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THE TWO NAVIES.

WHAT LOCAL NAVIES REALLY MEAN. (By Thos. R.-Roydhouse.) The expected has happened. Those who were itching for a local navy, but received a setback owing to realisation of the fact that the idea was not popular, are seeking to make the history of the war prove their case. "Goodness knows what we would have done but for the help of the Australian Navy!" they say. "If there had been no such navy in these seas," they continue, '"New Zealand ports would have been bombarded."

"All! If the history of the past three months were only known!" is the next exclamation, inferring a tremendous lot in support of the contention that there should ljp a local navy. The superficial view is nearly always misleading, and it certainly is so in this case, as can easily be demonstrated. The main contentions of those who favour a local navy are:— That but for the presence of the Australian Navy there would have been no convoy for our troops travelling abroad. That but for these Australian vessels our ports would have been bombarded. That New Zealand defeiice is not secured by an Imperial Navy. Admitting the possibility of the accuracy of the first two contentions, what ' then ? Let us looked a little beyond our noses, please. Let us take the evidence of one of those who have paid a lot more attention to this subject that any of the local men who have of late cried aloud about the need for a local navy. I call the late Governor of Samoa a German gentleman, well known in New Zealand. The Germans, it will be admitted, have for a long time interested themselves in war matters. As a result of their study they possibly know more than those who have not studied. This applies to quite a lot of things. The Governor of Samoa, when that "pearl of the Pacific" was wrenched from the German crown, said, in effect, "the fate of colonies is not decided in the colonies, but at the other end of the world." Who can demonstrate that he is wrong?

If the Germans have the good fortune to beat the British Imperial fleet, will New Zealanders hold Samoa? Will the Australian Navy be able to keep them there against a German Imperial fleet which has just lowered the Union Jack? The gentlemen who declare that they won't be happy until they get a local navy probably experience no difficulty in determining that two and two make four; consequently they must admit the accuracy of the ex-Governor's statement. That being so, they must further admit its application io Australia and New Zealand.

It would be bad to be bombarded by the Nurnberg or the Scharnhorst. A local navy could defend us from that —perhaps. But a local navy could not defend us from the navy that had beaten the British Navy, so our land would, pass under the flag of the enemy soon after the Union Jack went down.

These being incontrovertible facts, surely it is merely business sense to arrange to strengthen the Imperial Navy for the purpose of concentration in the desired quarter (as fixed by the Imperial Admiralty) that it can beat the enemy seeing that that beating makes us secure —and nothing else does. "Ah!" says the local navy man; "but you must admit that we need some local defence?"

I do; but he must admit that that local defence is of ho use unless the Imperial Navy is strong enough to smash the enemy. That conclusion is inescapable, as has just been shown. Make the Imperial Navy strong enough, and then it will not matter how we may amuse ourselves here with a icU warships which we call "our own." "Our own!" "Anyone would think it a greater, a nobler thing, to be able to, speak of a Navy of the Empire as "Our Own!" But there is a specious quasinational form of argument in this connection which delights in regarding N:-w Zealand as a separate entity. It appears to be thought that it adds to the greatness of the country, and that individuals will be able to feel increased piide in themselves as a result of reflected greatn.-ps. Now, as to this local defence, the means of beating off raiding cruisers What is to stop New Zealand and Aus tralia having a sufficient supply of cruisertj for this purpose detailed from an Imperial Na\y, which is ad 'juatiiv supported by tin* various overseas Dominions? Adequately supported, mind you; vhich, n far, has not been the case.

Here the little Navy man tikes heart of grace, and says: "But that was the arran;<"ment! It was fixed up that *e were to have certain cruisers, and the Admiralty failed to give them to us. Therel'oie. had the Australian Navy not been in existence we should have had no ships in these waters, and been at the mercy of anything!"' Let .'h>! little Navy uistr liimielf if it i» not possible that th* Admiralty took int> t.coiot the preneiii-e ef the Australian /n~ being f^r all local purposes?. These ih'.js betn* hero, osiers n* t At the best tuey, the vessels aru«ir«d fir, and vhirli did n.t • rrl*-, r»»>d «iHt prote.it us- from perr 'ail.', i»«'l t'ifre no ce'.'U itj at all «'iat tliey fuld <i» that. It «j •.. cot lie f--r the enemy to booO.Mni one Australian port, and if- it did tlie ports would require the splitting up of the fleet to secure the protection (from raid only) of all of them, and there would be none left over New Zealand.

So with the two Bristol cruiser* that were promised for these waters. They would have been useful, 110 doubt (acting with others, as the Australian Navy has (lone), but they could not enable the people of New Zealand to say that any one of their ports was safe from attack. How could it be so? The ships are not übiquitous. Had the Asutralians not gone for a local Navy it would have been possible to bring about an arrangement, between the various overseas Dominions and the Motherland, whereby all could throw

their naval defence money into the one pool. From that pool a navy could be built which would supply policing cruisers for all parts of the Empire, and atthe same time leave available for use ■ anywhere a weight of vessels and armament in excess of that of any force likely to be arrayed against it. That means Empire defence—the safeguarding of every portion. But if the resources are scattered, and the Imperial Navy, which will have to engage in the decisive struggle, is many units belows the strength required _ for that occasion because the just contributions of overseas Dominions have been diverted from the main naval pool to the building and maintenance of local navies, then no part of the Empire will be defended. We are apt to talk here of tions" as though we arc contributing to the support of the Mother Country. It is quite the other way about. We are still living on her, and should be doing 1 so (though not with the same security) 1 if we had nl local Navy. Our defense J _aa.

But when that news struck us we would know that our story was ended, that a strange flag would go over us, and that we would be (practically) foreigners in our own land.

Let us not wait for the wisdom that comes after the event. Let us get together and discuss naval defence—all the daughter nations of the Empire— and come to an arrangement for one navy, matically"—and it would be easy to provide for the cruisers necessary for all under one control not passing autoeeas.

As to the failure to observe the Bristol arrangement, it should be apparent to anyone that the Admiralty cannot explain to everybody why it varies its plans. It may be planned to send certain vessels west to-morrow, and circumstances change, making it just as necessary that they should go cast. There must be one control, and there must be secrecy. But it may be taken for granted that had the Australian Navy not been in existence, the required cruisers would have (been on the spot to do all that tiie Australian vessels could do.

And once more, let it be said that it must not be forgotten that useful though that work is, it ia not the work that decides whether this country shall continue under the Union Jack, and enjoy peace as in the past, or pass under an enemy's flag, and become another Poland, with a people for ever saddened. A thing we have to be constantly on our guard about is a fake nationalism. Remembrance of the fact that in this Dominion we total but little more than a million people should assist us in this connection.

Finally, local Navies really mean the weakening of our main defence. We divide ourselves so that the enemy may dispose of us piecemeal. No doubt he has all along lent his support to the baby Navy idea. J

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TDN19141211.2.12

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 159, 11 December 1914, Page 3

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,522

THE TWO NAVIES. Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 159, 11 December 1914, Page 3

THE TWO NAVIES. Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 159, 11 December 1914, Page 3

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