The Daily News. TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1916. GERMANY'S PIRATE NAVY.

Taranaki Daily News, 27 June 1916, Page 4

The Daily News. TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1916. GERMANY'S PIRATE NAVY.

We are "so accustomed to regard the navy of any Power from a British standpoint—as an all-important arm of defence— that we fail to note the possibility of its use for the purposes of out-and-out plunder and spoliation. It lias often been a matter of wonder that Germany, knowing how impossible it was to secure a navy in ,any way approaching the size and power of Britain, should have entered upon an apparent attempt at rivalry. Now that we have gained ah inSight into Teutonic methods, the mystery is solved. In order to arrive at an intelligent conception of the fundamental principles by which Germany's maritime operations have, by a process of natural evolution, arrived at their present point of evil intent, we have to look back as far as the twelfth century when the North German trading towns formed a league which has left its mark on the history of the world. This Ha'nseatic League, or union of merchant traders, gradually obtained complete control of the highways of commerce, monopolised the whole of the trade of Norway, and firmly established itself at the port of London on the spot where Cannon Street railway now stands, but was then known as the Steelyard—so named owing to its being the chief weighing place of the port fur heavy goods by means of the beam which is commonly known as the stilliard, or steelyard, which, for a long period of years, was the only means of weighing heavy goods. The Hanseatic League and the lay monks of St. Anthony played a dominant part in laying the foundation of Britain's commercial greatness, but whereas the trading monks devoted all their gains to the spread of Christianity, the League's aim was the enrichment of the members, and in pursuit of that object the League became a-species of confederacy under which the German merchants in England Were organised into a single flansa (guild), and later the League controlled the whole of the trade extending from Novgorod, in Russia, to London. The natural consequence was that the League found it necessary to obtain political power, the next Btep being that of becoming a naval power embarking on a war against Denmark, in which the traders proved the victors. Then began the decline of the League, which ultimately became extinct,.but it was from the ashes of this- gigantic confederation that Germany's subsequent commercial system sprang and flourished, under the protection of the German navy. It is interesting to note how closely interwoven are the threads that represent the arts of peace and war, and how narrow is the margin between the borderland of legitimate trade and ruthless plunder and piracy. Up to the point of acknowledged rectitude in building up a nation's overseas trade and protecting that trade by means of armed ships there is no ground even for criticism', but when, as in the case of Ger- ,. many, the money for creating a wellequipped navy is largely found by holding before the people the prospect of enormous indemnities to be wrung from other nations, then nothing but evil and disaster can be expected. In Britain's case, the navy has been, and is, wholly for protective purposes, while that of Germany has become permeated with the evil spirit of aggression, in the same manner, and for the same reasons, as the German land forces. It is entirely owing to Britain's supremacy as a Naval Power that Germany has been prevented fiom levying the enormous indemnities which she would so dearly love to handle. The spirit is only too willing, but; the navy is too weak. Exactly how large a defct the nations owe to Britain for safeguardinjf them from piratical

raids by tlie Teutons they will never nalise, simply because they have taken their security for granted, All the same the danger was real and over-preeent. Just before the war, Von Edolsheim formulated a scheme for capturing the most important and wealthy of the Americtn seaport towns and imposing on them heavy contributions. To what lengths the Huna can go in this direction has been forcibly illustrated in the case of Belgium. It would not concern German one iota that there was neither cause nor justification for such piratical plundering. The carcase was there, and the German eagle only too ready to pick it to the bare bones. It is not difficult to conceive that this barbaric enterprise would, if successful, have led to similar raids on the colonies of any Great Power that might be at war with Germany, or that she might consider could be safely squeezed. It is a doctrine that appeals with special force to these spirants for world domination. Why did they establish a powerful naval base at .Oar-es-Salaam? Undoubtedly for launching an attack against Western Australia, and for similar raiding purposes they established a network of strategical positions stretching across the South Seas to Samoa. We know ho.w nearly Australia escaped from the designs of the German fleet at the time of t!ie Moroccan crisis, solely by reason of the British fleet's watchful care. Germany's capture of Antwerp and her endeavors to possess the other ports facing Britain are due solely to the overmastering desire to become mistress of the seas by destroying the British Navy What such a disaster—if it could possibly happen—would mean to the Overseas Dominions they can now realise. We nifty therefore be profoundly grateful that the might and power of our I'avy. is still beyond question, and it should be a source of intense pride and satisfaction to New Zealand and Australia to have strengthened the fighting power of the navy by means of units that have already done good service for them and the Empire. It is our sole safeguard, and its aims are worthy of the highest honor by all civilised countries, just as the intentions of the German navy are deserving of the utmost reprobation. '