DARDANELLES OPERATIONS.

Taranaki Daily News, 29 January 1916, Page 10

DARDANELLES OPERATIONS.

CAUSES OF FAILURE. LESSON FOR THE FUTURE. (By Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Grace, tn Auckland Herald). If we really desire to probe to tlie bottom the causes which underlie the failure of the attempt to force the Dardanelles, we mu3t go back much further than the defeat at Suvla and Sari'Bair, further back than even the landing of Sir lan Hamilton's force on the peninsula. ( We must go back to the time when the ■enterprise was conceived in haste and launched in defiance of principles of strategy which seldom have been ignored with impunity. We must ask, Why in tlie first place the Navy wag ordered to attempt the impossible? Why was it not supported in the first instance by an adequate army? Why was the intention to operate subsequently with a landing force advertised to the whole world long before the expedition set sail ? Why was there not some attempt made, to use the words of the celebrated author of "Combined Tactics," first to mislead, next to surprise, and finally to overwhelm the enemy? In short, why were not all the advantages of conjunct warfare seized and used to the fullest extent by those who planned the campaign ?

It has always been difficult for an army leader to conceal his intentions, because the concentration and movement ,of his troops usually betray his strategy; ibut in these days of immense armies, .aeroplanes and wireless telegraphy, it is more difficult than ever for a general to conceal the intention behind his strategical movements. Indeed, it will 'be noticed that the members of the Ormau 'General Staff recognise the truth of this fact so clearly that usually they make no attempt to disguise their plan of campaign. They say they will turn their strength against the Bussians. and they do so. They say they will attach' the British army defending Egypt, and it is probaMe that they will d» so. Concealment of the movement of large bodies of troops by rail and road being impossible, they deliberately advertise itheir intentions, and reap the benefit of ,ihe impression of indomitablencss which a successful campaign may subsequently make on the German people and on their enemies. OPPORTUNITIES FOR SURPRISE. But it is quite otherwise with conjunct warfare, the warfare waged by combined naval and military forces. Here the element of surprise is not eliminated, .because the intention of the leaders can Ibo kept secret, the plan of campaign can remain hidden, the objective of the operations can be concealed. If troops, assembled, say, at Malta and Alexandria, embark on board their transports, who is to say whither they are bound, to Salonika, to Adalia. to Alexandretta, to Smyrna, or to the Dardanelles. 'Bona-

parte's descent upon Kgypt is the classic example of surprise in conjunct warfare). It is possible to make the enemy disperse his troops at various points along jiis sea-coast by feints of different sorts; for instance, by landing troops, say, near Alexandretta, with the appearance of striking at the railway from Constantinople, the defending armies may lie drawn from the true objective of the expedition, and when the enemy is oil' his guard the landing may be effected by the main army of the invaders fit the spot which has all the time been in the Winds of those who planned the campaign.

There is another vital point. Xoi. only must the command of the sea he assured to the belligerent Power engaging in .conjunct warfare; it must land an army of sufficient size to carry out its purpose without doubt. That is to say, that (lie army, when landed, must posses* a preponderance of force at the point of disembarkation suflieicnt to guarantee its success. There is also an elementary and axiomatic principle: If it is notadhered to the army, when landed, may find itself powerless to advance—as was the case at the Dardanelles.

STREKCSTII DISSIPATED. But the British War Council, ignoring all such obvious principles of strategy and tactivs, precipitately entered on the .most complex nnd difficult of warlike operations in such a manner that nothing short of a miracle could have brought success. What was thought by naval officers to be the impossible, that .they were ordered to attempt. That which would have rendered their task j simple and their victory comparatively easy —the landing by surprise of an ade- I quate army, simultaneously with the initial bombardment —was denied them. Instead of the Navy and Army striking j conjointly, and unexpectedly, their strength was dissipated in separate at- ! tacks, and after the fleet had failed the ] assistance of the Army was tailed in, I so long after the Tulks had been appris- . cd. of the intended invasion that they ' had bad ample time to assemble and entrench on 'the peninsula armies which greatly outnumbered the invaders. ' I

All these facts are known to the whole world. \'o one disputes them. Thev are set down here because the same causes as led to failure at the Dardanelles,underlie, non-success in other quarters. The British soldiers, whether on the Tigris, or in .Macedonia, or on the peninsula of Gallipoli, whether lie be private or noncommissioned officer, or commissioned officer, has borne himself well: but he has been debarred by the circumstances imposed on him by politiVians possessing but nil imperfect knowledge of how war should he waged, I'ro.ni achieving the success which in circumstances at nil favorable would probably have crowned his gallant efforts. Of course it may be argued that the campaigns referred to are diplomatic campaigns, engaged in for some deep purpose hidden from the common herd. That may be so. But when such campaigns bring defeat and loss of national prestige which necessarily accompanies defeat, it will be seen that the counsels which led to such campaigns may have been as illadt'ued as were the amateurish methods •by means of which tuey were attempted.

It is (o be hoped that the instituting of a Central Ceneral Stall', which shall co-ordinate the strategy of the various armies of (he Croat Alliance, will now and henceforth make is impossible for politicians, of whatever country and however enthusiastic, to precipitate campaigns organised without due reference in the strategists, who alone can say how such operations can best be carried out. It is for the strategists and the strategists alone (o say whether or no (he warlike suggestions of the politicians can be carried out, and the strategists' verdict should he hnal; and if they decide that cerium operations can be curried out, the military method'; to be adopted should rest entirely with them. When the term strategist is used in reference to Britain it includes naval as well as military strategists, because nil Britain's inililary operations are of Ihe nature of conjunct warfare, and concern both the army ami (he navy. In the past the British nation Ims been content to muddle (hrotigh its wars, because it knew it could look confidently to win in the end. and because it did mil regard Us wars with deep seriousness. Therefore, the crude methods of an nnwarlike nation, whereby laymen could plan campaigns, were adhered to, but with so able and powerful a, foe as Cermany, and with so pregnant an example of defeat, as the Dardanelles' campaign, it is to be expected that future operations will originate with and be formulated by those whose training and experience fits them for '(he. work of directing the nation's warlike energies. If such a system had been adopted at the beginning of the war very possibly long ere this our navy would have been through the Dardanelles, and our troops would have been iu possession of Constantinople, but though that glad day is .-.till far oil', it has only been postponed—if the control of the war is left completely in the hands of the Central Oencrn'l Staff.