MOTOR AND CYCLE

Taranaki Daily News, 16 October 1915, Page 11

MOTOR AND CYCLE

MOTOP.-CAR AND AEROPLANE ENGINES.

When German racing oars made a clean sweep in the French Grand 'Prix a year ago, says the Motor (England), it was reported that the Kaiser telegraphed his congratulations to the winner, and that the German Government contributed a substantial money prize; yet at the time nobody suggested an inter-connec-tion between the Mercedes victory and the German military organisation. But it existed nevertheless. Not many English motorists have had an opportunity of examining at close quarters the engines vised in recent successful German I racing cars, and fewer still have been brought in touch with the motors fitted in German w<ir aeroplanes. This fact is established, that the Mercedes motor which won the Grand Prix at Lyons in July, 1914, is identical with the motors employed on 90 per cent, of Germany's war aeroplanes.

The problem of providing Germany with reliable aeroplane motors was one of ,the most important features of this movement. Three years ago Germany had no aeroplane motors, while Prance was well provided with engines, mostly of the rotating cylinder type, or of tha multi-cylinder type radiating from a circular c-rank case. In France Che task of providing aeroplane motors had, with one exception, been left to engineering firms outside the motor-car industry, which is doubtless one of the reasons why what may be termed the motor-car type of engine has been little used in that country. Germany turned to Mercedes for her supply of/aeroplane engines, and, as might be expected, that firm produced an engine for aerial work, having the same general features as its car motors. The Mercedes production, indeed, was a motor-car engine developed with a view to low weight in relation to power. It was so decidedly a car motor for aerial service that, after having secured, fairly good results aloft, the Mercedes Co. d&ided to put their new engine to the supreme test of a road race. Hence the sudden appearance of a fleet of special and mysterious German cars in a provincial road race of secondary importance. To anyone acquainted with the Mercedes policy, there was nothing inconsistent in such a move. The firm's engineers have always recognised the value of racing as a supreme test of engines and chassis, and have not (like some leading firms) foregone the advantages of racing by reason of the fear of being defeated by some secondary or newly-established rival. Participathat lace with the new aviation motors convinced the Mercedes engineers that they not sufficient knowledge of the problems to be solved in the construction of high-speed motors. From these low-speed engijies, used at Dieppe in 1908 to the high-speed racing jnotora of 1912 developed under the French limited cylinder rules is the passage from one chapter to another in the history of engine construction. It is not sufficient to take a good motor built for speeds of 1200 or 1300 revolutions a minute and speed it up to 2000 or more by such expedients as bigger valves, special earns and larger gas passages. The apparently simple speeding-up process involves complicated problems of engine balance and entails tie re-designing of the entire motor.

After the Grand Prix rajce at Dieppe in 1908, ill which, incidentally, Germany captured all the spoils, the various French road races failed to interest the big motor-car firms to the east of the Rhine. That 1908 race represented the motor-car tendencies of the time, and has little retrospective interest. There followed a period of three years, during whieh the leading French firms were lukewarm in racing. When the revival came in 1912, Germany refused to he enticed. The 1913 race was announced, but no German ears appeared at Amiens. In the autumn of that same year a provincial club deeided to hold a road race over a fast course near Le Mans. As Peugeot refused to start, considering that the winning of two Grand Prix races .was sufficient justification of its superiority, the event appeared to be likely to arouse minor interest, for a walk-over by Delage was almost inevitable. At the last moment Mercedes put in a team of four cars, but aB the firm had not raced in France for five years, it was the popular opinion that these machines could not be full-blooded speedsters. The night before the race Delage discovered that he had against him four special racing cars, brought direct from Germany, and on which the Mannheim factory had expended all its science and skill. They proved to be formidable competitors, for although Delage won, the pace was hot, and tlie margin was narrow. What had happened that, after being indifferent to road racing for live years, Mercedes should consider it necessary to make unusual efforts to win a secondary race organised by a provincial French club? About 1912 the German war ministers had been forced to the conclusion -that their giant Zeppelins were not likely, in actual warfare, to justify the faith that had been placed in them. The history of the past twelve months had proved the accuracy of that conclusion. The order went forth that a .mighty effort must be made to put Germany in possession of a fleet of aeroplanes and aeroplane pilots superior to that of every rival nation. That the need was urgent and that the direct object was war is now clearly seen. Among the requirements were German construction of both aeroplane and motor; the fitting of a silencer (thus eliminating French revolving motors); complete visibility; simplicity and case of mounting and dismounting; the fitting of a special post to be used for taking photographs; a minimum speed of 55 miles an hour; good climbing ability, and facilities for putting the machine on a lorry or railroad track with rapidity. The movement was engineered with typical German thoroughness. Orders for aeroplanes were placed in such numbers that s tnany of the leading firms were unable to take part in the Prince Henry competition of 1014 owing to lack of men and the time necessary to prepare. Special prizes were offered for aviation motors. Officers were encouraged to make lengthy flights under all weather conditions. This encouragement was so efficacious that practically all German pilots were military men. Their value as pilots could not bo doubted. The fact that they successfully made flights of 18, 22 and more than 24 hours is proof of tlielr ability and testimony to the intelligence of the German army authorities on forecasting war requirements.

Tlie aviation motors sent to the Le Mans race were subject to periodic vibra-

tion to such a degree that when Lautenschlager finished his race his hands were raw to the bone, and called for immediate medical attention. Yet Yautensch lager is one of the most hardened and toughest race drivers in Europe. One of these special cure wae Bold to Mr. Patterson, of New York, and given to Ralph de Palm* to drive in the 1914 In-

dianopolia race. The first time De I'alma drove the car at speed he was convinced that something was radically wrong. Tho car vibrated to such an extent that, experienced driver as lie was, De Palma could not hold it for any lengthy period, and the oar threatened to shake itself to pieces if the throttle were kept open. Having almost unlimited confidence in anything carrying the name Mercedes, a cable was sent to Germany asking for advice. The reply was a monument of bland innocence, ft stated that the alignment of road wheels should be tested, steering column braced, frame members trussed, shock absorbers fitted, and tyre pressures verified. De -Palma appealed to the European drivers who had raced against the car in France the previous year. They explained that it was a bad case of periodic vibration wcentuated by running on a brick track. As a failure to start would'have entailed, disqualification in all American speed contests, De Palma called together the speedway technical committee, explaind his situation, then made a few laps, and asked them to examine the condition of his ear. The experts were convinced that sucli a car could not finish the race, and tliat its presence on the track would be a great danger to other competitors. Thus De Palma was exjeused and watched the race from the pit, to the great disappointment of the American public. i

Another year was spent on the development and improvement of tlie Mercdes aviation motor, and when the 1914 Grand Prix was announced the firm decided to put their engine to the supreme test. How the German cars comported themselves is now a matter of history. Again one of the racers was sold to America, and driven by De Palma; but this time, instead of him asking to be exicused, the driver carried all before 'him. Viewed at this distance, the amazing secrecy which surrounded tho German engines at Lyons is not so surprising. It was permissible to examine any chassis feature in detail, but beyond the bore and stroke, not an item of information could be obtained regarding the engine. Friend and stranger alike were kept at arm's length. Inside a 12ft wall was & double-locked garage with the mechanic sleeping by tho side of the car having chain and padlock around its bonnot. The precautions were not unreasonable, for the winning of that race meant more than the capturing of the Frernoh Grand •Prix. It is tangible proof {hat Ger.many had an engine superior to anything produced by rival European firing and Germany knew that the engine was intended to do its greatest work on war aeroplanes. It is not surprising that t]ie Kaiser should have taken a personal interest in that race. This story of the development of Germany's aviation motor has more than an abstract interest to ourselves and our Allies at this moment. France has specialised in rotating cylinder motors, aud motors radiating from a central crankcase: in other words, in motors of the "non-car" type. Gei'many has developed the pure car type of motor for aviation purposes. England has been largely dependent on France for her aeroplane motors, and has been and is still an important consumer oE the rotation cylinder type. Changes are so drastic and development so rapid when a nation is at war that tho writer will venture to predict that, before peace is declared, the rotating cylinder will have practically ceased to exist, and France and England will be using almost exclusively car type of motors, as represented by such engines as the 12-eylinder and the 12-cylinder Green. It is not maintained that they will all have twelve cylinders; there will be probably be a few fours, more sixes and still more eights. But the point is that the war has already justified what we have termed the car type of motor for aviation purposes, and that it will witness its complete triumph. This is important, for it means that our motorcar firms are those best fitted for producing the thousands of aeroplane motors which will be required before the war has been fought to a successful finish. It is important, too, in view of the remarkable movement towards eight and twelve-cylinder motors, already well developed in America, and having engageij the attention of European engineers. The experence gained in S and 12-cylinder motors for aviation purposes will be immediately available for car motors with this number of cylinders. Whereas the motor-car mado the aeroplane possible by providing the motive power, it is likely that the aeroplane will repay some of the debt by helping the develop-, inent of 8 and 12-cylinder cars. Until the outbreak of war Renault was the only French car manufacturer building big quantities of aviation motors. Although air-cooled, they are of the same general design as motor-car engines. It cannot be claimed that, they have an unusually high efficiency, but they have proved so reliable in war service that not a single aeroplane has been captured by the enemy owing to the breakdown of a Renault motor. Some clever pilots are in Germany now owing to the stoppage of other types of motors. Da Dion Bouton, Panhard, Bayard-Clement and others dabbled in the car type of aviation motors, but for some reason or other- their efforts were not continuedIt is doubtless safe to attribute this lapse to the lack of military support.

In England ear manufacturers wove encouraged even less to build a reliable, simple and sturdy aviation motor. Muring the'sporting boom there were a few feeble attempts, but they were forgotten when aviation became purely an instrument of war. Sunbeam alone persisted, for which persistence theio is reason to be thankful at the present time. It is not suggested that the Allies are seriously handicapped by a shortage of aviation motors, but it is maintained that it has required the war to prove to them that the most satisfactory type is the fixed-sylinder engine with (f, 8 or 12 cylinders, similar in all essentials to those developed on the road. Instead of one well-defined type giving general satisfaction, we have a variety of types, some of them good, some of them indifferent, and some of them recognised as bad. In consequence, we are bavin# to re-form our aeroplane engines while engaged ill fighting the enemy, Germany had one type and that a well-tried and entirely successful type. But Germany had the advantage of knowing two or three years ago that Bhe was out for war, and would get it by a certain date.

Australia imported from England bicycles to the value of £321,348 in IDI4. as against £207.706 in 1013. The N'ew Zealand figures show a decline for 1914, the imports being £208,122 last year, as against £221,920 in .1915.

In spite of the fact that a portion of France is still occupied by the Germans, a road race was decided by our Allies recently. The course was from Paris to Lyons, and a Belgian named Jessoret proved the winner, his time for the 77% miles being 4 hours 34min 123ec. .None of the famous French road riders appear to have competed in this interesting speed trial.