CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, 4 November 1915, Page 5

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

MR. ASQUITH'S STATEMENT. A BRIEF SUMMARY. NEARLY TWO HOURS' SPEECH. London, Nov. 2. Mr. Asquith's long-expected speech wa3 delivered in the House of Commons to-day and occupied one hour and fifty \ minutes. He said there were nearly a million British troops in France, He believed that Lord Derby's recruiting plan would make conscription probably unnecessary. Alluding to General Joffre's visit he said there was complete agreement as to the ends and means by which Serbia might be assured of her independence. It was regarded as essential for its object that the committee of the Cabinet concerning strategy should consist of not less than three or more than five members. The Cabinet's responsibility for large changes in policy would be preserved.

The non-success in the Dardanelles was a keen disappointment, as success would have prevented the entry of Bulgaria into the war. We were holding up 200,000 Turks. The situation at Gallipoli was receiving anxious consideration.

• Discussing the financial position, Mr. Asquith said it was serious. The United Kingdom was rich and full of resources, but the burdens could not be sustained without the strictest economy.

FULLER DETAILS. SYMPATHY WITH THE KING. In the beginning of Jus speech, Mr. Asquith, in the name of the whole House, expressed sympathy with the King, He was glad to say his Majesty was once more on British soil and going on as woll as could possibly be expected. The occasion was one of which the House ought to take advantage to express admiration for the manner in which the King always discharged his peculiarly responsible duties.

NOT A PENITENT. Turning to his statement, Mr. Asquith said he was afraid he was doomed to disappoint many of the expectations of those who thought it his duty to appear in the guise of a criminal making the best defence he could, or of a white-sheeted penitent asking for absolution. He proposed to adopt neither attitude, but to speak as head of the Government. "We are," ho said, "as determined to-day as ever to prosecute the war to a successful issue, and to use every means and exhaust, if necessary, every resource for the attainment of our common supreme purpose." THE THREE THINGS NEEDED.

To-day some parts of the horizon were overcast. The war, like all great wars, had Ibeen full of surprises and disappointments for all the combatants. It seemed that at this moment the situation in Britain called in an exceptional degree for three things: a proper sense of perspective (applause), a limitless stock of patience, and an overflowing reservoir of both active and passive courage. He did not believe that the British people, as a whole, showed any lack or any falling off in any of these qualities. All they desired was to be told, as far diplomatic and military exigencies permitted, how the cause stood, and they could be assured that in the maintenance of the defence of that cause the Government and people were playing a worthy part. There could not' be a greater mistake than to suppose the Government had any interest in concealing anything on the subject, and one over-ruling condition was that the Government's disclosure had not assisted the enemy.

UNPREPAREDNESS ADMITTED. Mr. Asquith asked "how did we stand to-day?" He emphasised the fact that we began the war witli six infantry and two cavalry divisions, but in the operations described in Sir John French's dispatch to-day (in the operations of September and October this vear) he commanded not far short of a million men. To this must be added the troops at the Dardanelles, in Egypt, and other theatres of war, as well as the reserves in the garrisons of the United Kingdom and the outlying parts of the Empire. This gigantic force had been raised from the manhood of the United Kingdom and the Empire.

THE EMPIRE'S RESPONSE. He would not like to give the precise figures, but it was an unprecedented number of men.

The contribution from India bad been splendid, and it was well-knpwn that Canada had contributed 00,000 officers and men, Australia 9-2,000, New Zealand 25,000, while South Africa, after a most successful and brilliant campaign in German South-West Africa, supplied important contingents for service in East and Central Africa, and in addition had furnished 8500 men for service in Europe, There had been also splendid contributions from Newfoundland, the West Indies, Ceylon, and Fiji. These figures regarding the dominions and colonies were remarkably significant, but even then they did not include the questions of prepared maintenance for the units in the field and the future expansion of the contingents they had already supplied, nor the very large number of men from all parts of the Empire who had made their own way to the United Kingdom to enlist. I should also add, to complete that aspect of the story, that in the Rliodesian, East African, and West African colonies there were important additions. The existing local forces had been placed m the field, and in other colonies and dependencies more remote from active military operations all the defensive organisations had received a profound stimulus

WORK OF THE NAVY. HUGE TRANSPORT OPERATIONS. Mr. Asquith then turned to the work of the navy and the transporting of troops. Since the beginning of the war the transport department of the Admiralty had, for the army alone, carried 2V& million officers and men, H-20,000 siek and wounded, and nurses, 2 ! / 2 million tons of stores and munitions, 800,000

horses, mules and cameß These operations involved thousands of voyages through seas which at one time were subject to raids of German cruisers, and which even now, though he believed the enemy were rapidly diminishing in strength, are infested by submarines.

A most remarkable fact hitherto was that the loss of life in such gigantic oversea operations was considerably less than a one-tenth percentage. He did not believe the history of the world, of any nation of any age, could produce sucli a comparable record. These figures he had quoted did not include millions of tons of stores that had been carried to the navies of the allied countries. Mr. Asquith asked: "Was anything in history comparable to the actual service of the naw itself?"

THE GRAND FLEET. The men of the Grand Fleet were living in the twilight, far from public observation, unconcerned, unnoticed, unadvertised, but performing, with an efficiency and vigilance it was impossible even to describe, an appropriate service to the whole Empire Where was the Germans' great . fleet, whereon so much talk, science, and money had been expended, and which was to be a perpetual menace to the United Kingdom? It was up in the Baltic, and dare not show its face on any sea where it could be encountered. The whole effective maritime and military resources of Germany upon the seas, after fifteen months of war, had been reduced to the sporadic and constantly diminishing efforts of a few furtive submarines, which had sent to the bottom far more innocent unoffending civilians than any military harm they had done. These figures were more eloquent than columns of rhetoric, and he could conceive no better medicine for any peoplo who affected to be downhearted, or doubtful that the Empire was not playing its part in the greatest struggle in history

NO APOLOGIES. He was not going to apologise either for the people of the Empire, who had borne their part so magnificently, or for the Government, which to the "best of its ability—no doubt with many shortcomings and mistakes, but to the beat of its ability, and he believed with the confidence of the great imia of their fellow-countrymen—controlled the organism and directed this great campaign,

THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN. He touched briefly on the campaign on the Western front, where the total casualties to a week ago were 377,000, or considerably more than twice the total of the original expeditionary force. He said that happily a very large percentage of recoveries from wounds had been made, and the net permanent wastage was much smaller. ' BRAVE RUSSIA. The Prime Minister affirmed that he could not pass without paying a tribute to the supreme fighting qualities of the Russian soldier, which had never been more splendidly nor more conspicuously- manifested than during the recent retreat.

The pedple of Britain had the greatest confidence that Russia, will ultimately, and before long, roll back the tide of invasion and reverse the past. CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA. • He would like to say a few words on our own important aiid highly successful campaign in Mesopotamia. The object in sending a force was to secure neutrality in Arabia, safeguard our interests in the Persian Gulf, protect the oilfields, and generally maintain the authority of our flag in the East Mr. Asquith then related a brilliant series of absolutely unchequered land and .river operations, until now General Nixon's force, he said, was within measurable distance of Bagdad. He did not think that in the whole course of the war there had been operations more carefully contrived and more brilliantly conducted, or with better prospects of final success. THE DARDANELLES.

He now came to a not so uiicheqiiered chapter in the story, namely, our operations in the =East, at the Dardanelles. From the moment Turkey entered the war it was no longer possible, either from a strategic or political point of view, to concentrate our entire energies to the Western theatre. The Turks threatened the Russians in the Caucasus and indirectly threatened Egypt. The Turks' were able to 'close the Black Sea and stop our supplies of Russian wheat from tile Black Sea ports. Their entry also produced a great and lasting effect on the attitude of the Balkan States. Consequently the Government had to face the question in the Near East, not merely strategically but they had to consider and consult with their naval and military advisors as to the best and most politic course to take, either aggressively or otherwise.

Britain, in January, had insufficient forces available for service in the East to do more than provide local defence in Egypt against a Turkish attack, which was ultimately defeated in February THE NAVAL ATTACK.

The Government had then brought to their notice the possibility of a naval attack in the Dardanelles. After full investigation and consultation with naval experts, ineludins the Admiral commanding that part'of the Mediterranean, and notwithstanding doubts and hesitation in the mind' of Lord Fisher, the Government felt justified in sanctioning the naval attai-k.' People were thinking and saying that the attack was initiated without a full review of all latent possibilities, but thev were entirely mistaken. It was carefully conceived and developed after consulta'tion between the Admiral on the spot, and the War. Staff of the Admiralty, and before any final decision was taken it was communicated to the French Admiralty, who entirely approved and agreed to participate'therein. It was enthusiastically received and acclaimed by the illustrious Grand Duke, then commanding the Russian armv, who rightly thought it would assist'him in the Caucasus. The matter was most carefullv reviewed over and over again by the' War Council. The operation was then conceived to be purely a naval one. They could not afford at that time-Lord Kitenener said so, and all agreed—any substantial military support.

"I TAKE THE BLAME." It was therefore decided to make the attempt by navy alone. "I take," said Mr. Asquith, "my full share of the responsibility for initiating that operation —my full share—and I deprecate more than I can say the attempt to allocate the blame on one minister or another, or the suggestion that some undefined personality of great authority and overmastering will controlled directed the strategy, That was not the case."

No one was more responsible than he. He thought then, as everybody must have thought who knew the whole circumstances, that we could run risks, especially as very great objects were in view, namely, the influence of the whole Balkan situation. In a sense it was favorable to the Allies to open communication to the Black Sea and strike a blow at the very heart of the Turkish empire. The operations culminated in the attack on the Narrows, which resulted in a set back. The Government had then to consider whether further operations should be continued. It was the opinion of the advisers of the Government, and it seemed a very tenable opinion, that by the aid of an adequate military force the attack might still be driven home successfully.

THE PLAN OF FURTHER OPERATIONS. General Sir lan Hamilton was selected to conduct the expedition. He had witnessed the first naval attack, and he and the Vice-Admiral on the spot were in agreement that a joint naval and military attack was necessary. The active plan of operation was left to the judgment of the commanders on the spot, and there was never any disagreement between them and the opinion of the general staff in Britain. The actual operations were familiar to everybody, and he would only say that in the whole course of the war they had never sustained a keener disappointment than the failure of the operations.

THE AUGUST FAILURE. At the beginning of August, the chances of success seemed not only great but preponderating, and the consequences of a success would almost immeasurably have solved the whole situation in the Balkans, prevented Bulgaria entering the war, and left Constantinople open to capture.. It would have been acclaimed throughout the whole Eastern world as the most brilliant demonstration of the superiority of the Allies.

But it did not succeed, notwithstanding the magnificent exhibition, which had never been surpassed, of the gallantry and resources of the British troops, and none were more conspicuous than the Australians and New Zealanders. Nor ought the House to forget the extraordinary and magnificent services of the navy. WORK OP THE SUBMARINES. Mr. Asquith paid eloquent tribute to the services of the submarines, and emphasised that up to Oct. 20, operating in the Sea of Marmora, they succeeded in sinking or damaging two battleships, five gunboats, one torpedo boat, eight transports, and 197 supply ships. He then described the arrival of Germajj submarines, but the navy was equal to this, and selected safe harbors, while small craft assembled in great numbers to .maintain communications with the army. Finally, a number of specially-con-structed vessels, largely due to the inventive genius of Lord Fisher himself, went to the Mediterranean, and had done most magnificent work.' The navy throughout had risen superior to all difficulties and had maintained the communications with the army intact. He considered it still premature to form a judgment on the Dardanelles operations, but it must be considered what would have happened if they had not been undertaken. Probably the Russians might have received a serious setback in the Caucasus; the Turks might have organised a great attack against Egypt; while the expedition in Mesopotamia might have been swept out of existence. Also, it must not be forgotten that the British in Gallipoli were holding up two hundred thousand Turks, preventing them from doing incalculable mischief in other parts.

THE BALKAN PROBLEM. The present situation at the Dardanelles had received most careful and anxious consideration as part of the large strategic question raised by recent developments. Mr. Asquith explained how the Allies had labored ceaselessly for unity in the Balkan States, and admitted that the result had been a disappointment and a failure. He pointed out to the critics who were talking of greater firmness and greater adroitness that unity of discretion was the most important asset. Germany had the advantage of such unity, while the Allies must consult each other, this resulting in inevitable differences in the point of view of any operation. Germany had a further advantage in making lavish promises to Bulgaria, whereas the Allies could not barter away the property of the Allies' friends behind their backs without the assurance of adequate compensation. Further, when the Allies were reproached for being- too late in providing active help to Serbia, it must be remembered that to the very last month there was the strongest reason to believe that Greece would acknowledge and act upon her treaty obligations to Serbia.

THE TRICKINESS OF GREECE. When the Bulgarian mobilisation began, M. Venizelos asked France, and ourselves for 150,000 men. This was on the express understanding that Greece would mobilise also. M. Venizelos later announced that Greece must abide by the treaty with Serbia, but the King repudiated the declaration and M. Venizelos resigned. These were facts to be recognised by people who were complaining of alleged inertia-on the part of the Allied Governments.

SERBIA NOT TO BE A VICTIM. He wished to say, on behalf of the Government and people of Britain, and his opinion was also shared by France and Russia, that Serbia cannot be allowed to become a prey to this sinister and nefarious combination. The British and French General Staff had come to a complete agreement anent Serbia, who may rest assured that her independence is regarded by us as one of the essential objects of the alliance.

HOME QUESTIONS. Mr. Asquith next dealt with the Home questions of an adequate supply of men for the Army and Navy, the provision of munitions, and the burden of common Allied finance. The nation had to consider how she could co-ordinate and adjust the different ways of serving these purposes so that the United Kingdom and Empire should contribute most fruitfully and effectively to the common cause. The financial position was very serious. We were buying goods abroad in excess of exports to the extent of thirty millions monthly, against an average of eleven millions before the war, and at the same time making advances to Allies and others which he estimated would for the current financial year amount to £423,000,000. We alone amongst the belligerent nations maintain a free market for gold, and, indeed, had exI ported a large amount. We were further undertaking commitments which could

only be paid by tbe further export of gold or tho sale of securities. Hence, rich and resourceful though we were, we must cut our coat according to our cloth.

Nevertheless he did not think the position compared unfavorably with that of Germany, where her consumption far exceeds what she could produce, and stocks were rapidly diminishing. Further, the standard of living was greater. Part of the population of Germany had left little or no margin of reserve and Britain was in a much better position in this respect, but we could not sustain the burden of this great war unless individuals and the Government alike were prepared to make greater sacrifices in retrenchment and economy. The average cost of the Army was usually reckoned at one hundred pounds per head annually, but under the present conditions it had vastly increased, and was costing between £250 r.nd £3OO.

COMPULSION. Mr. Asquith then dwelt on the question of compulsion. He admitted that voluntary recruiting as hitherto practised was haphazard and capricious, and to some extent unjust, but his objection to compulsion was based on the ground that under existing conditions compulsion would forfeit what he regarded as of supreme capital importance, namely, the mainteuance of national unity. He would propose not to rule out compulsion as an impossible expedient, but that compulsion ought only be resorted to with something approaching general consent.' He did not fear that there would be any necessity to resort to anything beyond Lord Derby's great national effort, which is being carried out with hearty goodwill by all parties.. He emphasised that married men who enlisted would not be called up to serve while younger and unmarried men were holding back. He hoped that unmarried men would bo obtained by voluntary effort, but if need be they would be secured by other means. In concluding, he mentioned the question of a War Committee. Cabinet had the power to summon experts of special knowledge on all important questions. Cabinet would be kept constantly informed of.the decisions of the Committee. Also, on all questions involving a new departure in policy Cabinet would be consulted before decisive action was taken. He was confident that only on these lines was the successful conduct of the war possible.

THE TRAGEDY OF THE WAR. He attached the greatest importance to more complete and more intimate coordination between the staffs of the Allied Powers. A very happy illustration was General Joffre's visit. He affirmed that a great responsibility was resting on him as head of the Government, as measured by what had happened and what was still to happen, Our best blood had been spilled and thousands of young lives had been cut short. A cry went up in ever-increasing volume from torn hearts and mutilated homes, and we might well stand aloof from this most moving tragedy in the history of mankind. Yet he did not believe that these sufferers would say that Britain could have acted-otherwise. (Cheers). He had laboured unceasingly in upholding the common cause. If there had been errors and shortcomings and lack of foresight he would be the first pcrsorr to acknowledge such, but he challenged anyone to prove that there had been anything like sloth, indifference and selfcomplacency to face unpalatable facts, or to conceal the thith. He was confident we were going to carry the righteous cause to a triumphant issue. WILL BEAR THE BURDEN.

"[ am not going to shift tlio burden until I am satisfied I cannot bear it, or tli at it can be performed better by others. I enjoy the confidence of my .Sovereign and the Commons and tne country, and shall not surrender the heavy task. If there be moments when we are tempted to be faint-hearted, let us ask ourselves in what year in our history have we done more to justify our faith in our manhood, our womanhood, and our people. It has brought us an imperishable story, in the last hours of Edith Cavell facing a worse ordeal than death, watching the momenta creeping on to her doom, slowly and remorselessly. It had taught our bravest men a supreme lesson in courage, and in the United Kingdom and the Empire there are thousands of such women whom a year ago we did not know of. We have great traditions, but the nation does not exist on traditions alone. Thank God, wc have living examples of all the qualities that have built up and sustained our Umpire. Let us be worthy of them and endure to the end. (Loud cheers).

CRITICISM FROM SIR E. CARSON. A STRONG INDICTMENT. Received Nov. 3, 95 p.m. London, Nov. 3. Mr. Asquith's. references to compulsion were received with mixed feelings, though general cheers followed when he affirmed his belief that Lord Derby's scheme was a success, and his intention ito call unmarried men first if compulsion was finally necessary. There was a demonstration at the close when Mr. Asquith affirmed the Allies' intention to carry a righteous cause to a triumphant conclusion. Sir E. Oarson declared that the terrible revelation of the absence of munitions showed that the Cabinet machine was utterly incapable of carrying on the war. Why then take on the Dardanelles, which hung, around their necks like a millstone, with absolutely no hope of result there? It was impossible to understand why, at the very moment the shortage, of munitions was discovered, the Cabinet took on the expedition. The Government was not justified in entering on it. It had cost one hundred thousand casualties, and the sufferings baffled description. Unless the naval and military advisers could give assurances of a successful conclusion there never was such a story of miscalculations. He considered the failure at Suvla the most disastrous and vital of the whole war. Under the Cabinet system the Government were unable to make up their minds whether they ought to proceed with the operations or boldly withdraw, and save the suffering and losses which went on with absolutely no hope of any result. We wanted the best military staff we could get, but so far as lie could see, with the Cabinet there was no staff at all. He did not think the Premier's plan would be a groat improvement. The House and the country really were anxious about three things whether the resources of men and material were being used to the best advantage; whether, what appeared to be grave miscalculations could have been avoided; whether the machinery of the Government was the most effective for carrying on the war. The country was groping in the dark.