THE DARDANELLES.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 286, 12 May 1915, Page 4

THE DARDANELLES.

What are the (liffifiulties confronting the enterprise of our boys in the -Dardanelles '! Writing- a month ago in the Saturday Review, a military correspondent said:—"A a purely naval problem, the forcing of the Dardanelles presents a task as difficult as it is novel. As a combined naval and military operation, the difficulty is limited only by the, numbers in the land forces and the special equipment necessary for their purpose, .. Ti;e attack, having been begun, must not on any consideration be allowed ta miscarry. A preliminary trial of gun ranges in the early part of November last enabled the main fleet now operating to economise ammunition in its opening efforts and to take station where immunity of danger from mine and torpedo is assured, or, at any rate, minimised. Per contra", it must have been of service to the defence and pointed out weak spots in the system. Our seaman-gunner will, however, find that, whereas one good well-placed shot may disable a ship or neutralise the employment of its entire armament (as was instanced in the case of the Lion), in the case of a fort and its armament a direct hit upon the gun or its carriage is imperative for such purpose. The gun crew can, of course, be destroyed or driven oil' by Are, and splinters from shelters and traverses may break sights and traversing and elevating gear, but a well-fought gun on land will deal its blows until the weapon itself is laid low. That our sailors have realised this fact is patent from the reports which reach us that landing parties have been detailed to complete the work of destruction, (iun for gun, the fort with its armament firing from a fixed permanent platform will always knock out a ship with its armament firing from an unstable platform, One blow 011 the structure of the ship may alone displace the runners of a turret, the working of an ammunition hoist, the hydraulic or electric power, or any of the hundred and one niceties of mechanism which go to complete the lighting ship. Our sailors know the ' odds on' chance they hare taken 011 at this venture of a struggle for gun •power. The seaman will have learnt from his land comrade some tricks in gunnery that will lessen his difficulties. The airman observer will do bis ' spotting' as he does now in the long trench line in France and Flanders, and wire back to the gunner the result of his hits. IBut progress must be slow. The Allied fleet will have to sap its way up and past the Narrows as the Allied armies are similarly but slowly progressing on their land task. What will trouble airmen ami seamen will be the movable armament in the system of defence if there be any such. The powerful modern howitzer, with its accurate shooting, can be hidden from the reconnoitring airman and attack a ship's deck with safety if at any moment she slackens speed. It is along the military roads that fringe the coasts of the 'ixirdanellos-that real trouble should be sought, and travelling along these ways these large calibre weapons can daily shift their positions. With ttieir Orman auxiliaries tho Turkish defence will not lack military skill, and opposition may be relied upon to be active so long as the food of the weapons holds out. A land force in co-operation on both flanks of the channel, until the Narrows are secured, should place the issue beyond much doubt, and even after the passage has been mastered the safety of transit becomes a question for the landsmen on both sides. At least some 100,000 men should be allotted for this task, and once the, CSallipoli Peninsula has been cleared up to the neck at Bulair a lesser force might be required. We may hope for an operation 011 a like scale being undertaken from the Black Sea by our Russian 'Ally. The mere threat of it should neutralise a large proportion of the Ottoman army detailed for the defence of the capital of its Empire."