WHEN WILL THE WAR END?

Taranaki Daily News, 8 January 1916, Page 9

WHEN WILL THE WAR END?

(By an American Military Critic).

Frank H. Simonds in the October number of tlio American Review of Reviews, deals with the "Crucial War Situations as Autumn Begins." Tho purpose of the writer is to explain tlic facts which suggest that "the Austro-German victors" are willing to inaUo peace arid the reasons why the Allies, "so far unsuccessful," should resolutely refuse all opportunity to end the strife at the present stage. Mr. Simonds gives a clear idea of the numbers engaged, losses, etc., which is followed by an estimate as to the duration of the campaign;— In the first months, the Allies and the Central Powers each put into the held armies aggregating in numbers 4,500,000. On the Allied side the quota of the several States was France, 2,000,000; Russia, 2,000,000; Serbia, 2.50,000; Great Britain, 150,000; Belgium, 100,000. Of the field-force of the Central Powers, Germany supplied 3,000,000; Austria, 1,500,000. The entrance of Italy toward the end of the first year raised the total of (he field forces of the Allies, but the Teutonic Powers have not increased the actual total of their field armies materially, nor have the original Allies. The first figures represent approximately the force that the contestants can maintain in the field.

To make good losses, and in .the case of the British alone, to increase the field armies above the first strength, the Allies have sent into the. field 5,500,000 and Italy has brought 850,000, making a total 'contribution of 0,350,000. The Allied loss in this time has been 0,700,000, 5,000,000 of which was permanent and the balance temporary, representing the slightly wounded and the sick who have been able to rejoin. The AustroGerman loss in the same period has been 0,350,000. Of these, 5,000,000 has been permanent and the Austro-Germans have contented themselves with sending to the front justsufficient troops to fill the gaps, that is 5,000,000. The total field forces of the Allies now are about 5,250,000 and of the Austro-Germans 4,500,000. On the Allied side the losses tip to the present time, permanent and temporary, have been as follows: Russians, 4,000,000; French, 2,000,000: British. 400,000; Italian, 100,000: Belgian, 100,000; Serbian, 100,000. This figure can be reduced by from a quarter to a fifth to discover the permanent losses. The huge number of Russian prisoners will incrense the percentage of permanent losses of the Russians. In the same period the German losses have been 3,350,000 and the Austrian 3,050,000. A similar deduction will fix the permanent as compared with the temporary losses. But again regard must be paid to the total of Austrian prisoners. I fix the Russian prisoners at conside- 'lily more than 2,000,000, the Austrian at rather less than 1,000,000.

At the present moment I estimate the Allied field armies to be as follows: Russian, 1,500.000; French. 2,000,000; British, 750,000; Italian. 750,000; Serbian, 150,000; Belgian, 100,000. The AustroGerman, as has been said, remains at 4,500,000. In the West I estimate that there are about 1,500,000 Germans facing 2,000.000 French, 750,000 British, and 100,000 Belgians. In the East I estimate that 1,500,000 Russians are facing 1,500,000 Germans and 1,000,000 Austrians. In the South I estimate that 500,000 Austrians are facing 750,000 Italians and 150,000 Serbians.

In these figures I have made no estimate of the Turks. The reason is this: In the British and French figures no rcjrard has been paid to colonial and native troops. Some have actually been sent to Flanders and France, but in the same way some of the troops in the regular establishments have been sent to the Dardaneles. I believe some 350,000 British and French troops are operating about Gallipoli and that the Turkish force there does, not exceed 150,000. The Allied loss exceeds 100,000, as does the Turkish, but by setting tHo colonial and native troops of France and Britain against the Turkish forces it is possible to disregard both for the purposes of the present calculation. We have, then, the approximate rato of expenditure of life by both sides during the first year of the war. It remains to estimate the resources in lives of the several States to reach an approximation of the time when the supply of human lives will run short, if the expenditure continues for another year at the same rate.

What is the fraction of a total population which can be put into the field in war? Not more than one-tenth, most experts agree. This is above the percentage of the North in the Civil War and not far from that of the South, which actually put its last man in. Now on this basis Germany was able to put in the field 0,700,000; France, 4,000,000; Austrio-Hungary, fi,OOO,OCO. In the case of Britain and Russia, we have to consider two different situations. Russia had available by the rule of onetenth not less than 17.000,000, hut such a horde is beyond all the possibilities of equipping genius. On the other land, it supplies a reserve that can be drawn on annually for just the amount that can be equipped. Last year the draft was 3,000,000. Roughly speaking we may evpeet that as long as Russia stays in 'the war she can furnish 3,000,000 new troops to meet losses each year. England, on (heather hand, does not have conscription and did not have a huge standing army or a trained national reserve. But by enlistment she raised 3,000,000 in a year, while her lossc3 about balanced her trained forces at the outset. Plainly England can never aj>ain supply 3,000,000 in a year. By the law of one-tenth she still has about a million men available, but there is grave doubt whether they can largely 'be brought In without conscription. We have already shown the present strength of the field forces of each contestant. Behind them there stand in the case of the Allies the allowing reserves now mobilised: England, 2,500,000; France, 500,000 remaining from the first lew of 4,000,000, and 400,000, the new class of 1017 just culled up, or 000,000 in all. Italy, having called but 550.000 and lost but'loo,ooo, has theoretically the difference between her resources under the law of one-tenth and this amount, or 3,500,000 less 850,00(1. But no one believes Italy is financially able to equip such masses, and 500,000 is perhaps a fair estimate of her contribution for 1010.

All told, then, the Allies can count on reserves of 7,000,000 during the coming year. As their permanent losses last year were 5,250,000 and their field armies to-day amount to the same total, a similar loss for this year would leave them witli 7,000,000 standing, either in the field or immediately available. Now consider the case ot the Teutonic allies. 'lhey had under the law of onetenth a little less than 12,000,000 available in August, 1014. They have lost finally 5,000,000. They have 4,500,000 in the field. This leaves a balance of 2,500,000, which will be increased by 1,200,000, when the contingent of conscripts for 1917 takes the field. But it their loss this year is equal to last year's, it will be 5,000,000 and ori August 1, 1916, they will have but 3,200,000 to i&0» 7,000,000 of the Allies. The lines % t|t West cannot be held, At their pre-

sent extension, by less than 1,500,000, and Italy and Serbia will require at least 500,000 more for safe defence. This leaves only 1,200,000 to face the Russians. Assuming that. Cermany can still hold her lines up to August 1, then what will be the situation as to fresh lives? France can only supply an annual contingent of 400,000, Englifnd 400,000, and Italy 350,000 plus anything she chooses, since only a small fraction of her total man-power available lias been used. The Teutonic allies can furnish an annual contingent of 1,200,000. But there remains Russia with the capacity to put ,000,000 a year in for a number of years still. This is the whole story of attrition as the Allies see it. They believe, on the statistics that are available, that some time next spring the time will come when Germany cannot keep her field force up to its present strength of 4,500,000. They believe that at the present rate of expenditure it will fall rapidly until by August 1 it will be around 3,200,0Qp. The Allied strength, on the contrary, will rise to 7,000,000, and will have behind it on August 1 great Russian and considerable Italian reserves, while the Germans and Aus.trians, like the French and British, will have only their annual increment to add to their field forces.

Before the winter of 1910 they believe the Germans will have to contract their lines, because their numbers are too small to hold the vast extent on the East and on the West. But until August 1, the Allies expect little change in the actual lines of battle and no considerable Allied success save about Constantinople.