The Daily News. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1916. ARE WE STRONG ENOUGH?

Taranaki Daily News, 26 April 1916, Page 4

The Daily News. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1916. ARE WE STRONG ENOUGH?

The appearance of the Russian soidiers in France is one of the minor surprises of the war. Whence did they come? They could not have come by way of the Baltic, for that seu is closed except to submarines; the Black Sea is closed, anj Archangel is not yet free from ice. They must have come via Vladivostock, probably in the warships returned to Russia by the chivalrous Japs. The cables, of course, give no idea of the strength of the Russian contingent. But it cannot be large if the troops have come all the way from the Siberian port. Their presence in France, however, is evidence of the unity of the Allies against the Teutonic foe and of the recovery of the Russians after last summer's trying retreat, Soldiers cannot bo short in France to necessitate reinforcement by the Russians. France must have close on four millions at the front and in reserve, besides the 1917 recruits and the North African forces, whilst Britain should have at least a million and a quarter of men in France, two millions in reserve, and another million in course of training. Then there are the colonials, who must number something like a third to half a million. The Indian Army Is probably engages elsewhere than in France. The Allies therefore must have plenty of men in France and outnumber the enemy by three to two at least. Still, the enemy has largely the advantage in positions, which he has areatly strengthened, and up till recent-

iy he had the advantage in guns anil munitions. How are the Ajlies situated in regard to the supply of these? We, of course, are net being told very much about this or any other vital military mutter, but a significant statement was made by Mr. Lloyd George the other day. He said that whilst our progress in the production of guns and munitions had been remarkable, events at Verdun showed that we must do more. By that he clearly meant that the Germans had shown themselves stronger in guns and munitions than the Allies considered possible. Very likely, too, he meant that the Germans' man-power was greater than expected. On the latter point there is a good deal of difference of opinion amongst the authorities. Colonel Repington, on the one hand, accepts as accurate the German casualty lists, but critics like Hilaire Belloc maintain that these lists, like everything else German, are purposely misleading. Lately Mr. Belloc has been in France, and had the privilege of examining the evidence which has been accumulated and thoroughly sifted by the French High Command and the French Government. Tiic German official casualty lists give a total of 051,708 dead up to January 31, 1916. The average delay between the death of a German soldier and the appearance of his name in the official lists is from four to six weeks. The above figures, therefore, can hardly include any casualties later than Becember 31, 1915. To this figure, Mr. Belloc suggests, of approximately 650,000, must be added to the enemy's own showing a certain proportion of the missing. A figure for the missing is given in the German lists, though not included in the number of dead. The missing includes (a) prisor.. ers in the hands of the Allies; (b) deserters; (c) dead. • The number of prisoners is, of course, precisely known to the Allies, and, after deducting a small percentage for desertion, the number of dead in the German lists of missing is not less than 160,000, making a total derived from the Germans' own admission of 810,000 dead up to December 31, 1915. This is not all. Apart from the lists published by the Gorman Government, Mr. Belloc tells us, the French authorities have amassed a large body of evidence based on the average of deaths per 1000 mobilised men at a given date—derived from local lists published by German trade unions, professional corporations, clubs, religious and industrial bodies, which prove conclusively that the German official lists are deliberately falsified or intentionally inadequate. In the early months of the war these private and official lists very nearly tallied, but ever since January, 1915, there has been a marked discrepancy, the official lists (which have a reason for concealment) giving an average of 20 per cent, less than the private lists (which have no such reason) —this represents a difference of over 200,000 dead. Summing up, Mr. Belloc argues that when it is added that in several engagements th« total number of killed, wounded, missing and prisoners published in the German lists is less than the actual number of prisoners taken by the French in the same engagements—it is simply playing the enemy's game to accept with childlike simplicity the numbers he would have us believe. It is a matter of mathematical certainty that the German Empire has lost over 1,000,000 in dead alone up to the end of last year. Then there are the permanently disabled and sick, which must run into quite another two millions. There is one thing we can be certain of: the Allies have now a preponderance of men on both the western and eastern fronts. Whether they have a preponderance of rims and munitions is another matter. If they have, the great offensive will not be delayed much longer. If they have not, then it will be a case of holding the Teutonic forces at bay for another year. Superior man power, this war has taught conclusively, is of no avail against superior gun power.