ALLIED STRATEGY.

Taranaki Daily News, 18 September 1915, Page 10

ALLIED STRATEGY.

('By. Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Grate, in Auckland Herald). The whole world asks, When are France and Britain going to assume the offensive, when is Russia to be relieved by pressure 'being brought' to bear on Germany from the West? Everything points to the preparedness of the Western Allies. Why, then, do they not strike ? J It is happily impossible to discern the plans of the great allies' military leaders, but a few factors which appear to govern the course of the war in no small degree may, perhaps, be mentioned, and when they have been fully considered perhaps it will be seen that there is nothing to be gained by precipitate action on the part of France and Britain. It seems evident that the retirement of the Russian armies from the line of the Vistula to Litov6k line, and from thence to a line still further east, is in accordance with a carefully-devised strategical plan, which bears a close resemblance to that of 1812, when the Russians were contending with the invading armies of Napoleon. Everything shows that the Germans are striving in every conceivable manner and at stupendous sacrifice to bring the Russians to'a decisive action, and it is quite plain that the Russians are not inclined to fight the Germans to a finish except on their own terms and under conditions chosen by themselves. • During three weeks the Germans advanced from Warsaw to Brest Litovsk, .a distance of 180 miles. If they maintain this rate of progress the third, week of September should see them beyond Pinsk, the second week of October should see them approaching the Beresina, and by the end of that month the snows of the Russian winter should be upon them. When Russia is frozen the activity of the Russian armies may be expected to begin, though what will then be the disposition of the German armies it is impossible to foreshadow. As the Russians retreat they draw nearer to their bases of supply, and the depots of their reinforcements; as the Germans advance they draw further from their bases of supply and from the depots of their reinforcements; moreover, whereas the railways in rear of the Russian armies are intact and in perfect working order, the railways abandoned by those armiae of the Germans will be rendered temporarily, if not permanently, useless by the destruction of bridges and the removal of rolling-stock. It is furthe'r a question, therefore, whether before German rolling-stock of a different gauge can be used on the captured Russian lines, their rails will not have to be relaid, These things being considered it will be seen that when winter has well begun and the roads of Western Russia are rendered difficult, the great problem of the German army will probably be that of supply. The Russians are fighting for time, because time will give them armaments and munitions, and will bring winter: the* Germans are fighting madly to smash their foes while they are still short of arms and ammunition and before the snow falls. When the winter comes military operations in the Tyrolean, Dolomite, Carnic, and Julian Alps will necessarily be much curtailed. Already Italy has a surplus army numbering upwards of 600,000 men; by the end of October that army, which may take part in the great Allies' general offensive movement, will possibly number a million of men. Here, then, is another very good reason why Britain and France should be in no hurry to begin that.general aggressive movement, which, to be decisive, must have behind it every available ounce of force possessed by them and their allies. Preponderance of force does not consist merely of the number of armed men, it consists also of ammunition and guns of all sizes, from the machine-gun to the huge siege-gun, which throws t a shell 17in. in diameter. / Therefore, before ths Allies take the aggressive they must have not only a preponderance in trained. men (which it can easily be shown they possess already), but they must possess an overwhelming superiority in guns and ammunition. Fortunately, time assures this to them, for not only have they in their own countries moans for making guns and ammunition together greater in the aggregate than similar means possesed by the Germans, but they are able through their command of the sea to import vast quantities of arms and munitions from neutral countries. To the west, but adjacent to Britain and France, lie the United States, which, since the war began, have been selling vast quantities of war material (o the Allies in the west, and, doubtless, will continue to do so. The actual participation of the United States in the war on the side of the Allies is not desired, since the best work they can do is to make arms and ammunition, and everything included under the heading of munitions of war to the orders of the Allies. In the Far East is Japan, a silent partner with the Allies, but all the same a factor of the maximum importance in the great combination of nations who are arrayed against the German tyranny. Herself a military power of the first magnitude, Japan is not asked to send her armies to the assistance of Russia, because of men Russia already possesses enough, but to manufacture ammunition and, doubtless, guns of all sorts and sizes, and to transport them to Russia by the Trans-Siber-ian railway. Thus from the east and the west all sorts of munitions of war aro pouring into the depots of the Allies, and what with their own exertions and what with those of America and Japan (.here is no doubt that in no great time the Allies will be able to assume the aggressive with overwhelming numbers and a vast preponderance in guns and ammunition. Russia palpably and confessedly is not ready to assume the aggressive, because she Jacks, not men, but ammunition and guns. She cannot turn her defensive campaign into an offensive campaign till these great wants are supplied. Manifestly it was best for the Allies of the West to strike simultaneously with Russia, which will be when Russia feels she lias accumulated sufficient munitions, and has got the Hermans into the position which suits her strategy and when, as in the winter of 1812, her foes will find it most difficult to manoeuvre and to bring up supplies. The .Germans manifestly are anxious to avoid another winter campaign; the Allies are making every preparation to fight a vigorous winter campaign. .The Germans have already made much talk about peace, but for'the Allies (here is \>« thought of peace, oil Germanv's term;-. It is plain that the Allies are'ill no hurry to bring the war to a conclusion, while .Germany is evidently pursuing her ominous campaign in the cast, mainly with the object of obtaining a speedy peace. In these conclusions, is it not likely therefore that the Allies will withhold their aggressive movement till Germany is more exhausted, till their own power, in munitions and men has reached the maximum preponderance, and till the snow and ice of winter place the German armies in Russia at a double disadyantage;

It would seem that the Allies' aggressive operations will be delayed, perhaps till late in the autumn, perhaps till the beginning of winter. But then, perhaps all these reasonings are quite wrong, as they may well be, and the great blow may be 'struck at any moment. It is usually the unexpected that happens in war.