The Daily News. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1915. MR. ASQUITH'S WAR STATEMENT.

Taranaki Daily News, 5 November 1915, Page 4

The Daily News. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1915. MR. ASQUITH'S WAR STATEMENT.

Now that we are in possession of the details of the important statement made in the House of Commons by tile British Premier, Mr. Asquith, it is possible to more accurately weigh the various criticisms on the conduct of the war, and especially of the Dardanelles campaign. It was characteristic of the head of the Government to shoulder the full rcsponsibilty for the policy which lias been followed throughout the war, and it is equally iu keeping with the best traditions of British administrative etiquette that an apology for any action connected with the war was deemed out of place. That there have been shortcomings and mistakes was the utmost that 3ir. Asquith would admit, but he claimed that the Government had, to the best of his ability, controlled the organism and directed the great campaign on the whole in such a way as to gain the confidence of the great mass of the people of the country. He was on safe ground in stating that the war had brought its full share of surprises and disappointments for all the combatants, and this gave additional emphasis to his assertion that at flic moment the situation called for a proper sense of perspective. limitless stock of patience, and an overflowing reservoir of active and' passive courage. The position could not have been more accurately summed up, especially in view of the carping criticisms and ultra-pessi-mistic pronouncements that a certain section of the press has been industriously and maliciously disseminating. There is no good purpose to be served by dwelling on Britain's unpreparedness. It was one of those blind, wilful, and inexplicable occurrences, in face .of the manifest threatenings of war, for which there can be no justification. Tt is also matter of history, the only redeeming feature being the superb efficiency and overwhelming power of the Navy, and in doing full justice to this branch of th» service, Mr. Asquith was

at his best. The Empire will thoroughly agree with his statement that the magnificent and thorough work of the Navy was the best tonic for the down-hearted and the sceptical people who believed that ttie Umpire was not playing its part in this greatest struggle' of all previous history. His tribute to Hussia was as generous as his confidence in that Power's ability to ultimately roll back the tide of invasion and reverse the past. Tt was, however, on the Dardanelles question that the greatest interest centred. In phrases of studied calmness, Mr. Asquith traced the history of the Galiipoli campaign from its inception up to the present time. His explanation was clear and frank, and though no fresh light was thrown on the subject, no unbiased person who intelligently follows the reasons given for entering on the campaign can fail to arrive at the conclusion tlmt it was fully justified, and carefully conceived, Hut where there is room for divergence of opinion is in relation to the manner in which it was carried out. We have Mr. Asquith's assurance that both the naval and military expert advisers entirely approved of the decision to embark on this campaign, and that fact should disarm the greater part of the irresponsible criticism that has appeared. Apparently, the one great fault made over this matter was the underestimate of the defensive preparations of the Turks and their German allies. There is no question that had the campaign succeeded, as was hoped, its objective would have been 'hailed as the greatest stroke of genius in military history, and, as Mr. Asquith states, would have solved the whole situation in the Balkans. So far it lias been a terribly costly experiment, but iu all fairness, judgment should be suspended until the campaign is either completed or abandoned—the latter being by no means probable. In dealing with the Balkans question, Mr. Asquith made the position and collateral circumstances quite clear, and his sketch of the German advantages in makiag lavish promises to barter away property belonging to others, in large measure explained why Teutonic bribes and influence had gained the advantage over the Allies. No new facts were stated, the Premier stressing the efforts of the Allies to obtain the help of the Balkan Powers by diplomacy, and the reliance placed on Greece to carry out treaty obligations with Serbia. Unfortunately, the Allies' efforts failed, 'out we have the deliberate assurance .of Mr. Asquith that Serbia cannot be allowed to become a prey to the sinister and nefarious designs of her enemies. This we take as meaning that no matter what the cost, the Allies will rescue Serbia from her present peril. This decision is evidently of recent date, for had it been made earlier it would have prevented Sir E. Carson's resignation. Now that it has been made it should be followed up by prompt and vigorous measures, or the time for helping Serbia will have passed. There is only one other point of Mr. Asquith's statement that calls for notice — conscription. Only a.s a last resort will compulsion be used, and then only with something approaching general consent. This will satisfy the opponents of conscription, but it should also stimulate recruiting.