BULGARIA.

Taranaki Daily News, 28 September 1915, Page 4

BULGARIA.

HER EFFECTIVE FORCES. Bulgaria is not a pretty picture it these days, but the course of its diplomacy could be paralleled from European history. Hera is not the first national ■ army that hat been pat up to awtfa. Estimates of tie numerioal strength of the Bulgarian forces differ rather wittly. It was reported during the early stages of the first Balkan war that 330,000 men were in the field, but this number, says a recent writer, mutt bar* included many reservists, too old for active eervioe, probity wato* at depot*. The fall atmnfta Wtim itU armies would probably not nave ax* ceeded 260,000, unless men had ben oalled to the colors in spite of tfa* fact that they were untrained and unlit. Of the 320J00Q believed to have been mobilised for the war, ow UftfOM were permanently put eat of actus. Approximately 461,11100 wen UM or <Bk of wuadi, and poja&ty auUm M» were killed and not anomintad *ff. 9m IOOfiOO men were wounded, and it la estimated that €0 per cent, of then were permanently disabled. The military critic who quotes these njpmta states that in the year following tike war the annual contiraai of Montta, which should have wmkmi. mfiVLmt not oalled up far (mWmv the Mfcr* ence being that it had already been with the colors. Oaaeonentfy it is estimated that, wtthon* caßiag ontrained boys and old nan to the oaleti, Bulgaria ooald not vm flfe 00 mg* than men, of mm M|PQ would be efficient.

Tine estimate, howemr, M&mi, » inexact information, aHuMptt It •** pears to agree with tin Apnea qpbtad in official handbooks. 11m Balkan Commission sent to oraSpli taw circumstances and condiikuw of Ae Mm by the Carnegie BMknNMpfc ««SMUlned that oat of a, total jsepatatfcn of imflOO, *> fewr than men. The S**ta propor*ion «m 467,W> men «* <tf a total population of a£i6,»6o. the meaaataf of These figures is that all ma* oapatte of bearing aou were oaifcd to ft* eaters, though not neee«M% tmfkmi la the neat The fan ntam of BttMfaa :lasses ii stated to bring the agnate of I neaths up to 6flyoOO, or 9 par aant, of the total number mobSiaad, tart OT*tt if the reduction of the effeothre sftength dozing the two van had t>e»f W per cent., that would atfll «b» a Mala of 400,000 on which psesent ejsWtt>ns would have to be tasted. The real position of Bulgaria seem* to be that some 850,000 first Hn* bums could be put in the field now, and wat provided arms and 6<jnipj*ent eoqU m supplied, and the financial difficulty were oyer* oorae, the miobfliaetlon at another jttarter of a million reserves could proceed forthwith. . .' ' During the two wars the Bulgaria* troops were, on the whole, well handled, though the leadership was better in offensive operations than in defence. Estimates of the vatua of the troops'-are prejudiced by the fact that in the first war, that against Turkey, the European press was cleverly exploited in 'Bulgaria's interests. The valor and efficiency of the troops formed the theme of many articjea, the equipment was described as perfect, and the leadership was described in terms that would by, applicable to a Napoleon.' The indention of the press oampaign was, of course, to create the impression that Bulgaria wae the dominant Power in the Balkans, and that she -was carrying the lion's share of the burden. As a matter of fact this idea was sedulously fostered in Bulgaria and among the troops, with the result that when the war between the allies arrived the Bulgarians treated both Serbs and Greeks contemptuously. Now, admirable as the Bulgarian army proved itself to be, it was not aa good as the correspondents alleged. Long preparation had given it excellent equipment, and when the campaign against Turkey started the smartness of the units created a most favorable impression that was confirmed in the earlier fighting. After lauding the Bulgarians and their leaders in unmeasured terms during the first war, the oritics went to the other extreme in the Second, when the Serbs and Greeks, with apparent ease, smashed the much praised, armies. The truth is that the Bulgarians were • far from being the perfect troops described by the correspondents, but they were certainly not as inefficient or a* badly led as the second campaign suggested. They were alreadv showing signs of laxity and weariness before the close of the campaign in Thrace, They were then brought back to Bulgaria, and at a time when they might reasonably have expected to be sent homo they were marched off to attack their former allies. Under these conditions it was unlikely that they would fight well. Then both officers and men seem to have been under the impression that the opposition of the Greeks and Serbians would collapse at the first, show n( force, and consequently thev were rudely shaken -when the allies' outposts revealed a very stubborn temper in the initial brushes. Then the higher leadership was laboring under serious disadvantages. The plan wax to avoid, if possible, immediate aggression, the idea being to create the impression the struggle originated in disputes between patrols. The Bulgarians had two objectives, one Serbian and the other Greek, and were thus tempted to divide their effort, and they were hampered by the belief that the Power* would intervene, so that the campaign had n# ccssarily to be forced on hurriedlv, But when allowance has been mode for all "these factors, it has to be said that the; direction of the campaign was faulty and the indifferent strategy, was followed bv weak tactics.'