THE DEFENCE OF FRANCE

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVI, Issue 83, 2 September 1914, Page 6

THE DEFENCE OF FRANCE

THE DEFENCE Of FIiANCE. The present situation in Franco is the subject of art interesting article in thi' Auckland Star, in the course of which occurs the following:— "That the Germans should ignore Lille suixl Maubeuge is almost incredible, because of the danger to their communications and their line of retreat if their onset is at once checked. But it is equally,' hard to believe that the Allies are retiring solely because of heavy pressure brought to bear upon them by the advancing German hosts. Of course, the Allies are making it their business to hold back the Germans as long us they can, but it may he reasonably assumed that their withdrawal is part strategic. It must not be forgotten that, as we have already pointed out, the defensive plan of campaign' which French and British military experts have discussed repeatedly during the past twenty years was liased on the assumption that the, German attack would be made through Belgium, and it provided for such a strategic retirement as the Alljfcs now appear to be conducting. Granting, that Germany would at .the outbreak of hostilities be able to place a larger force than France into the field, and that she. would be prepared to spend 'her troops recklessly to gain he» objective, it has been generally agreed that the French army's best chance of success lay in awaiting Germany's -attack along a line considerably nearer Paris than the point tho invaders Itave now reached. Some sixty miles from the frontier behind the Lille-lfaubeuge-Aleizeircs line, of fortresses is a still stronger outwork, the La Fere-Laon-Reims line covering all the roads that converge, on Paris front the North. 'ln front of this second line of fortresses in the valley of the Aisne, is tile position I'bosen for a determined stand against the invaders; and we may fairly assume that the Allies, if they do not succeed in holding the ground they now occupy, will be able to put up an extremely obstinate defence in the Aisne ' Valley, even if they do not break the strength of the invading army altogether. At this distance from its base the German army will lie far less formidable than in Belgium, and, however lavishly the Germans may waste their f troops' ill frontal attacks, the limit to endurance in this respect must ultimately -be reached. j