AN INTERNATIONAL GENERAL STAFF.

Taranaki Daily News, 1 December 1915, Page 4

AN INTERNATIONAL GENERAL STAFF.

It will be seen from yesterday's cables that a proposal is being put forward for the creation of aa International dand General Staff. The proposal, it will be noted, bears no official impress, but emanates from the London Daily Chronicle's Paris correspondent. It was only a short while ago that an arrangement was arrived at for holding joint conferences of Aggie-French Ministers assisted by expert advice from the United General Staff, being in effect a conjoint War Council composed of representatives of the two countries. This plan was carried out, but, apparently, only in an experimental fashion, for beyond the views of the initial meeting, no further record has been published. It is quite conceivable that there are grave difficulties in the way of making such a Council permanent, but there can be no doubt as to the desirability of establishing some method for ensuring promptitude in co-ordinated action. The Chronicle's correspondent states that the Entente Powers are beginning to realise the need of an international Grand General Staff of a permanent character, meeting regularly to discuss war questions as they arise. To the lay mind it would seem that unless such a Council was given a free hand as to their decisions, with power to act, it would be of little use. Would cither country consent to alienate its control of operations and place it in the hands of their representatives of the four Powers now co-operating with the Entente Powers? It is scarcely reasonable to expect that they would be agreeable to take such a course. At the same time much valuable assistance could be rendered to the Government and military high commanders of the four Powers by instituting an Advisory Council of expert officers of these Powers, and if that be the intention embodied in the proposal it is worthy ol consideration. It will be remembered that a proposal emanated from France for the appointment of a supreme commander of the Allied forces, but that it was promptly turned down by the British Government The principle of joint consultations is certainly one that can be thoroughly considered, but no single Power can possibly be justified in parting with the control of its forces. The question of how and where the various armies can bo most usefully and effectively employed from time to time could doubtless be better solved by suitable expert authorities of the four Powers in conference than by a single comouncrer. in-chief, for the representative? would possess important local knowledge that would he of material assistance. There arc, however, many problems that could not he worked out satisfactorily by such means, especially those which partook more of policy than strategy. Take, for instance, as a case jn point, the Dardanelles campaign—its conriu uiiiiro, or abandonment. It is quite likely that the representatives of each of the Powers would consider the question from a different standpoint, as effecting the country they represented. To Britain, however, it is one of the most vital campaigns of the war, for on its issue depends the maintenance of her control of the highways of the sea and the freeddni of hor commerce continued. Had the seat of the conflict been Egypt and the Suez Canal only been partially open for traffic, the Homeland, without our wool, cheese, butter and mutton, would have meant suspended industries, and an army short of food. The pivot of success of the Entente Powers is mutual confidence. Fortunately, this is firmly established, and the excellent understanding that exists between the Allies is a guarantee of ultimate victory. They are animated with one desire, and al! are working for one end, hut there should he an avoidance of any action or scheme that might tend to cause jealousy or friction, while each Power must maintain the control of its war policy, provided that policy is for the general good of the cause. Any consultative body that may he found desirable to further the joint interests could he useful, but whether it would ba a success is another matter.