FIGHTING A BATTLE PLANE.

Taranaki Daily News, 20 November 1915, Page 12 (Supplement)

FIGHTING A BATTLE PLANE.

VIVID STORY OF AIR TAOTICs (By an Observer attached to the Royal ■Flying Corps). An hour after daybreak I ,?as follow ing the enemy's lines of communication for thirty miles behind his trenches, For half an hour we ploughed and labored back, making varying progress. As we neared the lineg the "Arc'liies" (anti-aircraft guns) made more deliberate and better practice, but we managed to outmanoeuvre them. About 2000 feet below us on the right was a bank I of ground mist ascending rapidly, I ex-! amined this carefully through glasses and suddenly caught sight of a machine just within ihe outer fringe of the bank He was ascending rapidly in a. step upward spiral. He was travelling against the wind at u pace which seemed to be a trifle faster than ours. As lie got clear of the cloud bank he bent over again into a spiral, and his crosses (the German mark) were plainly visible. His shape was now discernible, and Ave .saw that ho was the "great battleplane' of the German communiques. Tl:e two propellers flashed sombrely in the sunlight as they lifted the big machine towards us. In the curious, bending wings aird the double fuselage (tail part of the machine) there was the effect of a grinning monster, exuiting hi iiis assured prey. HIS MACHINE GUXS BKf.'IN, He was soon within about half a mile of us, and about 800 feet down. As I watched him at that height I saw his machine guns begin to spit. In estimating tactics in air combat it is, of course, the first consideration to determine the enemy's ''Wind aide." The points of vulnerability in order of importance may be said to be the propeller, the engine, the pilot and the control'. In fighting a tractor (its propeller in front) one must keep in front and above. In lighting a pusher "gunous" one must avoid the front and keep behind at all costs, and rather below than above. On this occasion the enemy machine was a duplicate tractor—that' is, it had two propellers, both in front. Obviously our tactics were to keep above the front. Beyond strenuous attempts to get level with us the enemy machine had given no indication of his line of action. Indeed, he had fallen back about a quarter of a mile and had ceased firing. He was determined to get above us. As our machine was a tractor, we had to engage him before he had done this. So we swung round and bore down wind straight for him, opening fire with machine guns at the same time. The Hun replied with a fusilade from guns mounted both fore and aft; but his practice was bad, and only a stray shot found our planes. As we came down upon him at a great pace lie shoved his nose us at a tremendous angle, and almost "stalljed" his machine (i.e., made it point up so much that it refused to climb) in an endeavor to cross above us. But the big "battleplane" did not respond to the controls, and, instead of climbing, went over and slid away for fully two hundred yards before the* pilot got her out of -his "tail slip." "WE 'STOOD' ON OUR TIP." My pilot stood our machine on her left wing tip and swung round in a slow vertical bank (steep slope) which enabled me to sweep the enemy machine with my gun. As we were due in front of him, his fire was restricted. It was obvious also that the pilot's nerve had suffered froi)> the "tail slip," because when he came out of it he dived away until he was out of our range. We followed, keeping well in front and slightly above. By suddenly "dipping his elevator" my pilot brought the machine within pointblank range. The Hun did not reply. He was waiting until lie turned over on an angle on an outward bank just ahead of us. We saw the ponderous right wing go down and the fuselage's reverse position. But we had the inner circle, and swept round in front of him before lie was half-way through his bank. The moral advantage of having out-man-oeuvred him seemed to have disconcerted the Hun, for he gave up the bank, put his nose down, and went down at a very steep angle. He may have been hit, but to all appearances his engine and propellers were still working. As soon as we made certain that he meant to retreat for good we resumed our reconnaissance course. As he got clear of our zone he threw out a smoke ball, and the anti-aircraft guns recommenced their practice. While there was no startling result of the above meeting, it is typitnl of a great number of meetings which have occurred between our machines and the new "battleplanes" of the enemy. The moral to be drawn from it is that our superior-airmanship and power to manoeuvre have somewhat more than offset the superior armament and size of the enemy machine in the majority- of air combats. Speed and climbing-power arc the cardinal considerations. We must not let the enemy remedy his deficiencies in these respects to our disadvantage