SAUNDERS V. WESTON.

Taranaki Daily News, 17 March 1916, Page 3

SAUNDERS V. WESTON.

APPLICATION FOR RE-lIEARINC. FIVE HOURS' ARGUMENT. (From Our Own Correspondent.) Wellington, March 1.1. To-day's proceedings in the case Saunders v. Weston, ail application for a re-hearing of the libel action in which a New Plymouth jury found for the defendant, occupied over five liouiv;. The speeches of counsel were highly technical in character for the most part. Their salient point; have been indicated already in the News.

After quoting cases in support of his contention that the decision of the jury should not be "egarded as final. Hr. Myers, for the. plaintiff, said that Hie original agreement between plaintiff and j the Kinemacolor Company with regard to the White .Slave Truffle film had been produced, ami it showed that the receipts were to lie divided on a 50-30 basis. That was matter of fact about which there conld be no dispute, and it was false, therefore, to say that plaintiff had agreed to take 4(1 per cent, and had then demanded .10 per cent. That false' statement was the base of the action, and the jury in effect had said that- the statement was true. Then it had been proved beyond question, and admitted by the witness Mat'neson, that the article in the Herald had meant that Saunders had broken bis agreement with Kinenmeolor. The decision of the jurv or. that point had been demonstrably inaccurate. The fact was that there never fcad been an agreement with Kinemacolor and therefore it could not have been broken. There had been some correspondence on the point, as disclosed in the evidence, and certain oilers hud been made. ITis Honor said that there was a difference between a legal agreement and an agreement in a. loose, general sense. The word might have been used in a popular sense. \ Mr. Myers: On August- Ifl another offer was made, but there was no agreement on that, so there never was an agreement. His Honor: The agreement between Belgium and Germany was not legally enforceable by action in court of law. ' Mr. Myers: It was binding upon honor. His Honor: That is a different thing, from being enforceable in court under common law. Mr. Jive's: There was no agreement here even binding on honor. Mr. Myers added that whatever might, be said on the other issues, he submitted that the jury had been wrong on the first issue, since they had ruled that there was no libel in words that were unmistaknbly libellous on, a business man. He had not covered all the other issues placed before the jury, because the essential question was the first one. If the jury had been wrong there, as lie contended, then the other points were rare red. If the jury had regarded the sew.nrt part of the article as a statement of fact they had gone wrong, because the verdict was contrary it tlie evidence. If they had regards I it as i comment, then clearly they were wrong, I because it was a statement of fact. !tj looked very much as though the jury j had made up their minds to find for the ! defendant. They had found against tlie j plaintiff clearly against the weight of evidence. There was ample authority to : show that the question in tlie second ! part of the article was a statement J • fact and 110 mere comment. Mr. Skerrett (for the defendant): That is ft point for the jury. Mr. Myers: A question may be so clearly a statement of fact that for a jury to find otherwise would be unreasonable. I submit that the question of fair comment, in relation to the second part of the article, should have been withdrawn from the jury and they should have been directed upon it. I asked for that direction. Mr. Skerrett, for the defence, argued that the words alleged to be libe'lons by the plaintiff were ambiguous, and that the jury, therefore, had the sole right to interpret them and to decide upon the points of opinion that were raised. The verdict of the jury could not properly he reviewed when tiie point at issue was one of opinion and not. of fact. There were occasions when a libel was so clear as to become a matter of fact, but that was not the case in connection with the present proceedings. An innuendo was alleged, and the jury had to decide upon that innuendo. Mr. Skerrett proceeded to quote cases in support of his contention that if statements were made in self defence, by a person replying to charges made, the statements were privileged, providing that they were made without malice and in the belief that they were true. The question of whether any part of the libel in the present case was officious was not now before the Court,. Tlie jury had decided that point after a proper direction from the judge, no exception having been taken to the direction. Cases quoted showed clearly that a communication ma<le to a newspaper on a matter of common interest wns privileged, providing there was honesty r.f purpose and an absence of malice. The defendant in the present ease had made his statements without malice and believing them to be true. Counsel for the plaintiff had sought to discredit the verdict of the jury as unthinking and rash, because the jury had answered all the issues. This line of argument was not sound. The jury had taken a proper and quite justifiable attitude, and had shown a keen interest in the case. Counsel usually was rather alarmed at a multitude of issues. His Honor: The rule is this, if you are afraid of vonr case get a Ijrge number of issues put to the jury; if you are certain of it, get it put into one issue. slr, Skerrett added that during tlie hearing of the case his Honor had distinguished clearly between questions of fact and comment. There was no warrant for the suggestion that the jury had not been quite clearly directed on these points. The contention of plaintiff that the verdict given was against the weight of evidence could not be supported. All the correspondence had been placed before the jury. The question of whether nr not there had boon an agreement in the strict sense of the term had been for the jury to decide. The jury had decided definitely, and the point could not properly be re-opencd. It was most noticeable that, the plaintiff had been obliged to attribute an innuendo to tlie defendant's written statements, thus showing clearly that ambiguity existed. The jury bad the right to interpret ambiguity. Then it must be. remembered that the statements complained of by the plaintiff had not been isolated or officious. They had been part of a controversy, and had been made in reply to assertions put forward publicly on the other side. Mr. Skerrett proceeded to argue that the words used by defendant did not bear the interpretation put upon them by plaintiff. To say that a man had br»ken a contract was not necessarily

defamatory. A contract might be binding in honor but. not in law, and a statement that a person hnd taken advantage of the letter of the law would not be defamatory. But in any ease the authorities were clear that in no case had a jury s decision been traversed by the courts when the point was the interpretation of an innuendo. The jury's decision had to stand. The letter 3iad not made any attack on the general business character of plaintiff, but had simply made a statement in reply to another statement.

His Honor: It all depends on the v.'onh ''Held up." It is a question whether the wolds went beyond a reasonable reply. Mr. Skerrott said the words meant merely that plaintiff had refused to let the theatre and had asked better terms. There win 110 ulterior meaning. After hearing further argument his Honor reserved judgment. —'