THE COWARDS' JOB.

Taranaki Daily News, 6 November 1915, Page 12 (Supplement)

THE COWARDS' JOB.

GERMAN SUBMARINE FAILURE, VESSELS "TI-lAT NEVER RETURN." MR, BALFOUR ON PIRATE WARFARE. London, September 10. Mr. A. J. Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, lias issued another of his powerful and incisive epistles to an anonymous correspondent, in which he sets forth his reasons for the changed attitude of Germany to the United States.

It is a, coincidence that the letter appeared in Monday's papers at the same time as the news of the torpedoing of the Hesperian, and herein lies an interesting point. It is assumed "by the majority of the London papers that Mr. Balfour wrote His letter in the belief that Germany had decided to abandon the worst of her submarine crimes, but Mr. Balfour's letter is, strangely enough, dated Sunday, September 5, and as First Sea Lord he must have had the earliest information concerning the mishap to the Allan liner. The letter runs:

Admiralty, S.W., Sept. 5, WIS, Dear Sir, —Mivoh has been written about Germany's military methods and aims on land; not so much about her methods and aims at sea. Yet in truth the two are so intimately connected that neither can be understood apart from the other.

It was in 1900 that Germany first proclaimed the policy of building a fleet against Britain; and from the point of view of her own ambitions the policy was a perfectly sound one. She aimed at world domination; and against world domination the British Fleet, from tlie time of Queen Elizabeth to the present day, has always been found the surest and most effectual protection. The Germans have every reason to be aware of the fact, for'without the British Meet, Frederick the Great must have succumbed to his enemies; and without the British Fleet Prussia would scarcely have shaken off the Napoleonic tyranny. Whatever may be thought about the "freedom of the seas" in any of its various meanings, the freedom of tlie land is due in no small measure to British ships and British sailors. It takes, however, time as well as money to create a great fleet, and German statesmen were too wise to suppose that they could at once call into existence a navy able to contend on equal terms with the Power which—as they saw clearly enough—was the most for. midable obstacle to their aggressive projects. But they did not, on that account, doubt the immediate advantages which their maritime policy conferred upon them.

GERMAX MISCALCULATIONS. They calculated that a powerful fleet, even though it were numerically inferior to that of Britain, would, nevertheless, render the latter impotent, since no British Government would dare to risk a conflict which, however successful 1 , might leave them in tlie end with naval forces inferior to those of some third Power. Tliis is the policy clearly, though cautiously, expressed in the famous preamble to the Navy Bill. It is ; unnecessary to add that the German Navy League entertained much more ambitious designs. So far, however, neither the designs of the German Government nor those of the German Navy League have met with any measure of success. The British fighting fleet has become relatively stronger than it was thirteen months ago, and there is no reason to suppose that during the future course of the war this process is likely to be arrested. It is, indeed, plain that after six months of hostilities .Admiral Tirpitz and the Government which he serves arrived at the same conclusion. They saw that the old policy had broken down, and that a new policy must be devised. Submarines, they thought, might succeed where Dreadnoughts and cruisers had failed.. The change, no doubt, was adopted with extreme reluctance and many searehings of heart. The admission of failure is in itself unpleasant; and, though we cannot regard the Government responsible for tlie Belgian atrocities as either scrupulous or humane, even the most reckless of Governments does not desire to perpetuate unnecessary crimes.

GALLAVT MEN ON COWARDS' JOBS. As to what the German navy must have felt about the new policy we can only conjecture. But German sailors ore gallant men; and gallant men do not like being put oil a coward's job. They know well enough that in the old days, which we are pleased to regard as less humane than our own, there was not a privateersman but would have thought himself disgraced had he sent to the bottom unresisting merchant ships with all hands on board; and it can have been no very agreeable reflection, even to the German Xnvy League, that the first notable performance of the German licet should resemble piracy rather than privateering. We may, therefore, safely assume that nothing but the hopes of a decisive success would have induced the German Ministers to inflict this new stain upon the honor of their country. Yet a decisive success lias not been attained, and does not seem to be in sight. 1 claim 110 gifts of prophecy; I make no boast about the future. But of the past I can speak with assurance; and it may interest you to know that, while the losses inflicted upon German submarines have been formidable, British mercantile tonnage is, at this moment, greater than when the war began.

SHIPS THAT DO NOT RETURN. It is true that by this method of warfare many inoffensive persons, women and children as well as men, neutrals as well as belligerents, have been robbed and killed. But it is not only the innocent who have suffered. The criminals also have paid a heavy toll. Some have been rescued and are prisoners of war. "But from tile very nature of submarines it must often happen that they drag their crews with them to destruction, and those who send them forth on their itnhonored mission wait ■for their return in vain. Herein lies the explanation of the amazing change which has come over the diplomatic attitude.of Germany towards the United States. Men ask themselves why the sinking of the Lusitania, with the loss of over 1100 men, worsen and children, was welcomed throughout Germany with a shout of triumph, while the sinking of the Arabic was accepted in melancholy silenca.