CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, 17 November 1915, Page 5

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

IN DEFENCE. MR. CHURCHILL'S STATEMENT. DID NOT RECEIVE FIRM SUPPORT. London, Nov. 15. Mr. Clmrehill, in the House of Commons, said he had not received the clear guidance and firm support from Lord Fisher which lie might liavo expected. If lie (Lord Fisher) disapproved of the Dardanelles campaign he should have spoken out in the War Council. THE DARDANELLES ENTERPRISE. 'Mr. Churchill claimed that the "Psirdanellea enterprise was profoundly, maturely and elaborately considered. The Admiral on the spot said that the Dardanelles could not lie rushed, but might he reduced gradually by bombardment. Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Jackson confirmed this view. Lord Fisher in January deprecated reducing the margin of naval strength in home waters, but never criticised the methods of fittaeic in the Dardanelles. The first stage of the operations was successful beyond all expectations, but it was • lower in March. All the movements v.ere taken with Lord Fisher's written assent. .Speaking from a corner seat behind the. Treasury Bench, Mr. Clmrehill said that the fact that lie had not taken a place in the front Opposition Bench did not imply criticism of those who did. He earnestly hoped that Sir E. Carson would be constantly iu attendance. In the public interest someone with complete and secret information, and independent of the Government, should be available. THE FALKLAND? BATTLE. He could not conceive any reason why the story of the Falklands'bntlle should not have been published. -Regarding the destruction of the Bacchante cruisers, it was untrue that he had overruled the naval authorities, and that the disaster was due to him. He had no objection to the publication of the papers, but he would not press this if such would injure the officers now serving. THE ANTWERP EXPEDITION.

BLAMES KITCHENER. Reecived Nov. l(i. 5.5 p.m. London, Nov. 15. ' The projoct of sending an army to Antwerp originated with Lord Kitchener and the French Government. He (Mr. Churchill) was not consulted till large bodies of troops were actually moving. He summoned a conference at Lord Kitchener's house on October 2, when Sir E. Grey and Lord Fisher were also present. Then he learned of the project to send a relieving army, and also that after the preparations to aid Antwerp were so far advanced the Belgian Government telegraphed their decision '.o evacuate the city and abandon its defence. All were extremely distressed to learn this. It seemed that everything would be thrown away for the sake of tluve or four days of continued resistance. He accordingly offered, and did not regret it one bit, to proceed to Antwerp immediately, to tell the Belgian Government what they had done and to see in what way the, Belgian defence eouH be prolonged. His colleagues accepted the offer, and he. crossed the Channel immediately. Having consulted the Belgian Government and the British Staff officers at Antwerp he made a telegraphic proposal that the Belgians should continue their 'resistance to the utmost limit of their power, and that the British and French Governments should say definitely in three days whether they would lie able to send relief. Britain was also to encourage the defenders of Antwerp by sending naval guns and a naval brigade. His proposal was accepted, and he was told that a relieving army would be sent. He was told that everything possible would he done to maintain the defence. There had been a great mistake in regard to Lord Kitchener's effort to relieve Antwerp, as it only resulted in misfortune. History, however, would determine that it resulted greatly to the advantage of the Allies in the West, causing the great battle on the Yser instead of further south.

TAKES RESPONSIBILITY. The real operations were taken too late. On September C he had directed the attention of Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Sir E. Grey to the dangerous situation developing at Antwerp, and the grave consequences possible. Admiralty interests suggested tint Territorial divisions should be sent to stimulate the defence, and he made other proposals, but no action was taken until the situation on October 2 supervened. He took the responsibility for sending the naval brigade, despite their want of training, but the situation was desperate and they were the only men available.

"A GAMBLE." Mr. Churchill stated that he would not have it said that the Dardanelles campaign was a plan foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers. He regarded it as a legitimate war gamble, of inestimable value, in which there was (i reasonable chance of winning. On that basis he accepted full responsibility. Russia, in November, asked the Foreign Office whether (action against Turkey was possible, to relieve the pressure in the Caucasus. In consequence he began to direct the attention of Lord Fisher and other naval officers to the. possibility of action in Turkish waters. He sent a minute on November .10 to Lord Kitchener, offering facilities for the transportation of forty thousand troops, and was informed that no army was available. Early discussions in the House showed that the prevailing opinion was that even if a force were available it could hot be used in attacking Gallipoli Peninsula.

DARDANELLES COULD NOT BE RUSHED. As the necessity for action in the Eastern Mediterranean had been constantly pressed upon the Admiralty, Mr. Churchill said he telegraphed, on January 3, to Admiral Carden, and asked if he considered that the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone was a practicable operation. Admiral Carden replied that the Dardanelles could not be rushed, and suggested a sustained bombardment. Admiral Carden, in a. de tailed telegram on January 11, stated

his requirements. The Admiralty War Staff examined the plan. Vicc-Admiral Jackson expressed full concurrence and advised attacks on the outer forts as early as possible. Lord Fisher never expressed any opinion against the operations at this stage. Lord Fisher's memorandum did not question (he feasibility of Hie operation, but deprecated reducing the margin of the licet in homo waters. The first operations had produced an electrical shock in the Balkans, and when joint military operations were decided on Lord Fisher regretted the delay. He refused an order for resumption of a purely naval attack during the period between March IS and Aori! 13. This was one of the least pleasant experiences in his (Mr. Churchill's) life, lie did not regret Lord Fisher's return to the Admiralty, because he had produced a new design of ships and swelled like a tide their delivery. THE MILITARY OPERATIONS. Lord j Kitchener was responsible for the military operations at Gnllipoh, which should have been carried through with the utmost vigor and fury. Throughout the summer the army stood within a few miles of a great victory, and an advance like that at Neuve Chapclle would have decided the whole situation. He did not intend to be drawn into further controversy, no matter what was said in reply. He had left his documents with the AttorneyGeneral. When Lord Fisher had resigned, he himself had oll'ered to resign, but Mr. Asquitli had asked him to continue.

DON'T BE DOWNHEARTED. "We have no reason lo be discouraged hy the progress of the war," said Mr. Churchill. "We an- passing through a time probably ivo:?f than before. Tt is not necessary to win the war by pushing -hack the Germans in territory that is now held, while the German line is extended far beyond the frontiers, and military success has apparently attended tl>e German arm'.s. Germany might still be defeated more fatally in the second or third year than if the Allies had entered Berlin in the first year. The shortage of munitions governed the campaign of 1015, and the campaign of HUB ought lo he settled against Germany by the shortage of men." THE DECISION OF THE ADMIRALS. Received Nov. 18, 10.3 p.m. London, Nov. 15, When Admiral Garden was stricken with illness, Mr. Clmrcliill said that lie sent a personal secret telegram to Admiral do Roebeek, asking whether he approved of the Admiralty's and Admiral Carden's decision to press the attack on March 17; also to say whether, in his independent judgment, immediate operation* were wise and practicable. If not, he was not to hesitate to say so; if he approved, he was to execute them without delay. Admiral de Roebcck replied," fully concurring with the Admiralty plans, and added, "I will attack on the 18th."

'•TAKE CONSTANTINOPLE." Mr. Churchill declared that if, in the weeks elapsing between the naval and military operations, we had known what we now know, lie could not conceive that anyone would have hesitated to face a loss of prestige by breaking off the Dardanelles attack. 'lie, wished to make clear that he encouraged the War Office to the utmost to prosecute the military enterprise, and he had counselled the Government all through the year to take Constantinople, either by naval or military operations, but to take it quickly while time remained. But the situation was now altered entirely. A FAITHFUL FRIEND. Mr. Asquith said that Mr, Churchill had dealt with a delicate situation with loyalty and discretion. He had said some things which he (Mr. Asquith) would rather he had not said, and omitted some things which would he said hereafter. He had always found Mr. Churchill a wise counsellor, a brilliant colleague, and a faithful friend. MR. CHURCHILL APPLAUDED. London, Nov. 10. The House of Commons was crowded. There was no demonstration at Mr. Churchill's entry, but an encouraging cheer when he rose. When he concluded there was a hurricane of applause. A number' of members on both sides went up and warmly shook hands with him. There was nothing apologetic in the speech, and the references to Lord Ksher were spoken iu firm tones of condemnation.

RUBBING IT IN. PRESS COMMENTS. Received Nov. 10, 11.25 p.m. The Morning Post says that it is relieved that Mr. Churchill has left the Admiralty, and the paper hopes that he will not be allowed to occupy a superior position in the Army. The Daily Telegraph and the Chronicle say that Mr. Churchill refuted many allegations, but they regret bis attempt to shift the blame on to Lord Msher and Lord Kitchener. The Daily Mail savs that, on Mr. Churchill's narrative, Lord Fisher must bear the blame for the naval attack at the Dardanelles, but Lord Fisher has yet to be heard. It is disconcerting to discover that the Government persisted in the expedition after it had failed, and yet poured troops on to a terrible peninsula to see them slaughtered against increasingly formidable positions. The Times says that Mr. Churchill's speech was an undoubted Parliamentary triumph, but the country should have ibcen told months ago of everything that was said yesterday. There was no good military or political reason for keeping silent.

HOW VIEWED ELSEWHERE. Received Nov. 10, D.5 p.m. London. Nov. lfi. Bombay Chronicle hopes that Mr. Churchill's resignation will give him an opportunity of succeeding Lord Harding? ns Viceroy of India. Amsterdam, Nov. 15. Cerman newspapers ash whether Mr. Churchill will he the only victim. Some of them regard his retirement as only temporary.

LORD DERBY, MAY JOTN THE COUXCIL. London, Nov. 15. The Chronicle says there is some likelihood of Lord Derby joining the Cabinet,

SIR E. CARSON SPEAKS. ON THE BALKANS SITUATION. Received Nov. 18, 10.40 p.m. London, Nov. 10. Iu the Commons, Sir Edward Carson denied Sir Edward Grey's statement that lie resigned before a decision was arrived at in regard to Serbia. On the contrary, at the last War Committee meeting lie attended, a most emphatic decision was reached, founded on the advice of the military advisers, that it was too late to assist Serbia. He warmly protested, and urged that in view of our pledges Serbia should be told so as to enable her to fake her own steps against absolute destruction. Ho left the Cabinet owing to Cabinet's decision, and discussed the matter with Mr. Eonar Law and Mr. Lloyd George, the Ministers whose judgment lie most relied upon. They did not dissent from his view, and both send memoranda to the Cabinet on the subject. Mr. Asquitli, in replying, said that there was no delay in sending troops, and others had been sent to Alexandria in readiness. The necessity to help Serbia had always bulked largely i/, the Government's view. Mr. C. P. Trevelyan said that the war of attrition meant utter and irretrievable ruin to ourselves and Germany. Nothing was more disgraceful and humiliating than obtaining our ends by negotiation.

•TAKING THE FENCE." Mr. Boiiar Law condemned Mr, Trevelyan's speech. Not a member of the House believed that Germany would restore Alsace to France, or the Polish people their nationality until she was beaten. Referring to Sir E. Carson's speech, lie suiil: "It is untrue that Sir Edward Carson and myself galloped up to the fence together. Sir Edward Carson took it, but Irefused. 1 found no reason for resignation. It is true that the Coalition Government was not succeeding as was hoped, and therefore it was necessary that a smaller body be entrusted with executive action.

A WARM ATTACK. ON LOUD KITCHENER. Received Nov. Hi, 10.15 p.m. London, Nov. 10. In the Commons on discussion of the four hundred million pounds vote, Sir A. B. Markham hotly atacked Lord Kitchener, who, he said, had taken the censorship into his own hands, and thought he could treat the people of this country like dervishes. While Lord Kitchener remained in office no good could come from the War Ollioe. He vas a man who persistently bullied everyone disagreeing with him, and he could not bring the war to a successful conclusion. Lord Kitchener, in every stage of life, had broken every man who interfered witii him.

LORD KITCHENER'S MISSION. HE ARRIVES AT MUDROS. Received Nov. 18, 11.25 p.m. Rome. Nov. 10. It is reported that Lord Kitchener has arrived at Mudros. THE GLOBE. WILL SHORTLY RESUMI-. London, Nov. 15. It is understood that the Globe has unreservedly accepted the official statement respecting Lord Kitchener, and will shortly be allowed to resume publication.