THE ALLIES' RETREAT.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 102, 23 September 1914, Page 2

THE ALLIES' RETREAT.

ITS SIGNIFICANCE. . It must now be evident to nil that th<j original plan oi ilu: Ueiiuau civnipaigtt lia.4 cotupietu collapsed, The Army that at Uio beginning of August started out to make a. rapid and etl'eative descent upon d'aria is now seeking k' the salvst w&y home in order that it may defend its "owa. country from invasion.

For the .past four weeks tlio cables have .been toiling us a story so strange that in gome quarters doubt were expressed as towhether the British authorities were, in the matter of news, treating citizen population in some manner similar to that with which the Ueromans were treating theirs. The Allies were always winning, go we were told, '■but nevertheless, the (Jermans were steadily jotting nearer to iParis. Ia endeavouring to understand the situation, it must 'be remembered that tilie probability of this war was long foreseen by the partners of the Triple Entente, and that a plan of campaign had been earemJly uioughb out. ■General French 3iaa been .to France, and attended the Army manoeuvres, and there is little doubt tiut that the leaders of the Allies' forces have spent many hour* in conference together. Last October was looked upon as a critical time for France, and chat probably the war would 'break out then. The French Three Years' Service Bill -was designed to save the country from presenting to tho foe what would lure been practically a disorganisd army. It was foreseen that 'Germany, in "order to escape having to pass under the guns of the Strong lines oi i'ortii'iications on 'her south-western frontier, would most likely attempt a passage through Belg:um.

British experts, writing more than twelve months <igo, declared that it would bo fatal on the i[«ai't of the Allies to give 'buttle either in Belgium or Germany, for in those countries the conditions would favor the Germans, ot at least make of victory equ.il to bot'ii sides. To stake all on equal chances, when better terms wore possible, was obviously a mistake. It does not require a military expert to see tuat. To break through the Allies' line would, it was recognised by both aides, be done only at groat coit to the Germans. The Germans were prepared for tti«, tut hoped that after their initial losses, they would 1 'be aiblo to break through by sheer weight, and, 'having done so, to commence an uninterrupted march of victory until they had reached Paris. That the war would be conducted on an unparalleled scale and that enormous losses would result was so certain tiliat tho Allies determined not to incur loss in the attempt to prevent inevitable devastation. They had [ therefore determined upon the tactics of -retreat.

It is quite conceivable that had tha Allies kept on their first position, the Germans would have, .ultimately broken through. As ib was, the German* attacked and lost heavily before they were able to bring tho pressure of their numbers, and the Allies had retreated t; another nosition favoraJble to themselves but unfavorable to 'Mie enemy. The consequjnce has been that tha enemy has had to imake a succession of most expensive attacks, and never been able to break through the Allies' line. Experts declare that the retreat should bo carried on until the Allies" line extended from' tho north-west to l'arii.

13y this time tho enemy would be liampered by Qiaviing to keop open a long ! iine iof communications and also by the delay 'taken in 'bringing up reinforcement#.

Oil tlie other hand the Allies' position should ibe one of great strategic importance. Their left would foe safe; their light would rest on Paris, and all along their front they would occupy chosen positions. The possibility of a British force coming down from the north-west and threatening the enemy in the rear, also existed. Provided the Allies had nob suffered too severely in the campaign, the movement would have the effect of driving the enemy towards Paris, 'Uo worst place for them to he near, while the Allies' forces were \mconquered. Here is was expected that decisive action would lie fought under favoraWo conditions to the Allies. A decisive deiea.t would, leave no alternative for the enemy but to retreat to their own borders and by this time it would be impossible for them to retrace the steps of their advance. They would be compelled to seek a means of retreat through the strongly fortified frontier on the north-east. Umkir such conditions, the retreat was, it was pointed out, full of groat possibilities.

The, whole plan Teods so much like history of the last few weeks itlut it is difficult to imagine tnat it was foreseen by our military experts months ago. The Germans liave placed all their confidence in the completeness of their army organisation and we hare been a little overawed about it; but wo have grounds for confidence in the strategy of oufi own leaders. There are absolutely no grounds for boasting. (Out there is much ground for conlidtnue.