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Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 257, 9 April 1915, Page 5

THE EARLY STAGES.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE FRENCH.

ft ia a commonplace saying with hiitorians that it is impossible to write contemporary history with any accuracy, tine reason, of course, is that we arc too close to the events of our own day to get the right perspective; that ij, we cannot estimate their proper order (if magnitude. The more dramatic and sensational events always produce an impression out of all proportion to their intrinsic value, and the incidents which ire subsequently seen to be the cruaial or cardinal points in a long series of connected episodes are often obscured altogether for the moment by the ignorance or the prejudice of observers. But it must also be remembered that in regard to military history, it is part of the policy of both sides to conceal for the Lime being the fundamental features of their strategy, and it is thus very hard to arrive at any definite conclusion as to what constituted the turning point la a campaign, or visit special causes led to any decisive result. In the present war these general truths have been amply illustrated. As Colonel Foster, tho well-known Director (if Military Studies at Sydney University, has pointed out, we do not yet know precisely what brought about the two most important results of the early stages of the war- -""i.e sudden collapse of the French operations in Alsace and on the Belgian frontier. But the information that he is able to supply points very effectively the moral we have already drawn as to the difficulty of estimating contemporary events at their triie value, or securing adequate material to complete the historical record till long after the incidents in question have become "portions and parcels of the dreadful past." As regards the events thnt followed Immediately on the declaration of war and the German invasion of Belgium, Colonel Foster points out that the German concentration was clearly much ipore rapid than the French anticipated. The great difficulty at the outset, from the point of view of the Allies, was to mobilise the French armies quickly near the northern frontier. Tf it had not been for the unexpected and gallant resistance of Liege this would have been impossible. For the Germans would have been over the French frontier in two days, and would have seized the mobilisation centres and the connecting railway lines. The heroic Belgians saved us from this disaster; but next the French would appear to have underestimated' not only the numbers of German troops concentrated upon Belgium, but tliCjir nearness to the scene of action. It now appears that before war broke ant many German army corps had been mobilised close behind the advance guard that invaded Belgium. Further, the Germans allotted a far larger proportion of their forces to the task of "hacking through Belgium" than the French believed.

Another point is that the French Government till the Inßt moment refused to believe that the main German attack would come by way of Belgium, and had concentrated the greater part of its available forces on tho eastern frontier to back up the fortress barrier. Then when Luxemburg and Belgium were invaded the French seem to have assumed that the German advance would bo partIv through the Ardennes, partly down the valley of tho Mouse. They did not anticipate the great sweep westward past Brussels made by the Germans; and when the Germans, completing their outflanking movement, suddenly strti-k with prodigious force at the French left, near Charleroi, the result was what lias been described by a distinguished expert as "the greatest strategic surprise ever effected." Not even Napoleon's famous movement through the Alps upon the Austrian rear, which led up to his victory at Marengo, was more dramatic and effective.

But the surprise was not all on one side.' For the Germans also seem to have been misinformed. They had no idea at the time, Colonel Foster assures us, that any large body of British troops were yet in the vicinity. Accordingly, when tlicy delivered their blow a,t Kic left flank of the French line, near Charleroi, they were most unexpectedly "brought up ill standing" by the splendid resistance, of the British forces at Mon's. And, though outnumbered by three or four to one. bo well did the British soldiers plav their part that they not only extricated themselves from the trap, but saved the French left from annihilation.

For it is now quite certain that if those two and a half army corps lrvl not stood their ground so gallantly, the French left—already broken at Charleroi, and, therefore, unable to cover the British right—would have been crumpled up and driven in upon the centre. This would have been a terrible, and perhaps Irretrievable disaster, because at this critical moment the French offensive cu their right wing in Upper Alsace had met with a most serious check. Here, again, Colonel Foster warns us. authentic information is hard to obtain; but he describes in some detail two very serious French reverses, of which very few particulars have yet reached the outside world. General Joffre had apparently not yet been able to overcome political Influences and secure complete control of the armies. As a result of instructions from Paris, two forward movements were made by the French forces on the eastern frontier. We have heard already of the advance into Upper Alsace, the capture of Mulhauson, and its subsequent abandonment before superior numbers; but the other operations were much more serious matters. One French army, it seems, made a bold attempt to threaten the communications of the German forces by way of Luxemburg. It crossed the frontier into Lorraine, encountered a strong body of Germans, was badly beaten, and retired precipitately. The German advance carried them past Luneville, which they captured, and right up to Nancy, which the Kaiser made elaborate preparations to enter. But by this time the. French reserves had arrived at the front, and the beaten nrmy was able to hold its ground and resist every attempt made by the Germans to get within striking distance of the city.

Rut there is still another "unpublished episode," to describe. While the AngloFrench left and centra were falling back from the Belgian border towards Paris and the Marne, two French armies seem to have crossed the Meusc between Mof.ieres and Verdun. They plunged boldly into the Ardennes, evidently bent on Hiroiilcniiig the Gorman lines between j the Belgian frontier ami the l.ihino;. but [he task they undertook was far beyond (heir powers. Tho Germans were still nvorwlielrninglv superior in point of numbers. The French were taken by surprise, and "forced to fight on uniaxial . ground. Several army corps were brolcen ilp, and Colonel Foster appears to accept the German official statement that no less than 00,0(10 French prisoners woio laken. Fven if this is an exaggeration, there seems to be no doubt that this repulse in the, Ardennes was by far the most sanguinary defeat that the Allies have experienced since the war began and the Germans still claim it as their most decisive victory. Yet at the tinu this regrettable incident was not ev n mentioned in the official disptitenes, and we have still to look to the military hi loriaii of the future to give us th whole truth, and nothing but the truth, concerning it. Evidently we have still j much to learn as to what has gone on behind the scenes in this great war.