HAS THE NAVY DONE WELL.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 234, 12 March 1915, Page 8

HAS THE NAVY DONE WELL.

WHAT AMERICAN ADMIRALS SAY. THE SUBMARINE'S VALUE. I have by mc (says Mr. Alex. Hurd) tlie testimony which Admiral C. J. Badger, until lately Commaiulcr-in-Chwf <.f the Atlantic Fleet of the TV itcd State Navy, has recently given before the Naval Committee of the House of Representaives. This ollicer has served in the American Fleet for 11 ' years, and is one of the most talented and experienced of its representatives. He has summarised his opinion of Hip advantages which the British and Flench Fleets have gained as follows. —

1. Confined the German and Austrian main fleets to their own ports. 2. Practically closed all oceans and seas, except the Baltic, to German and Austrian commerce.

3. Enabled all lesser portions of their fleets—cruisers, scouts, torpedo and aircraft, transports and mining vessels—to carry on-their operations unhindered by the enemies', main tle"ts. 4. Kept open their trade routes and those of their Allies, except in the Baltic, thus giving life to themselves, while in a feasurc smothering their enemies.

Concerning the German battlesliipi, lie indicated the following as the advantages:—

By the superiority of the German fleet in the Baltic over that of Russia Germany has been able to do in that sea what the superior British and French fleets hove on +he oceans, the Mediterranean and the North Sea.

Notwithstanding tho daring and brilliant exploits of the German <iubmarinea. the sea control of tho Allien remains substantially unaffected. They receive munitions, food, and supplies from all quarters of the "lobe, their credit remains srstained, their a'Tnic. continue, to be transported overseas; while the ■ports' of their enemies remain closed, their foreign commerce remains in abeyance, their fleets arc confined to their own ports, and thev are thrown almost entirelv "non their own resources for munitions, food, and sunplies of every kind for both their military forces and their civil population. Notwithstanding the efficiency shown by the German submarines thev have not yet been able to change in the slightest decree the sea disadvantages under which that nation labors, because of the greater, strength of the battle ileets arrayed against it. I believe that the control of the sea will he maintained in this war and in all future wars by the, nation having the most powerful sea-going and seakeeping fleet, and that because of a few daring and successful exploits of what nU k"OAvledire to be useful and powerful adjuncts to the fleet wc should not rush to the decision that the sub-

marine as now detveloped has proved itse'f tiowerful enough to control the'sea, which control must be the end and aim of all great naval wars. That is what I think the fleets are doing at present.

fThe'-e is no enuivocatinn about this verdict on the British Xav" nnd its Work. Experienced sailors are not misled hv the bluster of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz and his satellites, or by incidents of no military consequence. Thev know that Germany is strangled and ruined. BATTLESHIPS v. SUBMARINES. In this connection it is of interest to quote the considered view, also given before the Congressional Committ««, of Admiral F. F. Fletcher, who succeeded Admiral Badger in the supreme command at sea. This officer was asked what he thought of the exploits of the submarines. Ho replied with deliberation:—

There has been considerable discussion about the submarine versus the battleship—the submarine' and other weapons of that character. The use of the submarine with its torpedoes in warfare may be designated as a weapon of opportunity. If the opportunity occurs for its use it is formidable and destructive, but a skilled enemy need not permit the opportunity to occur. In all naval wars there have been employed weapons of a similar character. There have been in use fireships, the bomb or jxp.'d mr ships, spar torrtdoes, automobile torpedoes mines and constructions for tho defence of coasts and harbors, ,l>ut none of these weapons have ever won battles br even materially assisted in the big battles that finally decided the war. Every new weanon of this character when it first appears appeals to-our imagination, and we are apt to say that it changes the character of warfare. But such is not the case, as is shown by the whole his-' tory of the development of the weapons of war. Twenty-five years ago had some inventor said: "I have here a weapon that will run beneath the surface of the water at a speed of 25 miles per hour for 0,000 or 10,000 yards, which will carry 2001b. of dynamite, and, when pointed to the direction of a battleship, will go in an absolutely straight lino, steered by a gyroscope to the noint aimed at," everybody would have been tempted to say, "That end-, the day of the battleship."

i"IT WILL NOT WIN BATTLES."

Continuing the discussion on this subject, this distinguished American officer remarked:—

But to-day every navy in the world as a weapon of that character, and yet wo still have the battleship larger and stronger than ever. The only thing that weapons of this kind can do is to delay or the movements of the main force of battleships, but eventually the final clash is decided when the battleships come together. The submarine is only another means of getting nearer a battleship in order to fire a torpedo. (The first torpedo that, was used, about 50 years ago, was used on the end of a spar rigged out from a little boat, It was a new weapon, and naturally na defence -had developed, and it destroyed or disabled four or five big ships before the defence was developed. Then came the automobile torpedo, the present Whitehead, that would run under water for three or four hundred yards. That was first used in 1878, and it destroyed or disabled three or four ships. Now, all these same weapons are comparatively useless to-day, because the defence has been developed, and so it will be with the submarine. Its first attempts will be heralded with some success. In the development of any offensive weapon it is naturally followed by development of the defence, which does not appear until later. The submarine is the latest weapon, and the defence against it is not yet fully developed, but in the natural progress of all such development, the submarine will take its place alongside of the spar torpedo and the automobile torpedo, and every other auxiliary weapon of this character. It will bo able to delay, obstruct, and hamper the movements of the m!ain force, but it will not win battles. After these two statements we can be in no doubt, first, as to what is the opinion of sailors the world over as to the work which the British Fleet has done, and, secondly, as to the place which the battleship still holds as the arbiter of sea power.