A DEATH TRAP.

Taranaki Daily News, 12 January 1916, Page 8

A DEATH TRAP.

THE FOUNDERING OF F4. A graphic story of tlie battie for lif# waged in vain 3000 ft beneath the surface of the sea by the 21 men who perished ill the U.S. Navy's submarine F4 last March at Honolulu is told in the final report on the loss of the vessel submitted by a board of inquiry headed by Rear-Admiral Busch. Examination oi the wrecked hull, after it had been placed in dry-dock, convinced the board that the disaster was caused by a leak resulting from a corroded battery lining, and the failure of the boat, through poor diving qualities, to respond promptly to the rudder change which should have returned her to the surface. Discarding the theory once advanced that chlorine gas brought quick relief iu death to :tlie crew, the board, from signs within the rusted and battered hulk, pieced out in their report a dramatic account of how the doomed men strove desperately to sjve ithemselves as the vessel sank to the bottom. Fifteen men met death in the engine room, where they sought refuge at the last; six died at their posts in the flooded forward compartment. All members of the ship's company are ab-; solved from blame in this tribute: —

CREW NOT AT FAULT. From the facts established we find tlio accident resulting in disaster to the U.S. submarine F4 on March 25, 1915, was not due to carelessness, negligence, or inefficiency on the part of the officers or men of the vessel, and that, furthermore, the personnel remained at their respective stations until all effective means employed to avert the disaster impending hnd failed, and 'thereafter sought, refuge. After reviewing the facts in detail, the Board of Inquiry give this statement of the causes of the disaster:— The primary cause -was the corroded condition of the lead lining of the battery tank, and, in consequence, of certain rivets starting in the port wall of the forward battery steel tank. The secondary causes were 'the poor diving qualities of the vessel, and the consequent failure of the vessel to respond promptly to measures taken to bring her to the surface.

From their examination of the values of the automatic device that was set to expel water from the vessel's ballast tanks at a depth of 100 ft, as required by the department regulations, the board found that the accident occurred before the 100 ft mark was reached. The most effective procedure for sending the boat to the surface was promptly carried out, diving rudders were set to send her upwards, valves opened to empty the forwad ballast tanks, and the electric motors started to drive her upwards, all without avail. It was then that somemembers of the crew rushed into the engine room and the door of the bulkhead was closed. Fifteen bodies were found there, and from this fact and the position of valves and rudders, the board concluded that some member or members or the personnel were alive and capable of action for at least a short time after the occurrence which led to the disaster.