BLOCKADE OF GERMANY.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 208, 11 February 1915, Page 7

BLOCKADE OF GERMANY.

disadvantage; oj-- tiik ixxeb LINK OF OPERATIONS. DAMAGE ]X WAIt (By Liellt.-Co], Roustam lick.) Thu geographical itituation of the countries engaged in war is such that Germany ami Austria are obliged to make Avar on the ''inner operation lines," which, from one point of view, is very favorable for them, though from another it presents many strategical difficulties.

■Britain, France and Russia on tlie the contrary, must operate on the outside lines, which, as General X. I>. ilielmewitch, tile distinguished Russian professor of strategy in the Superior Military Academy in Petrograd, explains in his "Strategy," has this advantage, that the enemy may be met and defeated in detail. On the other hand, says (!eneral Michnewitch, this danger is counterbalanced by many favorable eircumstances which are denied to the strategically encircled enemies. Among these are:

The increased speed of the movements of troops; Supplies from outside; The possibility of surrounding the enemy in the battlefields by frontal movement without the use of any complicated manoeuvring. The position of the enemy is quito diametrically the opposite. lie is strategically encompassed from all sides and blocaded hy sea. lie must utilise every moment to stop the advance of his adversary, especially 011 the most important points, in the attempt to break through his front, and to defeat the separati"! twii+.s on-; "f' f ;l\e other.

NEED FOR ENERGY. Operations on inner lines demand great agility and gigantic energy, and are a most difficult task to accomplish successfully. This strategical situation of Germany is slightly cased by the presence of neutral Switzerland and on the southern frontier, and allied Austria, who supports her on the front attacked by the Russiuns, which is the most dangerous for Germany.

Realisation of this position lias led Germany for years past to pay great attention to the increasing of the strategical junctions of her network of railways and oil the skilful working out of fortified positions in order to prevent the possibility of invasion. 'jhe concentrated system for supplying the army and the whole population of Germany, if called up, with ammunition ami arms is really wonderful, anil allows our enemy to carry on his gigantic plan of defence by vigorous offensive tactics A\hich Napoleon himself would have considered foolish. The Germans, with incomparable obstinacy, ir> spite of enormous sacrifices and losses in men and material after a series of strategical and tactical defeats, are continuing their offensive tactics with undiminished energy, in order to save the strategical position of their army.

STAFF ERRORS. J/ tliv German army is suffering now and shows weakness, this must be considered a consequence of the series of mistakes which the General Stall' made at the beginning of the war. The miscalculation of tile real strength of Russia and of the resistance that Belgium would offer was the main reason tor that. The Germans first decided to concentrate on the Russian frontier only five army corps and to direct twenty army corps to the west. They mobilised their Landsturm with extraordinary speed, and have directed most of it towards France. It is clear that there was a decision to smash the Anglo-French army before Russia could accomplish the concentration and movement of her army to the frontier.

This plan was based also on the presumed ability of Austro-Hungary and the adherence of Italy to the Triple Alliance.

But the French campaign entirely broke down. By choosing the shortest lino to Paris, avoiding the fortified line Verdun—Toul—Epinal—Belfort, the Germans villainously broke the neutrality of Belgium, and put themselves by such an action in opposition to all the civilised world. It was a grave mistake of the German strategists, as they certainly musu recognise at present.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEES?. If the Germans, instead of invading France as they did, had attacked, with Austria, the Bussian front, they would, of course, have been defeated ultimately, but ill any case they would not only have invaded Poland, but would have appeared in the Central Russian governments, and harmed Russia more than they have done by both their invasions —and harm is absolutely one of the most important tasks in every war. As regards the French front, they could easily have met the French army on the line extending from the Belgian frontier to Strasburg without breaking the neutrality of Belgium. In this case their front would have been shorter than it was when they started the invasion of France.

It is absolutely impossible to imagine that France would have broken the neutrality of Belgium any more than she did in regard to Switzerland at a most favorable moment when the Swiss army was not mobilised at all; but the Germans liave not trusted their enemies, measuring their political morality as low as their own, and they hastened to commit the most disgraceful international crime, in spite of the price which has to be paid for it. This act of sheer immorality has brought them near to catastrophe, the shadow of which, like a black cloud, is already hanging over Germany.