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HOW WE MISSED.

m tie peninsula. STORY OF THE FAILURE. NEW ZEALANDERS EULOGiSED. GENERAL HAMILTON'S REPORT. London, January 6. (ieneral Sir lan Hamilton states that the battle of the sixth to eighth of May showed that neither the northern nor southern forces were strong enough to light their way l« the Narrow--. "I cabled, on May Id, asking for two fresh divisions in order to prevent the attack degenerating into trench warfare. I cabled on May 17 saying that if we were left to face the. Turks on our own resources we should require two additional army corps. Owing- to the Russians giving up the idea of co-oper-ating on the coast of the Black Sea. several Turkish divisions arrived at the Dardanelles, and we were therefore just as weak in June as we were a month earlier. (ieneral Hamilton recalls that Lord Kitchener, in June, promised three regular divisions and two territorial divisions of infantry, and their concentration would be complete. On August 10, after rejecting the possibility of an advance from Cape Tlelles, the disembark a i ion on the Asiatic side was followed liv a march on Chanak. The possibilities were a landing at Jt'nos. in order to seize the neck of the isthmus near llulair, or the reinforcements of Australians and Xew Xcalandcrs combined landing at the (Siivla bank. Admiral De Kocbeek's naval objections to the landing at F.no.s were wellnight insurmountable, owing to submarines. All reinforcements nail been brought up front Mudros. to Cape Tlelles and Anzae by night, in a fleet of sweepers and trawlers, A lauding at Bulair would have added fifty miles, which was too severe a strain for the capacities of the flotilla.

THE SUBMARINE MENACE. It was impossible to guard against submarine attacks at Enos. The enemy had time to organise a formidable opposition from their troops in Thrace, and therefore I determined to storm the dominating height, Hill 80S, with the capture of Mudros and Gaba Tepe a? a sequel. From the very first I had hoped that the landing, force under Sari Hair would have enabled us to strangle the Turkish communications, but my hopes did not bear fruit. Nevertheless the Australians and Now Zcalanders rooted themselves very near the enemy's vilais, and their tenacity and courage still lipid open the doorway whence one strong thrust forward would have given 11s the command of the Narrows. In order to carry out the plan for smuggling large numbers of troops to Anzac and landing a large force at Suvla, it was essential to eliminate the moonlight, and unless the plunge had been taken in the second week In August the ivliolo venture must have been postponed for a month. Having decided upon the plan and the date, it was necessary to fill up the intervening period. I'i'i • was much fighting, and a possible Working out of the ammunition allowance. I found we could accumulate enough high explosives to deliver one serious attack every three weeks. One of these was the attack on Tasmania Post, which was threatened by the extension of a Turkish trench, and the ta>k of capturing this was cntbrusted to the Third Australian Brigade. On July ill four assaulting parties of the. Uth Battalion dashed forward and crossed our barbed wire on planks. Directly a series of mines was fired. Only eleven were killed and 7-1 wounded, compared with 100 Turkish killed.

SCTIEMKS OF STRATEGY. August (! was now approaching, and in order to divert tins enemy from the main strategical conception a certain amount of ingenuity was essential to mv scheme for hoodwinking the Turks. Firstly strategical diversions, intended to draw away the enemy reserves not yet landed oii the peninsula; secondly, a tactical diversion, meant to hold up tin: reserves already on the peninsula. The strategical diversions included a surprise landing in the north of the gulf at Eros, demonstrations by French ships opposite 'Mitylene, concentration at Mitylene, and inspections of Mitylene by Admiral de Roebeck and myself. The tactical diversions included maintaining the attack at Cape Holies and at Lone Pine trenches. As a result, the Turks, despite their excellent spy system, were completely oil' their guard At dawn on August 7 it wag impossible to concentrate on the peninsula even one-third of the fresh troops required to attack. The forces destined For (he offensive were the day before the battle at Anzae. lmbros, Mudros and Mitylene, the last throe detachments 1), (10 and I'2o miles from the area of attack.

I believe the clearness and completeness of the "ieneral Staff's orders for this concentration and landing will hereafter bo studied as models at military academies.

An enormous quantity of water was secretlv stowed in a reservoir at Anzae, holding 30,000 gallons, and in petroleum tins holding 80,000 gallons. Accidents interfered with both plans, but Anzae was ever resourceful, and in (.lie face of misadventures did not meet disaster with folded hands.

I took "p my headquarters at Imbros, where J was 45 minutes from Cape Hellcs, 10 from Anzae ami 50 from Suvla. The attack at Cane llellcs on' August 0 showed that the Turks regarded us as hlilf-boaten. The enemy were again offering; as stout a resistance as to the original hmding. This was due to news of tin' Ausi.ro-German advance in Russia. The arrival of reinforcements at Tlelles, although their attacks were only a partial srieeoss. drew certain Turkish'reinforcements to the southern area. Passing to the operations at Anzac, General Hamilton says:—The entire details of the operations were formulated I>y General Birdwood, subject to my ■final'approval. The local preparations reflect the greatest -credit, not only upon General Birdwood and his staff, but upon the troops, who toiled like slaves to accumulate food, drink, munitions and accommodation for the extra troops to be landed. Tiiis necessitated an im-

mense amount of work, preparing concealed bivouacs and making interior communications. The Australians and New Zoalamlers worked an entire night without complaining. The eirorts"oj ilicse much-tried troops are as much to their credit as their heroism in the following battles.

NO HITCH IN THE SCHEME. The reinforcing troops were shipped into Anzae very silently. They were tucked away from enemy aeroplanes' ob--"wations in prepared hiding places. The scheme was carried out without a hitch. f much don!,!, wbecher .., ~,„.■,. pregnant enterprise than the landing <,f s0 l ar g(, a force under the very eyes of an enemy, and keeping them concealed for three days, is recorded in tile anmil- of war. Ocueral Birdwood'j troops numbered .17.(101) rilles, with 7'.: guns, sunpuvteij by two cruisers, four monitors and two destroyers. The enemy's left and centre were subjected to slow bombardment for three days and an assault upon Lone Pine entrenchment was ordered on the afternoon of August (i with the object of drawing (he Turkish reserve:; from the grand attack. Major-Oeneral IValker. of the First Division, worked out the scheme with forethought, and the assault was entrusted to (ieneral Smyllie, of the First Brigade, who carried it out.

The Second, Third and Fourth Australian Battalions were the first to rush across the open. It was a regular race against death. Then came a terrible moment, when it seemed physically impossible for them to penetrate the trenches. Overhead cover of stout pine-iieams resisted all their individual efforts. Yet the loop holes continued to spit tire at the groups of men. When they bodily lifted up the beams individual soldie-'s leaped down into the semi-darkness of the galleries amongst the Turks. Within seven mimtr;M ihe Third and Fourth Battalions we,-> well within the enemy's vitals. The reserve of the Second Battalion advanced over their parados and made good in the whole of the trendies. The Turks organised a vioVnt coun-ter-attack. Wave upon wave of the enemy swept forward, the bayonet battle continuing until Anaust 1:1. The Turks were in great force and very lull or' light. Vet a weak Australian Brigade, numbering 200(1 men, s-tnoorted by two weak battalion", carried Lone Pine under the eyes of a whole enemy division and maintained it in a grip like a vice for six days against successive counter-attacks.

HOLDING TURKISH RESERVES. The other frontal attack; at Anzae we"c less fortunate, bat Uiey kept the Turkish reserve:; on Bui.cs'iip Hill from becoming available to mcei lie real push, wliK-Ji was i night attach 0:1 the summits of Sair Hair ridge. Our object was to effect a lodgment rlong the crest of the main ridge with -two columns of troops. We planned that two assaulting \columns should work up three ravines, and that two storm a high ridge. These wore preceded by two covering columns, whereof the ii-.st was to capture the enemy's positions commanding the foothills, and the other was to strike out northwards until from llamajelik flair they could guard Ihe left Hank of the column assaulting Sari Hair irom the enemy in Amtfarta Valley. The whole of this big attack was made under General Godley.

'file Atizaos, assisted by the warship Colne, had been educating the Turks how they lost the redoubt near Tabletop. Every night at nine o'clock the Colne threw a searchlight and bombarded the redoubt for ten minutes, then a ten minutes' interval and a second illumination and- bombardment, concluding at precisely 1.110 o'clock. The idea was I hat the enemy would get the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear out until Che shelling ended. On the night of August fi the searchlight was switched oil' at !U0 and instantly our men poured out of the scrub and jungle into the empty redoubt, and a whole series of entrenchments was carried bv 11 o'clock.

Referring to the attack on Clialak Dere, General Hamilon remarks:

•This was less cleanly carried out. than Lone Pine. Indeed, it made an ugly start. Tho little column of stormers were held up by barbed wire of unexampled height, depth and solidity, which completely closed the ravine. Here tliat splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and best, but when one thinks of the desperate passage forced one recognises the most conspicuous and cool coinage exhibited by Captain Sliera anil his. party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who are descendants of the warriors of Gate Pa. , A SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK.

Simultaneously an attack on Tabletop was launched under cover of tho Colne's heavy bombardment. The banks are so steep that Table-top gives the impression of a mushroom, the summit bulging over the stem, but, as faith moves mountains, so their valor carried them. The Turks fought bravely. The ascent of angle (able-tops is recognised in regulations as impracticable for infantry, but neither the Turks nor the angles of the ascent were destined to stop Russell and his New Zealamlors that niglif. There are moments in a battle when men become supermen. This was one of those moments. The scarped heights were scaled, and the plateau carried at midnight. With this brilliant feat (he task of the right covering force ended. The attacks were made with bayonet and bomb only. The magazines wen? empty by order. No words can do justice lo the achievement of Russell and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, the Otago Rifles, the Maoris, and the New Zealand field iroops. .Meanwhile the right assaulting column, under Johnston, with a New Zealand Infantry Brigade Indian Mountain Baterty, and a company of New Zealand Engineers, entered the .southerly ravines at midnight and commenced a hotly eontested fight in the trenches on the lower part of Rhododendron Spur, whilst the Chalak.Dere column pressed up the valley. The grand attack' was now in full swing, but the country gave new sensations of cliff climbing. Even officers and men who had graduated over the goat tracks of Anzae, owing to the darkness of the night and the density of the scrub, made slow progress on hands and knees up (he spurs in sheer physical fatigue and exhaustion of spirit, due to repeated hairbreadth escapes. All these combined to take edge off their energies.

The troops of the Fourth Australian Brigade, with the loft assaulting column under Cox, struggled, fighting hard as they went, and making for Hill !io">. The crest line was nncapturcd at dawn, although, considering all things, Cox's column made a marvellous advance, the enemy being flung from ridge to riil.rr<\ An excellent line for a renewal of the attack was secured, The auspices were propitious, exeopt for the exhaustion of the troops.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TDN19160108.2.25.11

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Taranaki Daily News, 8 January 1916, Page 5

Word count
Tapeke kupu
2,071

HOW WE MISSED. Taranaki Daily News, 8 January 1916, Page 5

HOW WE MISSED. Taranaki Daily News, 8 January 1916, Page 5

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