A COLOSSAL TASK.

Taranaki Daily News, 6 November 1915, Page 11 (Supplement)

A COLOSSAL TASK.

PROBLEM FOR ALLIES. SPECULATION OX PROGRESS OF CAMPAIGNS. (London Correspondent N.Z. Times) London, September 3.

To keep a level judgment and a sane outlook in these somewhat dreadful times one needs above all else a sense of history. It is the absence of any such sense, and of the wide reading and systematic study on which to base it. that carries away the halfpenny and twopenny-halfpenny journalism of London into excesses almost equally lamentable and amusing. Some people in Fleet street, reared up in an atmossphere of quickly-ensuing sensations, simply cannot realise that a great war is not social tittelation like u standard bread ''stunt." They think it ought to be all over, and some fresh excursions and alarms inaugurated, long ago. There is not much real danger to be apprehended from these popular journalistic diatribes so long as Britishers overseas and in other lands attach as little important"? to London's new-fangled journalism as we people at home do. 1 The great new nobleman, who represents in this age the volcanic apotheosis of the British board school, may fondly imagine that he is running the country and the war. In reality he is only the catspaw wherewith sundry political monkeys are trying to pull the chestnuts out of the iil'e. Any experienced journalist who is really a little in the know can explain the system. The central idea of the new journalism, which incidentally may he one of the things that will not survive the war, is to get wind of what is very likely to happen soon. To boom that tiling is an imperative demand, and, when tin: predestined thing actually does', happen, to shout out, ''Alone we did it!" It is rather like backing winners, after the race, but before the news has got abroad. This is what happened witli the great munition "stunt. 1 ' And meanwhile every sane and common-sense man and woman in the United Kingdom perfectly knows that whatever decision the Government may take 011 this or any other question for tho drastic prosecution of the war, the whole country will whole-heartedly support and approve. The nation's response to the call to arms has been splendid. The national register will confirm that statement when the figures come to be published. Had the war lasted only as long as everybody, including the Germans and the new journalism, expected, tile voluntary system would have served every purpose. This does not mean that public opinion in this country is not fully persuaded that we made a colossal error in not adopting national service years ago. But that grand error having been made, and being irremediable, so far as this war is concerned, the voluntary system has worked wonders. So far nothing could have been gained by adopting national service now. But since the war threatens to be long, and the precise ultimate issue may be regarded as somewhat doubtful, it is probable that national service may shortly be adopted. It is beyond the power of the Germanic Allies to win this war. But it is just conceivable that they may not, perhaps, owing to unsuspected weaknesses on the side of the Entente Allies, be absolutely vanquished. And the inconciitslvc peace, though still happily an unlikely contingency, is an event just sufficiently possible to render it necessary to look ahead.

THE REAL POSITION, What the insignificant peace-at-any-price prattlers cannot perceive is that anything short of absolute victory for the Entente Allies means European militarism more rampant than ever before. Unless we win this nght right out, and administer the knock-out blow to German ambitions for all time, the peace that follows this war will be worse than, and almost as expensive as, the war. For that very reason an inconclusive peace is almost inconceivable. But where national existence is tit stake it is necessary to provide even for the almost inconceivable event, and that is what our Government is now contemplating. If national service is established in this country now it will be done as much with an eye to a possible, though highly improbable, situation after the war as to the actual conduct of the war now. So far sis the present situation goes, it is rather doubtful whether we should gain anything by national service. Germany's population is nearly double ours. Germany has been able to put about eight million men into the field. We have, in addition to manning our greatly expanded Navy, secured about three and a-quarter million soldiers. This does not suggest any very considerable untapped margin. But for the sake of the future it may be well to avoid the great mistake of the past. We must see to it that never again, if Europe is to remain an armed camp, are we caught napping. If there is to bo another great war half a century hence, or two decades hence, we must have our men ready trained and equipped, and for that reason it may be necessary to have national service set going right away. The people who are quite sure it is not necessary now are just the same people who told us it was not necessary beforehand who always assured us that the Germans were nice inoffensive people whose single desire it was to be at peace with the world. The newspaper agitation for national service now is beneath contempt. It needs only a word from Lord Kitchener, or the Government as a whole, and the country will cheerfully respond at once. Until we get that word it is worse than idle to arouse controversy on the subject. Tlic most enthusiastic advocates of national servke in this country, of whom the writer is one, recognise that the great cause of national service has suffered greatly from some of its advocates. Had the politicians who agreed with Lord Roberts' campaign only adopted his methods of rousing appeal and eloquent persuasion, instead of hectoring the British public and browbeating it, we might have had national service in full swing before the war.

THE WINTER OUTLOOK. At the present moment the military experts, by which one means not the journalistic Von Moltkes of the press, but the serious soldiers, are considering the chances of another winter campaign. The only thing that could prevent it would be an economic collapse of Germany, and, though that is not quite so impossible as some critics now believe, it need not be very hopefully regarded. Had our naval blockade been effective from the start, Germany would now be in extremis. But she will reach that desirable stage in time. In the meantime, what will be the enemy's plan of campaign? The most natural

development would seem to ho a trench blockade of the Russian armies in the East, and a renewed push against the Allies in the West; and to be absolutely confident that it would fail disastrously. To attempt it unsuccessfully would mean positive military disaster for Cennany and her Ally. Their losses already number about live million men, and the loss of another two would mean exhaustion. What most of the military authorities expect to see is an endeavor to hold up the Entente Allies in the East and in the West, and drive through to Constantinople. That project offers tbe most picturesque and least costly achievement to the Kaiser, and might lend itself most usefully to pence conditions. But it would be a desperate and dllicult adventure all the same. | What wo are almost sure to see, how- : ever, is some hard fighting in the West | before the winter comes. There will be | a big offensive movement by the French j and British armies, and on the result of that movement must depend to a large extent the prospects of the winter. The hour j? opportune. If the Germans | could be pushed back decisively in the West now, the state of public feeling in the Fatherland, with another winter up- j on them and the sea blockade in efli-! cient exercise, would be rather ominofts I for the present rulers of Germany By j the spring of l!H(i, Russia would have ! her new armies trained and her old ones | equipped. Because we shall in any ease be through the Dardanelles before Christinas. Then the Ausiro-German Empires would have to face a joint effort on both flanks which would test them decisively. It is a futile thing to prophesy when so many chances might upset all the most careful and shrewd calculation?, but that seems the normal course of events. In other words, it may be assumed that Germany must win decisively before the winter if she hopes to win at all, and that, failing such success, of which there is as yet scant promise, she will be hopelessly outplayed when next spring arrives. The Allies I have had to improvise during all the di*- i advantages of war those military prcpar- j ations built up in Germany during years of assiduous peace work. By next spring that colossal task should have been accomplished. In the interval Germany will try to work an inconclusive peace. But the fact appears to be that no terms of peace to which the Allies could by any possibility agree would be sullkicnt to indemnify the German nation for its enormous sacrifices, and consequently the Hohenzollem dynasty and its counsellors must gamble for high stakes. That we shall win the final cast is practically assured so long as the Allies hold firmly together, and there is less fear on that score now than there was a few weeks ago.