THE DARDANELLES.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 305, 3 June 1915, Page 6

THE DARDANELLES.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFENCES. KEY TO TURKISH FORTS. VALUE OF LANDING PARTY. The following description of tho defences of the Dardanelles is taken from an article by H. Charles Woods in the Fortnightly Review. The position of the forts referred to in the article by letters can be seen by reference to the map which accompanies tho article. _ The coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula rises in many places precipitously from tho water's edge. Nearly the whole of the country in the rear of Maidos and of Kilid Bahr consists of hills which, in many places, attain a height of 600 ft. or 700 ft. above tho level of the sea. These hills are intersected by small, rocky valleys, with steep, almost precipitous sides. Much of this country id covered wjth scrubby bushes about 2fft high, but the area immediately to the west and south-west of Kilid Bahr is prettily wooded, the trees extending almost to the sea shore. Unless the Turks and the Germans have recently improved them, the roads along, and across the peninsula are bad, for, in the past, communication has usually been maintained by sea,

The most important town on the peninsula is Gallipoli, at the north-eastern entrance to the Dardanelles. The town is essentially Turkish, and was the fir.!t to fall into the hands of i;he Osmanlis, soon after Sulioman Pasha crossed the Dardanelles and planted the standard of the Crescent in Europe in the year 1350. The only other places of any importance are Maidos and Kilid Bahr, lying much lower down the peninsula, the latternamed village being situated at the narrowest part of the channel. These detowns would be practically unknown and neglected were it not for the strategic value of the country which surrounds them.

The modern defences of the Dardanelles, situated on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, may practically be divided into four groups:—

(1) The two forts built to protect the! outer entranco to the channel, and lying in the immediate neighbourhood of Cape Holies and of Shedd-el Bahr. Whilst we now know officially that these forts (lettered officialy A and B) were armed with fairly big guns, their importance and power of resistance have'.always been considered as insignificant as compared with thoso constructed to guard tho Narrows. In this first group, too, I would include, also,' two forts, or batteries (lettered F and I), which are situated respectively about seven and ahalf miles and about nine and a-half miles from the south-western extremity of the Dardanelles. They are both placed close to the water's edge. The forts inj rear of, and near, Kilid Bahr, are therefore on, or immediately below or above, the narrowest part of the straits. Those forts (lettered from J to T, and which include another designated CO) constitute by far the strongest portion of the defences of the straits. Hero the shore litteraily bristles with redohibts—ll in number-some being hidden, amongst the trees which cover the hills, whilst others are dotted about right down to the water's ed-"> Yildiz or Tekeli Fort (lettered P), which has always been considered as one of th" most important of these forts, lies at the extreme outer end of the group, and a little to the south-west of Kilid Bahr It owes its strength to its height above the water, to its field of fire, and to the consequent difficulty of damaging H from the sea. ' B

(3) The forts built to the north and north-east of Maidos—forts which, therefore, lie within or above the narrowest part of the channel. These defences, of which there are four (lettered DD, EE, and two not yet designated), are built upon the summits of the various., hills which border this part of the straits. They are so constructed as to be able to fire across the channel towards Nagara Point, up the Dardanelles in the direction of Gallipoli, and down the straits towards Chanak.

(4) The Bulair lines. These defences run across the Isthmus of Bulair ami thus defend the Peninsula of Gailipoli from an attack by a force advancing from the land side. They consist of three or four redoubts, connected by trenches constructed to cover tho onlv road running into the peninsula from the remainder of European Turkey The importance of these lines has now been considerably diminished, because, as we now know, it is possible, by means of the fire of modern ships, to threaten and to cut oil all means of communication by way of the Isthmus of Bulair. Equally well, and by the same method, it would be comparatively easy to render lncflectivc the fire of these forts wer« it necessary to give assistance and to support an attack delivered against the peninsula from the mainland, an attacE winch would have to be conducted over the open rolling, hilly ground which here extends from sea to sea. THE ASIATIC SIDE. There is a great contrast between the two shores of the Dardanelles. The Asiatic coast is for the most part lower and the appearance of the country is' greener and more fertile than that of ho Peninsula of Gallipoli. Communication by land is also bad, but a passable road connects Lapsaki, just opposite Call.pob, with Chanak, and thence runs on down the coast towards tho entrance of the stra.ts. The only centre of any importance is Chanak or Dardanelles situated opposite Kilid Bahr, and unite, with that place by a submarine cable, ilie town which possesses a population of some 10,000 people, is prettily located on the water's edge. There is an anchorage for ships, both, below and above it and ,n the past the little bay immediatoyto the north of the villa.-,. iu ,s usually been occupied by some of the ships which go to make up the Turkish Fleet Asa matter of f a ,t, it was here that the Messudiyeh was torpedoed by the British submarine Ml on December i 4

ASIATIC COAST DEFENCES. Partly owing to their position, situated for tlromoHt part morn or less upon the level of the sea, the defences of the Asiatic coast are, from a natural point of view, decloly lc 3s .strong than are ose Imilt upon th, Kuropcnn side, these As.at.c forts may also be con-

veniently divided into three main or principal groups :-r----(1) The two forta built to protect tk» outer entrance of the channel, which lie in the more or loss immediate vieiniu ..; Kum Kitle. Wliilst we now know that I these forts (lettered C and D) were am J* cd with guns of a considerable size, Ur:_<, have always been considered, like thu:v upon the European shore, as a sori, <•• ! advance guard to the main defences, of the straits. In this outer group, too, i would also include the batteries loc-Ueii near White Olifl's (lettered G), Durdinus l''ort (lettered E), ami the redoubt sit uated on Kephez Point (lettered II). (2) The forts at and near the town of Chanak, and therefore on or near the narrowest part of the channel. One of those, Hainidieh I. Tabia, is located rather under a mile to the south of (lie town, another Hainidieh 11. Tabia lies at Chanak, and two more are located above but within a distance of about one mile from the Narrows themselves. (3) The forts built on or in the neighborhood of Nagara Point, and therefore at a distance of about three and a-half miles above the narrows. These forts occupy a very strong position, owing to the way in which this cape and also Cape Abydos run out into the channel, thus giving two of them good fields of fire in more than one direction. The official news, informing us f,hat ships, provided with long range guns, have attacked the forts situated on both sides of the Narrows, by means of indirect fire, is far more important than it seemed to appear at first sight. In tinpast it has often been said that to sIH! the forts in this manner would probably only be a waste of ammunition, and \\vd it might well be a danger were this method adopted at the same time that ships were endeavouring to force their way up the channel. The success, now achieved, proves the first of these contentions to have been unjustified. Again, the danger to ships in the channel, due to the fact that many of the forts to be shelled on the Narrows are situated absolutely on or just above the water's edge has so far been obviated by using this indirect fire, not at the same time that, but as a preparatory measure before, the Allied fleet endeavored to steam up between the towns of Kilid Bahr and Chanak. Some years ago, I believe in 1!)0."> or 100(i, the Turks, in order to endeavour to guard against a surprise by a landing of a force on the north-western coast of the (iallipoli Peninsula, built a small look-out station on Gaba Tcpc-r- a little promontory situated on the western shore of the peninsula, and lying at a distance of about seven miles to the north-wast of Kilid Bahr. This look-out station, destroyed by the Are of an Allied cruiser on March 4, was located in the immediate vicinity of the best landing places. Such a disembarcation would naturally bo a matter of very considerable difficulty, for it would probably be strongly opposed by a force located in the hills', a force which would be in an extremely strong position unless that position could be rendered untenable by fire directed from battleships lying in the jUgeaii. WHAT THE ALLIES MAY DO. An army once gaining possession of the hills which lie in the rear of Maidos 1 and of Kilid Bahr would be able to cut off the water supply of many of the European forts a supply obtained through pipes from the hills 'in the rear. Moreover, as most of the forts are open at the back, and as few, if any, of their guns can be fired otherwise than towards the straights, such a force would, too, be able greatly to affect the accuracy of the aim, if not actually to silence the fire, of the great Dardanelles guns which defend the all-important area of tne channel which has now grown to be known as the Narrows.

In addition to the fact that an, army once occupying the hills in tho rear of Killd Bahr would be able to threaten not only the European forts, but likewise those constructed on tho Asiatic shores, it would be possible for a force, landed on the /Egcan coast of Asia Minor, to advance towards the Dardanelles. But to menace the Asiatic forts, situated on the Narrows, from the rear, would be a far more difficult undertaking than to occupy the hills of the Peninsula of (iallipoli. To begin with, these Asiatic forts cannot be commanded from the land in tha same way as can the European defences. Moreover, a force, disembarked from the Jigean, instead of being compelled to advance only a distance of about five miles, would have to undertake a inarch of at least 20 miles over an area of country in which no proper roads exist.