DIARY OF THE WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, 20 November 1915, Page 10 (Supplement)

DIARY OF THE WAR.

FiECRETS OP DIPLOMACY DODGE TO NEUTRALISE BRITAIN. KAISER'S FEAR OF REGICIDES. The tangled skein of German duplicity which culminated in the war is gradually being unravelled (says the Sydney Sun's London correspondent) A fortnight ago the German Chancellor told the Reichstag that "in order to arrive at lasting relations with England we proposed an uuconditional mutual neutrality undertaking. This proposal was rejected by England as going too far." Last night (August 31) Sir Edward Grey told the true story of the negotiations which Lord Haldane conducted with Germany in 1912, 111 the hope of arriving at an understanding on the questions of armaments and policy. German apologists have persistently alleged that German anxiety for such an understanding met with no sympathetic response in Great Britain. It is perfectly true that it did not, but for very different reasons from those which have been alleged by Von Bethmann Hollweg. Groat Britain initiated the negotiations and offered neutrality in the shape of a definite promise that we would not support any attack made upon Germany by another Power. Considering all that wo knew, even then, of German aims and intrigues, the offer was more than generous, and obviously genuine. It was not, however, prodigal enough for Germany. Htinland was afraid that we might be forced by circumstances to throw our weight into the balance *vhen its plots for securing th& hegemony of Europe were fully matured. So in the guise of an apparently frank, inoffensive, and innocent agreement, it sought to tie us down to an unconditional neutrality. It asked for an understanding that would have left the Triple Alliance unassailable and indissoluble, while disrupting the Entente Cordiale and making it impossible as a combatant factor. CHEATING THE EYE Though in appearance scrupulously fair as between the parties, these conditions would have manacled Great Britain in the event of that European conflagration for which Germany was insidiously preparing. The Kaiser had binding obligations with Austria and with Italy. Great Britain had only two operative war treaties—with Japan and with Portugal. The formula would have compelled Great Britain to abstain from making any alliances with any other Powers than the two mentioned. That is to say, Germany, Austria, and Italy could have attacked France or Russia as they felt disposed, while Great Britain, despite the Entente existing between her and those countries, would have had to stand with folded arms and watch the conflict. Neither Lord Haldane nor Sir Edward Grey was to be caught by this cunjiing scheme. Probably both of them recalled Bismarck's system of isolation and aggression. The Iron Chancellor used Austria in his first assault upon Denmark. He wooed France with honeyed wtfrds before he descended like a brigand upon Austria, and then he persuaded Austria that he wa3 her best friend before he turned and humbled France in 1870. Bethmann Hollweg, true to Teutonic tradition, was evidently taking a leaf out of Bismarck's infamous book on statecraft.

Sir Edward Grey pointed out very politely that however atupid Downing Street might be in tlie estimation of the Wilhelmstraase, it was not quite stupid enough to permit Great Britain to be pinioned by consent in order that Germany might crush her neighbors without interference. What the Germans angled for was freedom to fight, while Great Britain was forced to look on. Our turn would have come later. Sir Edward Grey offered a reciprocal and unconditional neutrality. The Wilhelmstrasse declined, pushed on with its inflated navy estimates, rushed through its great war levy, enormously expanded its army, accumulated prodigious stores of guns and munitions, nudged Austria into attacking Serbia and making that the excuse for a world war in which, despite the most damning diplomatic records, Berlin still has the colossal audacity to assert that the Allies were the aggressors.

BELGIAN REVELATIONS. Between the failure of the German formula and the war there were apparently no further peace negotiations of any importance. We cannot expect to receive any further light upon the immense war activities of the Germans by the publication of our official archives unless it be that the Foreign Office sees fit to print some of the reports which it received from our Ambassadors and our Ministers stationed in the Central European Empires. There must be a wealth of wonderful material in the despatches which it was the duty of these representatives to write for the information and guidance of Sir Edward Grey. It has always been considered contrary to the principles of high polities to disclose communications of this character. But fortunately for us all tlie German Foreign Office has, in a most despicable manner, nosed amongst the Belgian records left in Brussels, and with these has meanly attempted to justify its violation of tiie little kingdom. , This resort to dirty tricks has brought from the Belgian Government a Grey Book, packed with startling revelations, which unmask the perfidy of the Kaiser, and read like a thrilling romance. Towards the end of July the Belgian Minister in Berlin could no longer trust his correspondence to the German post ofiice. The Imperial Secret Service would have tampered with his letters, and have acquainted the Willmlinstrasse with any advice which lie might tender to King Albert. After the Austro-Hun-garian Note had been delivered to Serbia he wrote a letter, which has since proved to be strangely prescient, and sent it to Brussels by special courier. In it he repeated the substance of conversations with the French and British Ambassadors 11 ud the Greek and Dutch Ministers, which for the first time had given him the impression that the Mailed Fist, ultimatum to Serbia was a coup prepared between Vienna and Berlin, or rather planned in Berlin and put into execution in Vienna. "It is this," he wrote, "which constitutes the great danger. The vengeance to be exacted for the assassination of the Grand Ducal heir to the Austrian Throne and for the. pnn-Ser-bian agitation serves only as a pretext. The end that is aimed at, besides the wiping out of Serbia and the Southern Slav aspirations, is to deal a mortal blow at Russia and Franco with the hope that England will remain outside the struggle. "To justify these views, I must reinfnd you of the opinion that prevails in the German General Stall'—to wit, that, a war with France and liussia is inevitable and not far distant, an opinion which they have succeeded in getting the Emperor to share.*

Here it, may be well to interpolate a passage from a despatch written by the Belgian Minister two days earlier, because it introduces an entirely new suggestion as to the motives which moved the Kaiser: "The fear and horror that he has to regicides explain how the Emperor has come to leave a free hand to his allies, in spite of the risk that he is running of a European conflict." The Belgian Minister was so remarkably accurate in his diagnosis of other phases of the situation that his theory that the Kaiser wa3 actuated by a desire to strike terror into the hearts of all regicides lest his own head should fall is very tenable. Reverting now to the Dispatch of July 20, we read: "This war, ardently desired by the military and pan-German party, might he undertaken to-day, the German General Staff judges, in circumstances which are extremely I favorable for Germany, and which are not likely to present themselves again in any short space of time. I "Germany has completed her military reinforcements provided for by the Law of 1012, and, on the other hand, she feels that she cannot keep up Indefinitely an armaments race with Russia and France, which would end in ruining her. The war levy (wehr beitrag) lias been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has shown the limit of the national wealth. Russia, before she has completed her military reorganisation, has committed the mistake of exposing her strength. That strength will become formidable only some years hence j what she now lacks is the development of the necessary lines of railway. As for prance M. Charles Humbert has revealed the insufficiency of guns of great calibre; now it is just that arm that, so it seems, is to decide the fate of .battles. England, finally, whom for two years past the German Government have been trying, not without some success, to detach from France and Russia, 13 paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish quarrels. "The existence of a concerted plan between Berlin and Vienna ifi proved to the eyes of my colleagues and of myself by th£ obstinacy that tho Wilhelmstrasse adopts in denying that it had any acquaintance before Tuesday last with the tenor of the Austrian Note. It was also on Tuesday last that it became known in Rome, which explains the disgust and discontent displayed here by the Italian Ambassador. How can it be admitted that this Note, destined as it is to make war immediate and inevitable, both by reason of the excessive harshness of it's conditions and by reason of the short delay allowed to the Belgrade Cabinet to carry them out, could have been drawn up without the knowledge of the German Government and without its active collaboration, when it involves for it the gravest consequences? What proves still more the perfect accord between the two Governments is their simultaneous refusal to prolong the period allowed to Serbia.

"The desire for immediate and unavoidable hostilities must have been the same in Berlin and Vienna. The paternity of the plan and the suggestion of the measures to be employed are attributed here, in the diplomatic world, by reason of their very cleverness, worthy of a Bismarck, to the brain of a German rather than an Austrian diplomat. The seoret has been well kept, and its execution pursued with a marvellous rapidity Observe that, if the secret aim of the statesmen of the two empires is not really to generalise the war and to force Russia and Prance to take part in it, but only to wipe out the power of Serbia, and to prevent her from pursuing her occult work of propaganda, the result is the same. It is impossible that the foreseeing of this result lias escaped the clear-sighted eyes of the directors Of the German Empire. In the one as in the other of these suppositions the intervention of Russia would seem inevitable; they must have ooldly faced this complication and prepared themselves to give ewrgetio support to their allies. The prospect of a European war has not made them hesitate for an instant, even if the desire to unchain it has not been the motive of their conduct."