MESOPOTAMIA.

Taranaki Daily News, 9 May 1916, Page 6

MESOPOTAMIA.

GENERAL TOWNSHEND'S SUBRENDER. THE ORIGIN OF THE EXPEDITION. The surrender of General Townshend, with some nine thousand men, ends a highly unsatisfactory episode of the war. It has been plain for some time past that the situation of the beleaguered force at Kut-el-Amara was becoming critical, but it was not until General Townshend was compelled to turn the non-combatants out of the Tillage that the news could be said to look really ugly. Attempts were made to cany fresh supplies 'by aeroplane, but it must have oeen a hopeless business attempting to meet the needs of nine thousand men by what may be termed aerial parcel post. Ultimately, according to the communique, an heroic effort was made to push through from Umm el Henna to Rut by river, but the steamer went aground, and was at the mercy of the Turks. General Townshend himself«appears to have been sustained by the hope of early relief, for otherwise he would not have sheltered ''useless mouths" in Kut, and it may be inferred that when the relief column was despatched from Basra the staff had no doubt of its ability to reach the beleaguered force,

ITS PURPOSE UNREVEALED. The origin of the expedition up the Tigris has been the subject of a good deal of controversy, and the facts are still obscure. Indeed, its purpose has never been revealed,' although official statements have not been uncommon. Towards the end of September General Townshend was reported to have defeated a Turkish force six miles below Kut-el-Amara, and to have occupied Kut itself. That action was fought on September 28. The British force consisted, apparently, of about ten thousand men. It received reinforcements a few days later, and the advance up the river was continued. Kut was made the head of the Britis'h line of communication, and was utilised as the base of further operations, including an attempt to reach Bagdad, a hundred miles away. According to the statement of an officer with the force, news arrived at Kut that Turkish reinforcements were reaching Bagdad, and in the absence of more definite information one may assume that General Townshend determined to make the attack .before the Turkish concentration could be completed.

THE STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY. There is little doubt, indeed, that he had information concerning the strength of the enemy that warranted the advance, and that lie calculated on being able to smash the opposition in good time, and then to meet whatever reinforcements might arrive from the north. The advance, however, was a tedious process, and, as it proved, by the time General Townshend was within striking distance of Bagdad the enemy was already in greatly superior strength. The main Turkish position was on the plain around the ruins of Ctcaiphon, but the entrenchments extended to the river, and a position had been prepared on the right bank as well as on the left. The British force, consisting apparently of about a division, attacked on November 22, and succeeded in driving the enemy back, occupying the Turkish entrenchments. As the enemy had at least four divisions, this was a notable victory, but the price at which it was won rendered further progress out of the question. The British casualties numbered about 5000.

A GREAT BATTLE. "This hard-fought action," wrote an officer of General Townshend's force some time later, "will rank as one of the greatest battles in which the Indian Army has ever been engaged. Our troops, British and Indian, emaciated by the terribly hot weather, afterwards suffering greatly from cold and constantly wearied by incessant work and incessant fighting, boldly faced enormous odds. Victory rested with them at the end of the day, but at such a'price that further advance would have been too costly. For three days the force held to the captured position until, further Turkish reinforcements having arrived from Bagdad, a withdrawal to the Kut-el-Amara position was determined on. This was carried out by General Towns'liend with the greatest success, and it speaks well for the spirit of the troops under his command that, in the face of overwhelming numbers; the retirement was carried out with cheerfulness and steadiness beyond all praise, and not even the prisoners, of which 1300 had been captured at Ctesiphon, were allowed to fall ;r.t<j the hands of the enemy.

NAVIGATION OF THE RIVERS. "The country above Kut-el-Amara differs little from that lower down except that here the level of the ground is above the normal flood level of the river. The country is perfectly flat, covered with short grass or scrub, though here and there old irrigation channels make it difficult for carts or motor-cars to negotiate. An occasional mud wall a few feet high stands out against the sky. These are mostly evidence of ancient works built to control the vagaries of the river. Often they appear quite useless, as the river has since changed its course. North of Kut the river presents the greatest difficulties to navigation. It is tortuous to a degree. No small scale map shows its eccentric curves, nor can one understand why it should flow off a mile in some new direction only to return within a few yards of its own course. Below Kut the river is comparatively narrow and deep, though here, too, there are many traps for the unwary ship's captain. Above Kut it broadens out into a much more spacious stream, at times 500 yards across, but at such places it becomes so shallow that there is hardly enough depth anywhere for a ship to pass, and, as the channel is constantly changing, it may be half a day before the unwieldy river flats are lucky enough to And a' passage past a difficult place.

DIFFICULT COUNTRY. "The operations above Kut were carried out by land, though ships played an important part in bringing up supplies_ and the thousand and one things required to maintain an army in the field. We are operating now on a long 'line of communication from Basra to Kut-el-Amara, and, though a German official report appeared to the effect that the Turks had captured one of our armoured trains near Basra, it will not be giving away a military secret to say that no railway of any sort exists south of Bagdad. The ground surface of Mesopotamia is silt, built up by. the flow of the great rivers through countless ages. The top surface is dust, Any movement raises a cToud of dn.it. The strong winds, which blow almost continuously over the wide plains, raise storms of dust, and dust was the bed and food of the troops during the ■*wnsi of S«pt«nbJr and Qgtebtr. A*» J

ter October the weather began to get cooler and the dust less enveloping. Throughout the minor operations in November the nights became very cold until, at the time when Ctesiphon Was fought, the thermometer nearly touched freezing point at night, a contrast indeed to the sweltering nights of the hot summer. ... By the twenty-fourth the casualties had been evacuated to the ships eight miles in rear. The British force remained on the position which they had won for another day and then withdrew to Kut-el-Amara to await reinforcements. The troopi, though wearied with much fighting, turned to bay on December 1 and repulsed with heavy loss a Turkish force which, by a forced march, had succeeded in catching them up."

IN THE LOOP OF THE TIGRIS. By December 5 the whole column was back at Kut-el-Amara, where General Townshend determined to rest his troops after their forced marches and to await support. The Turks,, however, gave them little rest. Almost at once the enemy started to dig entrenchments, and in the course of a few days a considerable body of artillery had been brought from Bagdad, and the little town and the British eamp were subjected to periodical and vigorous bombardment. Once or twice the Turks attempted to attack, but were driven off, and finally they settled down to a regular investment of the place. Kut lies in a loop of the Tigris, in a position adapted to defence; but.once the Turks gave up the idea of carrying it by direct assault, its strategical merits ceased to be of importance. The enonvy's principal concern, was now to prevent help from reaching General Townshend from the south.

Till? RELIEF COLUMJT. On January (i the relief column, under General Aylnier, was at Imam AH Gherbi, fifty miles from Kut. Fighting its wa> against heavy opposition—there were.three Turkish divisions opposed to it at this stage—the British column ultimately reached Sheikh Saad, where it halted in order to ship its wounded back to Basra. Torrential rains then set in, and, as the Tigris was steadily rising and overflowing its -banks on the flat plain, the movements of the British were very gravely hampered. It maysbe said, indeed, that ever since the beginning of January the relief column has been struggling against Nature rather than against the Turks. Whenever the weather and land conditions permitted an advance, an advance was made, but invariably the enemy was found in occupation of strong, -prepared positions, and it was a costly business expelling them.

TURKS' IMPREGNABLE POSITIONS. The crisis was reached at Umm el Henna, or Felabic, where the Turks had taken advantage of the floods to establish almost impregnable positions on both sides of the river. The flood waters had filled and extended the swamps, particularly on the north bank —the river here runs east—and the enemy's position presented only a very narrow front, rendering an attack in force virtually impossible. For the same reason it was impossible to attempt to outflank the position, and the difficulty of transport prevented the British commander from attempting a wide detour. For a week past the relief column has been only eighteen or twenty miles from Kut, and yet it was impossible to effect a junction with General Townshend's little army. There has been a great deal of sharp fighting, however, and more than once the Turks were driven from their advanced lines. The failure of an attack a few days ago, however, showed that at the relief column had little hope of reaching Kut, and the surrender of General Townshend's force has now to be announced. . .

GENERAL TOWSHEND. A SECOND GORDON, Mr. A. G. ("Smiler") Hales, writing in John Hull, in February, said: Kut was not the objective when Townshend's expedition was flung forward into the almost unknown. The Official Press Bureau is, seemingly, trying to create a false impression in the public mind by issuing bulletins which state that Townsbend's force will leaguer in Kut, and that no retreat is meditated. Retreat! When are we to bear the last of that most damnable word? It has not a British ring about it, nor an Irish ring, nor an Anzae ring. Even if Townshend and Aylmer were able to join forces, they could not retreat now with safety. Why lie to the public about "concentrating" at Kut? Townshend will concentrate at Kut as Gordon "concentrated" at Khartoum, and be and his may perish there as Gordon perished, to the undying shame of the Government of that day. Kitchener avenged Gordon; he spread the ashes of the Mahdi to the four winds of Heaven, and put an iron hand upon the 'Mahdi's followers. We do not want Kitchener to avenge Townshend. We want Kitchener to save him. The man was given an impossible task with the force at his command, and he achieved miracles. He has an eagle eye and a lion heart. I know him well; clever, dauntless, tireless, cheerful and debonair in the face of perils that would shake the nerve of most of the sons of men; he is too good, too great, too gallant to be butchered on the altar of Incapacity, whose high priests arc a 'bunch of laymen who have had the audacity to usurp soldierly powers to gamble with the lives of heroes. Should Townshend go along the path that Gordon trod, into the valley of the shadow of death, there will not be a guiltless man or woman in Britain if the nation does not stir itself and shake some soul, some imagination, some swift, unerring action, into the men 'whose shibboleth is "Wait and See."

Townshend is the man who held the Chitral fort', and'in so doing wrote a glowing page upon our Empire's history. . . His name lias never loomed large in the limelight; he never courted popularity. Born to 'be a leader of forlorn hopes, he loved all danger for the danger's sake, and ho could laugh with lightsome zest even in the teeth of the enemy's guns; but his head was ice in the councils, as bis heart was a flood of flame in the headlong rusn of the charge. Can we sit "still and see such a man shambled, he and the splendid lads who are with him?- Have we so many men of genius and of licroic mould that we can sit with folded hands and murmur "Kismet"? There is to he no present retreat from Kut, the Press Bureau says, and rubs its fat stomach, where its 'brains He. Men like Townshend do not want retreats; that i? not their ideal of British soldier-craft; "Upward and, Onward" was ever Townsbend's motto, and he has lived up to it, and if need be, will die acting up to it. But, oh! the pity of It, when Hell would be richer for the presence of twenty of the council of twenty-two who sent hi.m forth half-manned and ill-equipped!