FUTURE SEA FIGHT.

Taranaki Daily News, 11 September 1915, Page 12

FUTURE SEA FIGHT.

WHEN THE GERMAN FLEET OOMES OUT.

As matters stand to-day (says the Scientific American of June 12) the German first line includes probably seventeen Dreadnoughts; against this force Great Britain could oppose to-day, including ships commissioned since the war began, thirty-eight Dreadnoughts. In point of numbers of ships, this means a superiority of over two to one; but if we take into consideration the heavier batteries and higher speed of the later British ships, the actual fighting superiority is about three to one. As to the future, it is certain that the longer the war lasts the greater will be the British advantage, for under the accelerated rate of construction she is, adding to her main fleet at the rate of over one Dreadnought per month. Is the German main fleet, then, destined to spend the long years of this war condemned to hopeless inactivity within its own harbors and roadsteads. We doubt it. On the contrary, we believe that when the readjusted plans of the German Admiralty are ripe for prosecution the German fleet will issue forth in full force for a great trial of strength along those strategical and tactical lines which under the present naval conditions in the North Sea alone can offer her any chance of victory. We offer it as a plausible, if not a probable, theory that the German tactics' when the great sea-fight comes off, were foreshadowed in the operations of the German battle-cruiser fleet a few months ago in the North Sea. We believe that the raiding of undefended towns on the East Coast of England was not so much an exhibition of what has been termed German "frightfulness" as it was the preliminary stage of a German strategy, which was destined to draw the British fleet into action and lead it in a stern chase into waters where flotillas of German submarines awaited its coming. This theory would explain two very retnarable facts, which certainly seem to require explanation, connected with that running fight across the North Sea. The first of these was the complete abandonment by the powerful German armoured battle-cruisers of the unfortunate Blucher, whose destruction was certain as soon as they drew away from her. The other, and more astonishing, fact is that after the flagship Lion had been put out of action by a shot in her engineroom, and the odds, so far as the ships engaged were concerned, were three German to two British ships, the Germans with an advantage of twenty-eight ar-mour-piercing guns against only sixteen on the two British cruisers, failed to close in and attempt to sink the enemy with an overwhelming superiority of gunfiiy. If the Germans had immediately closed in to nine or ten thousand yards, their guns wT>u!d®iiave been able to penetrate the 9in- belt armour of the British ships with ease; and with a superiority of twenty-eight guns to sixteen, and anything like equal shooting, the result would have been a foregone conclusion. THE GERMAN PLAN. Why did not the German admiral seize such a tempting opportunity? Certainly not from fear of the British fire—that has never been a German characteristic. We are inclined to believe that, in continuing his fight, the German admiral was acting under strict orders and according to a predetermined plan, which was to lead the British fleet into waters where a flotilla, or perhaps several flotillas, of German submarines were gathered. It is possible, and, to our minds, rather probable, that the German Admiralty realising the hopefulness of any attempt to gain strength with the British in capital ships, is devoting the whole of tlie country's shipbuilding strength to the construction of submarines of the greatest size, speed, radius of action, and torpedo-carrying capacity. At the opening of the war Germany probably did not have over twenty-five submarines in commission. If, early in the war, she ceased the construction of capital ships and devoted her whole energy to the construction of a vast submarine fleet, it is possible that she may have over 100 of these craft to-day in commission, and this in. spite of her many losses. It is conceivable that she may have another 100, or even more, under construction. Undoubtedly as fast as they are completed and the crews can be found the new boats arc put into commission. It cannot be disputed that the work of hunting down and sinking the'merchant ships of the enemy affords the German submarine fleet every opportunity to become proficient in manoeuvring and torpedo practice. FUTURE TACTICS. When Germany feels that her submarine fleet is sufficiently numerous and its personal fullv efficient for the prosecution of her long deferred offensive, we mnv look for a general calling in of the raiders to the home ports and a sudden cessation of the sinking of merchant ships. Whenever that occurs, it will be reasonable to watch for the exit of the whole German fleet in full strength to seek- and get in contact with tho enemy. Contact once secured, we mav expect a repetition on a grand scale of the tactics employed in tho recent battle-cruiser engagement. There will, conceivably, be a lire tended fight of the German fleet from superior forces, and an attempt to lead Admiral Jellicoe and the fighting forces under his command into a veritable shoal of submarines. Some day, under conditions which suit themselves, the Germans will come out into the North Sea in full strength: and when that happens the world will witness a series of manoeuvres and a great Imttle or series of battles which, in point of interest, noveltv of conditions, and frightful destruetiveness, will set a new mark in the history of naval warfare.