Taranaki Daily News, 3 July 1916, Page 5

ENEMY TERRIFIED.

-VIOLENCE OF BRITISH GUNNERY. D.ARINU INFANTRY RAID. . Received July 2, 11.45 p.m. London, Julv 2. Centers correspondent at 'headquarters states that he traversed nearly linety miles of British front and was impressed bv the superiority of the British trtillcrcy. Deserters atates that in consequence Of the violence of the British gunnery they were foodless for three days. The wholesale daring of the infantry raids terrified the enemy. Tiie raids enabled the British to definitely identify the position and character of every Gerwan battalion between the Yser and the Somme, and showed that the enemy had not withdrawn any formations from the British front. It is known, however, that the Eleventh Bavarian Division, which was at Verdun, the Twenty-second Reserve Corps and the Tenth Army Corps from the Champagne were sent to the Eastern front, as were probably ftlso three other divisions. FRENCH ACTIVITY. 3500 PRISONERS TAKEN, Beeeiyed July 2, 11.40 p.m. Paris, July 2. A' communique states: Northward and southward of the Soinme, the FrancoBritish developed an offensive over a forty kilometre front and captured the first German positions along the whole front of attack. The French, northword of the Somme, established themselves on the outsirts of Hardecort, and On tile fringe of the village of Curlu, where fighting continues. Southward of the Somme, the villages of Dampierre, Mecquincourt, Buaius, and Fay are in our hands. The French, alone, took upwards of 3500 unwounded jiiaonei'i. FURTHER DETAILS. SATISFACTORY FRENCH ATTACK. Received July 2, 5.5 p.m. London, July 1. General Sir Douglas Haig reports:— The attack was launched north of the Somme at 7.30, in conjunction with the French. The British had broken the German forward defences on a sixteen mile front. The French attack on our immediate right was proceeding satisfactorily. Raiding parties on the remainder of the British front penetrated the enemy's •' »s at many points, inflcting IOS 3 a., -aking j)risoner3. SEVERE GERMAN CASUALTIES. SUCCESSFUL AIR RAIDS. Received July 3, 12.30 a.m. London, July 2. Sir Douglas Haig adds: The large number of enemy dead indicated that the casualties were very severe. Parties penetrated the German trenches at various points between Souchez and Ypres on Friday night, inflicting casualties. There was much successful air work against the railway depots, junctions, and trains, as well as the batteries «i>d frenches. WHAT THE ALLIES CAN DO ON THE WESTERN FRONT. (By a Military Officer.) Two out of the Jiree war predictions attributed to Lord Kitchener have already been fulfilled—the defensive of 1914 and the "draw" of ifli-i Wbat jf the third —the itocce&ful advance of 1916? A reply to this question is essayed by a military office- in the May number of the Fortniahtly Review, in an article Marked by so much insight and such obvious technical ability that its signature "Special Reseive," might well cover the identity of a famous soldier. His reply to .he question is comprised within 20 words: "I look forward," he says, "with absolute certainty to clearing France and Belgium of the Huns before the year is over."

He puts forward cogent arguments in .support of his conclusion, and these are military and not economic arguments. The economic argument, indeed, he dismisses as wholly inadequate. "It is impossible for this country or its allies to depend for victory on nothing hut tin* economic or financial exhaustion of the Central Empires. There is :io record in history of any great military Tower which suffered defeat through purely economic causes as long as its fleets and armies and national spirit remained intact and active, however much such causes may have contributed in the long run to its military downfall. . . .

There will never be peace in Europe until the Onnan army has been utterly defeated in the field. An economic, victory would mean nothing but a renewal of the conflict at a later date, "we war not with flesh and blood, but with principalities and powers." What must be crushed, if Europe is ever again to know security, is not the stomachs of the German people, but their belief in the invincibility of their own arms.

He gee* on' to discuss the impossibility of leaving everything to Russia, "unless it is desired to' extend the period of the conflict at least into 1917 or even 1918," and shows that Russia has already borne more than her fair share of the war, and contends that without resolute help on the Western front the coming autumn will not see her armies further advanced than her own original frontier.

This brings the writer to bis third general contention—that an advance irom the west this spring is the key of the whole military situation. "Victory in the third year of the war," he lays, "depends upon breaking through in the west." Pessimists declare that the German line is unbreakable, and this argument has b<?en supported by experienced officers at the front. The writer sets forth a phalanx of reasons against this proposition: What is clear at least i 3 that germany is coming to the end of her Tirst i line 'troops—that is to say, men who -«re competent to go anywhere and do tnything which efficient soldiers are ejected *o do. In the course of th« X

last live months "notliinjj but her interior lines of railways have enabled he r to place her effectives now on one Front and now on the other The attack on YerJun has taken its full toll. There must eonie a period when the -.pearliead of (lie j'ermaii armies is blunted or destroyed and an insufficient number of mobile soldiery exist for any given front. BETTER THAN THE FOE. On the other hand our own personnel has Inherited in full measure the spirit of t!u- original Expeditionary Force, while the Territorials have become warhardened troops with which anyone might be proud to serve. T>hc main facts seem to be that our troops are now superior as tactical and mobile units to those of the enemy, and that we should possess a great superiority of force. The German troops on the western front are usually estimated at two millions, but they could he, and no doubt would he, considerably reinforced in view of an attack being directed against them shortly. None the less, they wculd still be very inferior in point of numbers. . . .

At the lowest estimate, then, we ■diould be able to put three AngloFrench sobers against two Germans, whiie a concentration of two to one on Ih- sectors selected for attack could be madi. with complete safety to the rest of the line. This estimate errs very greatly on the side of prudence—for three to one or four to one would be a more probable figure at the decisive point.

The three conditions which must be postulated for a successful advance are: Unlimited shells, greater numerical force and an army not Inferior in courage, skill and administration to the German. The two first conditions have been fulfilled. What of the third? The pessimist contends either that no army can break through modern field defences, or that at any rate our army cannot. The .-'.iswei to this argument lias been given at Hooge. Neuve Chapelle, Loos and elsewhere, though these actions have been often written down as "partial successes*, or incomplete failures." The German front has been broken frequently up to the first line, several times up to the third, ■ There remains the question as to the form of attack:

The ideal attack must combine a great variety of operations. ... In the first place, the enemy must remain uncertain as to the precise point of danger. In the second place, the artillery preparation must so far abolish the resistance of machine guns, infantry fire and wire entanglements, not on one line of the defence, but on all the lines of the defence, as to make the advance of the infantry practicable at most points. Finally, the thrust must be made on a sufficiently wide front to prevent the victorious regiments being hopelessly enfiladed from either Hank at the very moment of their triumph. Even then everything is not gained unless the attackers still retain sufficient strength and cohesion to repel a counter-attack or to go straight on, as the circumstances dictate.

To possess these assets implies that they not only possess a very high sense of discipline, but that the arrangements, rations and ammunition have been carried out with precision and success. Granted al! this, and the German front will be hopelessly broken, over a front of, say, ten to twenty miles. Such a breakage in a line over three hundred miles long, means far more than the retirement of the defending force to a new position a few miles in the rear. The ablest general staff in the world could not guarantee to get its whole line back intact such a short distance in the pellmell and confusion of retreat in which the attackers and defenders would be honelossly mixed up together, witlio.it risking whole army corps being left behind, enfiladed, outflanked, or even surrounded.

Can we do it? We must fit any rate attempt it, and if we fail the first time we must try again, and if we fail the second time we must make a third effort, "and if British soldiers are what we think them to be, tliey will succeed before they have finished. . . and victory will crown our efforts with peace before the year has run out."