"GERMAN DEFEAT CERTAIN."

Taranaki Daily News, 22 January 1916, Page 10

"GERMAN DEFEAT CERTAIN."

TALK WITH M. VEMZELOS. Hesiuuion is the word tliat Uest sums us the present attitude of the Creeks (wrote Mr. G. Ward Price from Athens on November 9 to the Daily Telegraph). They are held in prey by conflicting emotions. Influencing them in one direction is thoir fear of the power of Cerjnany, which grows as the battleground draws nearer down the Balkan Peninsula. On the other hand, their sympathies in the abstran are distinctly with the Allies. Over and above all is (i very real desire to keep out of ihe war I altogether if it can be possibly avoided.

As a result of all these considerations, the opinion of the nation is rather delicately poised, and comparatively little would incline the balance to either side. The realisation that tlie Allies are going to carry out their new Balkan campaign ou the grand scale with every ounce of available foive; the arrival of contingents large en.ugii to regain from the German and Bulgarian armies the initiative which they now hold; or, better still, the gaining of a distinct initial success by the Anglo-French forces would reassure the Greek nation and allow its natural instincts of friendliness towards the Allies to develop more freely. On the other hand, an initial reverse, even of no ultimate importance, suffered toy * small detachment of our troops before the main strength of the Allies has had time to reach the Balkans, might only too possibly stampede them towards tliu opposite camp. It is the abnormal conditions under which vre are obliged to undertake this new campaign that give especial importance to the feelings of the Greek people at this juncture. Our principal base in the Balkans, Salonika, lies in a corner of Greek territory close to the Bulgarian frontier. The difficulties of stall' work there must be immense. As a neutral town, we cannot help its swarming with agents of the enemy. And were it not for our present cordial relations with the Greeks the awkwardness of the situation there would be considerably increased. The Greek people ask nothing better than to see us win the war, but there is no denying that they are to a grc-at extent bemused by the ceaseless German propaganda carried on in their midst. Sparing neither effort nor expense, the Germans have dinnad into the ears of the Greeks the cry that Germany is invincible, and before Greek co-operation on our side can be looked for, before her present state of hesitation can be altered, something mure dellnite will have to be done to dispel tlmt illusion. To influence Greek public opinion, the Germans have used every kind of persuasion, From the Big Stick to soft solder. They have scared some and cajoled others. They have threatened and they have bought. In fact, the principal distinction between their diplomatic methods in the ISalkans and our own lias been that the Germans have systematically appealed to the baser motives of fear and self-interest, while we, with less effect, have invoked the more abstract ideals of honor, righteousness and fair dealing.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. The undecided attitude of the Greek notion on foreign policy is directly responsible for its abnormal political condition at home. Democratic Greece is living at present under what is practically an absolutist regime. The pledge which Greece had given to her ally Servia has been repudiated, the Chamber of Deputies is apparently about to he dissolved, and new general elections held at a time when 400,000 of the electors are away with the army—all at the will of the Greek monarch. The King and M. Venizelos stand out more and more as the leaders of opposed policies Other Greek litatesmen are only phantoms in the train of one of these two. M. Venizelos is identified among the people with war on the side of the Allies, on ground both of honor and of interest. The King is for keeping out of the war—perhaps not indefinitely, but certainly until it is quite clear \vhi;h is to he the winning side. What attitude M. Venizelos will ndopt towards this general election, which is being irregularly forced upon this country, is not yet decided. Meanwhile he a strong partisan fro.m every point of view of vigorous action by the Allies in the Balkans.

''l am not a strategist," he said in a conversation which I had with him yesterday, "but two thin,:;* seem quit* clear to me. First, that the Germans are bound to bo conquered in the end from the fact that the reserves from which they are drawing their resources are muvli smaller than those at the disposal of the Allies. The Germans, in fact, have already passed the zenith oi i.lioir strength, though they are still powerful enough to prolong [lie. struggle for k long time. ''Secondly, it seems to me that this new battleground in the Balkans offers favorable conditions to the Allies. Their pnsiiion in tile West must be strong enough for them to hold on there and at the same time detail large bodies of troops for use here in the Balkans There are several advantages that would result from developing this Balkan cam paign on a large scale. "It is important, for one thing, that you should cut ofl Germany from the supply of men and material that, are waiting for her in Turkey, and the moral effect upon Greece and Roumania of an Allied success in the Balkans would !'• considerable. Moreover, if the Allies succeed in smashing the Germans in Serbia there is a line of invasion into their enemies' territory open to them across the Hungarian plaiu-Gcrmauv's weakest fia.uk.

EFFECT OF A REVERSE. "A German reverse in the Balkans, too, would have most serious effects for them at home. The German people have been promised so much and have been so often disappointed. First Paris, then Calais, then the surrender of Russia after tlie taking of Warsaw—and if this new enterprise, with its much-trumpeted aim of opening the road to ICgypt, turns out to be but another failure, Ihe results in the interior of Germany may well be disastrous."

M. Venizelos spoke, too, of the great effect the German propaganda in tile Balkans has had upon Greek public opinion. As a result of this campaign the Germans, lie said, who started with public opinion against them, have greatiy gained, while the Allies, who had the sympathies of the Creek people with the.m, have lost ground. "Thanks to German propaganda in Greece," said the ex-Premier, "a great part of the Greek people while still ardent desiring tlie victory of the Allies, believe not that Germany will win, but that she lias won already.

"I have the greatest admiration for Sir Edward Grey," added M. Vciiizeloo, "and when I was in office had Ihe most eordial relations with him. hut 1 foe! that ;** ."vas a mistake to' chill Greek

Sjmpaiilss by olTering- Kavalla to tin Bulgarians without at any rate first ascertaining I'hcther they would accept the bribe. As for tin: offer of Cyprus to Greece,'' lie went on, "the feeling of Hie mass of the Greek people is that it would be too gmt a risk to accept 'Cyprus under condition* of a co-opera-tion which, in their opinion, as I have said, might lead to the forfeit of most of the rest o f their territory." Tram the point of view of the Creel;?, as fron> tlmt of the Allies, it is a great loss that the influence oJ M. Venizelos. with'his clear perception of the fundamental facts and principles of t-ie war, should be' withheld from the guidance of his country at this crisis. How different and less dubious would be the attitude of Greece were it not for the opposition to hi-j policy of King Constantine anil tbo General Staff is indi. cated by the fact which 31. Venizelos mentioned, and which is not generally known, that even before the battle of the Manic, when the Germans were advancing victoriously on Paris, he then as Premier—voluntarily and without askmg any concession in return—assured the Allies of the co-operation of Greece as soon ns circumstances should permit.

"Wo cannot march now, I told them," suid if. Venizelos, "or Bulgaria will fall upon us. But if 'Bulgarian neutrality can be definitely assured by you, Greece is with ypu. We recognise that you are fitting the battle of the small nations of fcuropo, find that it is to you that Greece owes her existence "