The Daily News. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 22. THE GERMAN NAVY.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 168, 22 December 1914, Page 4

The Daily News. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 22. THE GERMAN NAVY.

Recent events in connection with the piratical raid made by squadrons of the fastest cruisers and battleships of the German navy on defenceless coastal towns in the north of England have naturally revived a keen interest in the almost forgotten sea-fighting machines of our unscrupulous enemy. The German warships have, with a few exceptions, been sheltering in unenviable inactivity for such a long period in strongly-de-fended harbors that they have come to be regarded as a negligible quantity so far as their ability to inflict damago is concerned, but the raid on the Yorkshire coast has' proved that they can at least assume the role of the cowardly bully, who, afraid to fight in the open, can rush out from his hiding' place, damage Ms opponent by a stab in the back, and then llee for his life. Yet during the last fifteen years Germany has spent on her navy an aggregate sum of not less than £ 300,000,000. To what end? Merely, so far, to commit wanton destruction on defenceless towns, trusting to speed and the fogs of- the North Sea to escape the just vengeance which such a barbaric acf merited. When the. German Navy Bill of 1900 was introduced, the world at large; was allowed to .obtain some inkling of Germany's ambitions. Apparently that remarkable document was elaborated by Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz, the Naval Secretary, and, in the light of what has happened since war was declared, great importance attaches to the contents of the Bill. For instance, the first paragraphs state:—

"A naval war for economic interests, particularly for commercial interests, will probably be of long duration, for the aim of a superior opponent will be all the more, completely rendu: i the longer the war lasts. To this must lie added that a naval war which, after the destruction or shutting up of the German sea fighting force, was confined to tin; blockade of the. coasts and the capture of merchant ships, would cost the opponent little; indeed, he. would, on the contrary, amply cover the expenses of the war by the simultaneous improvement of his own trade. ... An unsuccessful naval war of the duration of even only a year would destroy Germany's sea trade, and would thereby bring about the most disastrous conditions, first in her economic, and then, as an immediate, consequence of. that., in her social life. . . . Quite apart from the consequences of the possible peace conditions, the. destruction of our sea trade during the war could .not even, at the close of it, be made good within measurable, time, and would thus add to the sacrifices of the war a serious econo. mic depression." Had You Tirpit/. been gifted with the power of prescience, lie. could not more accurately have forecasted the fate that was awaiting the German navy,.which lias been shut up in its own harbors, and such portions of it as were unable to gain that shelter have been swept off the sea by the Allies, so that after fifteen years of unparalleled sacrifice of treasure, and mail.fisting, Germany lias been forced to realise that she has not only missed the goal whien fiacl been set, but lias so aroused the fears of her neighbors that she is relatively little stronger on the sea than when she embarUcd on her scheme of naval expansion. She attained the second place among the great naval Powers, but in so doing Hjinrrcd Britain to put to the best use her unrivalled shipbuilding facilities so as to reinforce her supremacy. Some evidence of what those facilities are, may be gathered from a cable which appeared In Monday's issue relative to the. rapid building of the light cruiser Caroline, which was delivered to the' Admiralty six months before contract date. In ISiIS the British Channel Squadron consisted of only eight first-class battleships, there being a reserve squadron manned with reduced crews, and embracing seven old first-class and three old second-class battleships, which cruised once a year. This comprised the streng'.i of tne British Fleet in Home waters, and the Channel Squadron spent most of its time oil' the coasts of Spain and Portugal, and even visited the Mediterranean, where practically all our best ships were concentrated. The prophetic vision of Admiral Von Tirpitz would appear to he limited to forecasting what would happen to his own navy, though in giving publicity to general principles it may be considered that lie had not then in his mind's eye the bottling-np of his country's naval force. The great mistake he made was in being sufliciently innocent to assume that what was would always !»•, and hence the assumption that a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to bring all its striking fillers against us. To-day, and for some linn; past, he must have been a wiser, though probably a sadder, man, for not only did the greatest naval Power carry out the concentration which Yon Tirpit/. assumed it would not carry out, but by arrangement with France it was able, soon after the opening of the war, to entrust the French Admiral, do Lapeyere, with the defence of British interests in the Mediterranean, whereby we were in a position to hold the North Sea with practically all our strength, as wc do to-day, while France holds the Mediterranean. As a consequence, the basis on which the expansion of the German fleet had been planned was swept away before the peace was broken, and ' the Germans have been compelled to hark back to their naval policy of ISoS—the withdrawal of the fleet into harbors, there to await a favorable opportunity for making a sortie in the intense dark. ness of the long nights of mid-winter, covered by a friendly and dense mist. For four months her fleet has remained inactive, not even assuming the function of a sortie fleet, and when at last it did como out in the open like a thief j*

tlio night, its mission was such as to

evoke the condemnation of the civilised world. In delivering his estimates for' naval expenditure in July, 1913, Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty, pointed out that "in the near future we shall receive incomparably the greatest delivery of warships ever recorded in the history of the British Navy," and, he showed that the rate of delivery was equal to a destroyer once a week, a light cruiser every thirty days, a Dreadnought of the latest possible type and of the highest possible cost every forty-live days, and this record has been, and is being, maintained. A comparison of the rival navies shows that the dual alliance (Germany and Austria) possess 1!) Dreadnoughts, as against .'1") in the hands of the Triple Entente (Britain, France, and Russia). In other classes of warships the ratio is: fence ships, 8 to 3; armored cruisers, 11 to 00; cruisers, 40 to Q2; destroyers, 148 to 312; torpedo-boats, 39 to 19S; submarines, 27 to 109; while the total tonnage of the Dual Alliance amounts to only 1,I50,"23!), as against the Triple Entente's 3,108,051. In a recent article which appeared in the London Times it was stated that the assurance given by Mr. Churchill as to Britain's naval programme was one that gave so much support and confidence to the nation and the Navy during the weary weeks of wear-and-tear warfare that is now being carried on by the enemy. The losses al. ready sustained by the British Fleet are of comparatively small importance as compared with its total strength and the losses inllicted on the enemy. At the rate of increase in our naval strength there is ample margin for such further losses as may in ordinary course bo expected, but wo can feel supremely confident that the resources of the Empire will amply suffice for all demands, and that the undying faith in the power of the British Navy to defend and uphold the greatness of the Empire, as well as to support the cause of our Allies, and to crush the overbearing and tyrannical Germans, is amply justified.