THE VERDUN OFFENSIVE.

Taranaki Daily News, 8 March 1916, Page 6

THE VERDUN OFFENSIVE.

THE CROWN PRINCE'S REPORT. (By Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Grace in the Auckland Herald). The great concentration of German troops near Metz and the terrific attacks on the French battle-front,, protecting Verdun, are but a repetition of those warlike methods which the Germans used unsuccessfully at Nancy, Ypres, Loos, Neuve Chapeile, against the French and British, and successfully against tlie Russians at Dunajec, Novo Georgievsk, and Kovno, and the same factors which governed the results m these instances of German aggression will doubtless govern tlie result in regard to the present attempt to break the French defensive. The chief reasons of the Germans' success against the Russians during last summer and autumn were the inability of tlie Russians to bring up reserves to the points of their line, against which the Germans' concentrations were made, an inability attributable to the lack of sufficient reserve forces and bad lines of communication, and because of a serious shortage of artillery ammunition; the i reasons of the success of the Allies in the I West were the existence of the perfect system of railways and roads in France, a sufficiency of reserve troops, and an abundance of artillery ammunition, factors which not only continue to exist but are considerably enlarged. THE BATTLEFIELD. However, the concentration of threequarters of a million troops under the Crown Prince is a matter of stupendous potentiality, and, even though its object may fail, forms one of the major operations of the war. The French battlefront about Verdun forms a semi-circie which stretches from the Argonne to St. Miliiel, along a line of 40 miles. From St. Mihiel the line takes a sharp turn a little north of east for 25 miles, to a point which is but ten miles from Metz, and turns south towards Nancy, It is against this turning and twisting front, from the Argonne to the salient which threatens Metz that the Crown Prince's army lias been operating Snce the beginning of the war, and it is here that the present concentration of German troops has been made. Behind the bow-shaped French front, which stretches from ths Argonne to St. Mihiel, is the strong fortress in rear of the French salient which poms towards Metz, is the strong fortress of Toul; in rear of the German salient, of which the apex is St. Mihiel, is the equally-strong fortress of Metz. It will be seen that such a battleground, irrespective of the configuration of the country, which lends itself naturally to defence, is one which presents great difficulties to the antagonist, whether German or French, who decides to attack, but that those difficulties are augmented for the Germans by the twin fortresses of Verdun and Toul and the fortification's of the line of the Meuse, in a greater degree than the difficulties of the French are augmented by the fortress of Metz. The worst that appears possible to the French on this part of the battle-front would be the abandonment of their semi-circular line for the line of the Meuse from Verdun to St. Mihiel, and the straightening of their salient which at a point north-east of Pont-a-Mousson threatens Metz; the worst which would appear possible to the Germans would be their abandoning of their eccentric salient at St. Mihiel and the straightening of their line from the Meuse north of Verdun to the apex of the French salient north-east of Pont-a-Mousson. FRENCH ADVANTAGES. Now, it is indubitable that just as the Germans have concentrated on Metz, so the French have concentrated immense armies of reserves on Verdun, Toul, and the line of the Meuse. Whatever may be the tactical advantage which the Germans seek to obtain, it may be calculated with perfect certainty that the French have made ample provision to thwart the enemy, not only because the military ability of the French general staff is equal to that of the Germans, but because of the enormous reserves—a million British and some two million French troops in France—available for attack or defence, but also because of the excellent facilities which exist for concentrating those vast reserves on any point of the battle-front, and because of the abundance of ammunition and all warlike supplies which the Allies in France possess. GERMANY'S "FINAL" OFFENSIVE. Von Deimling, the commander of the loth German Army Corps, is credited with proclaiming. in an order to his troops, the fact that this is the final aggressive movement of the Germans against France. He is probably right, because it is very possible that after this furious and stupendous attack has ended the Germans will be unable to make another. Furthermore, they may never have another opportunity, because it is just possible that subsequently the Allies may assume the offensive, and with their preponderating armies force the Germans to fight, not merely on the defensive, but for the very existence of their Government, Kaiser, and Fatherland. IF THE CROWN PRINCE FAILS?

Supposing that this final effort of the Crown Prince to solve the economic and dynastic difficulties confronting his nation and family fails, as fail it surely must, then it would appear that with the waning of his terrific onslaught may come the even more terrible counterstroke of the Freucli and their British allies, who conjointly out-number the Germans opposed to them by two to one. Before the German troops, which have been thus concentrated at Metz and its neighbourhood for the purpose of trying to break the Allied sector—Vcrdun-St. Mihid-Psnt-a-Mousson—could be used for the purpose of strengthening the German line at the point where the Allies' decisive counter-attack may have fallen, and instead of the Germans breaking through the Allied line, it may well be that it is the German line which will be broken. There is nothing more difficult in the matter of prophecy than to make a prediction in regard to war, but if the Crown Prince should fail, as he is certain to do unless sonic miracle happens, some miracle of German devilry which alone can help him materially, then, taking into consideration the disposition of the French troops on their line at the point where it touches Lorraine, near Ifetz, and in the Vosges and Alsace, and, considering the great preponderance of force possessed by the Allies of France, it would seem possible that an effective counter-stroke may be made down the valley of Moselle, with a view to getting behind Metz and cutting the lines of communication of the Crown Prince's army, or into and down the valley of the Rhine, with a view to the redemption of Alsace and the crumpling up of the left wing of the German army. Of course, it may be that the time is not ripe for the general offensive of the Allies to take place in France; perhaps it U ftet part of the AUiu' plan to n«k«

sporadic offensives on this or that front; perhaps it is their plan to make but one offensive, and that general anil decisive; but if General .loffrc chooses to sieze the opportunity to make a great counter-at-tack wlion the Crown Prince's onslaught has spent itself, it would seem that he will lack neither the means nor the apportimity. GERMANY'S LAST HAZARD. In any case, the failure of this probably final effort of the Germans to gain the ascendancy in the West, will havi> a tremendous effect on their own country. The economic conditions of Germany grow worse as every month goes by, the dominant position of the Kaiser and of the German military caste can be maintained only by means of a victorious conclusion to the war, the lost reputation of the Crown rrince can be regained only by his accomplishing some notable feat of arms which shall compare with Hindenburg's triumph in the East. But victory is impossible to Germany while France remains unconquered; the Croivn Prince may just as well throw hi 3 last hazard near Verdun as elsewhere. But if he fails, then all Germany will know that France is unconquerable, that victory must rest ultimately with the Allies, and that the Holienzollerns and the German miliary caste have accomplished for the Teutonic nations nothing but defeat and disaster. Then the end of the war should be within sight.