War Notes.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVI, Issue 82, 1 September 1914, Page 7

War Notes.

"YTOE TO THE VANQUISHED."

A great tirsil of sympatic las been ratm-aily evoked in l-Jngnmd ana France by tile terrible in'iskiriunes r.uii i;ullerings that the: people of Belgium have been compelled to undergo tiiruugh the irruption of ih- Uunuan armies into vlieir country. Ue have already warn ed our readers tliat we must not, without proper investigation, ;;«ept the I tales of sanguinary atrocities sueh as i tuive been freely imputed U> the Uermans in Alsace as well as in Belgium. It must be remembered, also that the rulea of warfare are rigid, and that every invading army must enforce tlieiu, if necessary, against civiLians and noncombatants for its own safety. We may even admit that the imiKitition ci an indemnity or war levy by the ijcrnuaiis upon Uie Belgians ciu-.-s is not inconsistent with the principles on which international law is basal as between belligerents. But whenever the Germans have uone, and w-hc;,u.'r they arc guilty of 'iie heinous crimes charged against them or not, the fact remains that the evil fate whidh has now overtaken Belgium must always be in store for any country exposed to the- menace of war, and incapable of 'iefending itself. The horrors of war.'viie in all their fury have been let 100, ; again upon the peaceful cities and the smiling countryside; Belgium is once more "the cockpit of Europe"; and li>r the moment the moral that we can most effectually draw for our own benefit is the necessity for maintaining vigilantly a strong defence against the possibility of f invasion, however distant '.to danger may seem. So far, by vir'/iie of her naval strength, England has t-*a.ped the terrible calamities that! Belgium now has to endure. But if it were not for our fleet, or if our fleet could i.ot lio'i the German navy in check., an invading airmy wold ere" this have ianued on •England 1 ? shores .and the horrors that iiave already shocked the conscience of the civilised world would be re-enacted speedily in England itself. it is ail a terrible object-lesson in the futility of the "peace-at-any-price" creed, and we may at least hope that it 'has brought home to England, and to every one of her dependencies, Mio truth of the well-worn aphorism, "if you wikli for peace, prepare for war." |

APPEALS FOU PEACE.

lwird Roberts, in the course of a speech lie delivered at Newca.st.le on (September 23, 1912, said that it is only when there is a prospect of war that any interest is taken in the Army by tlie general public, and then cr.ly in a hysterical and excitable fashion. The approach of war, Lord Kobens went on to indicate, merely turned the great mass of the public from one. irrational standpoint to another. In peice tiri'.j the miblic, or at least a lar;.:. portion] of them, clamour against the expense, necessity, .ml ii:Comcnici'.':? ol preparing for'war, anil when war U actually upon thim these same people expir. that the army, in whieh they have taken no interest o'f whose numbers and comlatency they arc pri.foun-lly ;gnoiant, Ui ai-eompl'ish wonders, no .matter against whom it is pitted. Si:tli an attiude, whieri U not uncommon even m JS'cw Zealand and other rviism .!■>■ minions, is both unpatriotic and suicidal. We know of eases where the mother has said: "No, I will not let my boy undergo military training.'' not because slu has a strong .jh; ciion u such, training, but because she did not believe there was going to be war. This particular instance, in one form or another, is too f-uiiilir.'. ihe ignorant and the inditi'ereiu ;:'••: legion, and Hie combined effect c.i their obstinacy has t-ren distinctly ik'liiwuia; to the well-being and safet/ of the Empire. 'We admit that dose we have in mind were actuated by th? best mtionfi. 'flu-ir most grave oli'.-irce has been to act without knowledge, and, at the same time, in the bclici that Oiev possessed exceptional knowledge. O. such, too, are the men and won /ill wlla talk'ot pe«e where there is m pea«'. Ignoring the most elcmenUrv facts 01 the international situation aa it has been for years, these peo >'c, through their peace societies, agitate for disarmament, and seriously assert that by this means and mono other peace ".a to •be attained. If it were pn.-..mile for every nation that lias b.'cn spcmlin-,' cne-half of its revenues on 1-attlwhins and armies mutually and simultaneouslj to disarm, a world-wide ami lastm;f peace would be within the possibilities. But this is not the teaching of pacificists, Their cry is that disarmament is a good thing in itself, and tba, England and the Umpire should lead V" way. They will not admit, tor they cannot perceive it, that this sort of disarmamen-, and neglect ',: adeiiusile iTertarations would mean ;<:,.! cvwituate in war, not peace. Th, one and only guarantee of peace ; s that a nation is ready to enforce it, to be so strong that the would-be ag;',re»<>T dure not carry out his desires.

THE WAR OF 1870.

It mav be interesting to recall the extraordinary rapidity of the march ot events in the Franco-Pi ussian war ot 1870-1. Oennan mobilisation began cm July 16 and was eompleted by July'.• France began her mobilisation on -nly 18, and the troops were sent out immediately witH their peace esUiblisaments. The French army corps wore a-t unprepared for action, and the opening movements were consequently postponed until August 2, when the r-reuel. army consisted of the i«"o wl "K = - -Metz group ■■ 100,00(1 Strasbourg-Uelfort group SO.OOO Reserve •• ■■ 40 ' OO ° Against this force Trussia had in the '"First armv, liO.flOO. on the Lower Saar. Second army, 200,0IM) <m the Nahe, to Mainz. , Third army. 140,OfM* men, between Landau and Gcimcrstoin. A total of 400,1100 men with 1200 guns. The main events of the war were then as follows: July 30—Slight French success aSaarbruek. . ,„,,.„ August 4-Battle of Weissenbui;.'. French repulsed. , mnnrv August ..-Battle of Worth 20000 Germans, 50,000 French, under H'Mahon. French retreated; Battle of Spiclieicii, won by German endurance August 7-14-German advance to In Moselle, French retre.it from . Med .<> 70000 Germans. 150,000 French, casualtie', on each side, about 1 li.mii» August 18-Battlc ot Gravelotle, >- "•_ 000 Germans, 140,000 French; Itcik.. draw back behind Metz. September 1-Battle of S.dan. _-o,_ 000 Germans, 120,000 French; J'.mpcio. ill. surrendered. . September 4-.March on raris b.guu. September 19—Paris surrounded. September 27-Straabourg •- i " vr,, " l "' r ;- October 27- ltaMiine surrec. M Met/. Xovember 7-25-Advaiicc. '" <.<™™ 2nd army corps to the Loire. November 20-24--Heli-f ..; •■rat.on, .)! the Loire army. n,1,.-,ns December 5-French evacua e_ Oi c.u*. January 15-10-ltatUc of Helfort, oO-

000 Germans, 150,000 French, indecisive. January 28—Paris capitulates. May 10—Treaty of Frankfort signed, ■vFranee gave up .Alsace, except Belfort, and the old German portions of Lorraine and agreed to pay a war indemnity of £200,000,000.

BATTLES LONGER, WARS SHORTER.

In one of the latest French hooks on .strategy, Commandant Colin's "Transformations of War," the theory of the I big blow in modern warfare, according to French ideas, is carefully developed. Commanders, it is stated, are learning to put their full strength into one big light instead of sending forth armies one after the other. Nowadays, says the author, "we must employ all the living forces of the nation, employ them in common action together, and in the same battle," so that, while battles will be longer, wars will be shorter;'

| Commandant Colin criticises the French strategy in the Franco-German war, by which one large French army was crusihed at Gravclotte and another at -Sedan. These tactics of sending one army after another resulted in tlicir all being overthrown or locked up by the second week of August in 1870, within four weeks of the outbreak of tlie war. Indicating what he thinks France should have done, Commandant Colin remarks: "By refusing to fight in the iniddle of August, it would have been possible to assemble six or seven hundred thousand men by the first day of September."

THE MEANING OF DEFEAT.

The principles laid down in the French book seem to fit in well with the facts, so far as they have been cabled. Some days ago the continued use of the word "allies" in the cablegrams, in relation to the operations in Belgium, suggested that the French had taken up permanent positions in Belgium. This was negatived byi a later announcement that on Thursday the Germans broke through to Brussels, and later to Ghent, witfiout fighting a battle of magnitude. Now we are told definitely that British and French hold the lines between Mons and Luxembourg, and that a great engagement has begun. It is apparent that, according to Commandant Colin's idea, the sending of one army after another into Belgium would have been a mistake. Better to await on the chosen ground the issue of one big fight. The strong points of this strategy are plain enough to the view. It provides both for victory and defeat. In the case of defeat, the Allies have their own carefully prepared means of retreat on which to fall back. Behind them partially overlapping the "gap" on the Franco-Belgian frontier, are their own internal lines of defence. Everything is prepared behind them, with a view to preventing defeat being converted, into disaster.

With the Germans it is different. They have maivhed fast across Belgium, losing man? men, and havo plunged at once into the big battle. If defeated, they have no supporting lines to fall back upon, except their hastily prepared entrenchments. The communications in their rear are newly made and temporary ; and. clever as they have been in utilisinc motor traffic and converting to tin-:- own use the Belgian railways, their commissariat and ammunition supply cannot' hardly be equal to that of the waiting foe. Defeat for the Germans may easily spell disaster. What they rely on this that the word "defeat" is not in their dictionary.

INTRKASW! THE BATTLESHIPS,

"When the war began, Britain liail thirty dreadnoughts and super-Dread-noughts in commission, while Germany had seventeen. But it is probable, that tin- numbers have boon increased on Imth .-'uli'S since that time. The shipyards, it is certain, have been working night and day preparing for sea battleships that were launched, but not completed when hostilities commenced, and no time will be wasted on yond the bare necessities of war. The equipment of living quarters and the usual steaming and gunnery tests could be postponed until a more convenient time. The British super-Dreadnoughts Emperor of India and Benbow, each displacing 25,000 tons and armed with ten 13.5 in. guns, were launched last November, and would have been commissioned in the ordinay course of events before the end of this Tear. The Queen Elizabeth, the first battleship to carry the new 35in. guns, was launched in October last and a sister ship the Warspite, took the water in November These •>7 500 ton 25-knot battleships, the most poWerful in the world, may be ready for service by this time. Three other ships of the same class, the Valiant, the Barham and the Warspite, have probably not yet been launchecl. Then the battle-, ruiser Tiger, a 30,000 ton ship of 30 knots designed for speed, was launched last December. She famed eight 13.5 in. guns. (iermanv has the. Dreadnoughts Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf and Koenig, which were launched in March, May and .Tune of last year. Ihcy are 2b,000 ton vessels, armed with ten 12-ineli guns each A sister ship, the Kronpnnz, was launched in February of this year. The three battleships were reported to be "Hearing completion' last month, nnd though (lerman constructors are slower than British, experts have stated that (ierman ships are often ready for service several months before their ollicial trials take place. The German battle-cruiser Derfflinger was launched last .Tulv and was expected to be ready for her ollicial trials last month, bhe is a iS-.Oflfl-ton, 30-knot vessel, currying eight 12-inch guns. Another battlecruiser of the same class, the Lutzow, was launched nine months ago. In the ordinary course- of events, the commissioning of these new Herman ships would have eaused some old battleships to lie removed from the reserve and used a.s targets. The (ierman navy has long used its condemned units as materials for realistic gun practice. Before an old battleship is taken out to be fired at, patehes of modern armor platimi are fitted on her side, and it is »aid that the very lifelike imitations of the lire control positions of British ships (the covered plate forms high up the masts from which ranges are. taken and firing directed) have been mounted on the masts of these target ships as an interesting object for practice. Before they are towed out. elaborate precautions are taken to lill these ships up with cork, as a precaution against their sinking, and the ships is also generally moored in shallow water, fast year the British Dreadnought used an old 14.000 ton battleship as a target, but she sank after a few shots had been fired, and could not he recovered for purposes of examination.

A I'll ESS-PLAYER'S VIEW.

A chess champion sends to a Sydney paper the following .summary of the military position from a chess player's point of 'view:—Europe just now is a, huge chess board, on which kings, «astlcs, knights, and the liumble pawns) are fighting. The Germans are admittedly the finest chess players in the world, and

their champions, among them Lasker, the world's champion, stand out from other nationalities. Von Moltke and Bismarck were high-class chess players, and in the Franco-Prussian struggle, they organised their war game on the lines of an experienced player of chess. Had thosq strategists been in command of the German forces during the present critical juncture, they would have conducted their war game differently, and on a chess player's lines. When Bazaine was cornered in a French fortress, Moltke, the chess player, when he played his great match, just forty-year ago recently, foresaw that the enemy must stay in and starve, or come out : and he slaughtered. The result of this strategy was justified. Bezaine hew the white flag, and the war of the 'Seven- i

tics was practically over. In the present crisis, Germany lias forgotten th:>. chess axiom that premature attacks recoil on the aggressor. Belgium was lighly regarded as a pawn in the game, which could he shifted oil' the board at will. The result was an unexpected check, which retarded the German attack, and gave France and her allies all important time for perfecting defences. The consequence is that Germany I stands every chance of being check- | mated at a comparatively early stage < of the game. France and England have developed their men, and secured all-im-portant strategic positions on the board. Germany and Austria have no point of attack. England is threatening checkmate on the seas, Russia and Poland are harassing the Germans and Austrians in the rear, and the outcome of this war chess game must be in favor of big bat-

talions.

(JIiRMAN ATTACK.

Since active operations in the war began it has been mentioned wore than once Chat the Germans .attacked a fortified: position in close iormulion. The Gorman infantry attempted to carry the Liege forts in close formation, and subsequently it was reported that an assault was made upon Antwerp, an even stronger fortress, ,by the same method. The German method of .attack is thus described by General Huttos, a distinguished soldier wiio saw a great deal of service in the Boer war and wag for some yearns Commander-in-Chief i n Australia, It was written 10 :i resident of Sydney, and is published in the Svd - ney Morning Heraldi:— "It was imp'ossibte for onlookers to have had better opportunities of studying the German system of attack than was presented t» us at this—Hariau—most, interesting mimic battle. The preliminary stages of the attack, like out own are carried out by firing and supporting l.'ncs of infantry in .single rank at intervals varying according to ; the reserves were, how'ever, retained in close order and even in company columns, 'i ne j Intelligence Department (British) handbook tells us that the German regulations are framed upen ti'ie rule "that 'close order is the basis of all things, and that the principle alwavs in view is to keep the men in close formation as long as possible, preferring co Jo-* a few !iiM'.n lather than let their commands get (Alt of hand a moment sooner than neecssatry.' This principle ;s carried out to such an extent that -en many occasiens it was observe., that the companies were kept in con piny columns at ell'ective artillery and even decisive infantry ranges. The idea is consistently observed that everything should 'be sacrificed, even human life, to a steady, cohesive discipline upon ,tne field of" battle. Tlie most extensive latitude is left to individual commanders as to when or 'hew the lir.al rush, or prepared assault, for the cnemys position is to iake place. When the o;l'iocr commanding the company, or h nwy be larger unit, considers the decisive m;o----n-'cnt has arrived, he brings up the reserve, usually two deep, wii'i amis at the shoiudcr and in close f.nMi.ilion.

•rili-i \ LLMvKAJILt: PEKIiSCOL'I'

_ A 'big argument has been going on in IJiglaiKL just- over tin* ponu —now lur you can "snot'' Uie submarine and attack her through the medium of her perisiopc. Immediately before the war Adnnrai Sir Percy 'Scott replied to In* critics, who said that through lviymg en manoeuvre tests Sir Percy had allogetmer overrated the value of the submarine as against tins .battleship. One point which Lord Sydenham (isir beoi'ge Sydenham Clarke, formerly Governor of Victoria, and one ■vi Hie best known, nnlilory theorists in Great Britain) had brought loiward was that the experience, of manoeuvres was no guide to Mie iproiubablc experience m war so far as submarines were concerned. "In manoeuvres," he said 1 , "the most anxious caire is exerted to avoid injuring the submarine. Jn war the utmost eagerness ruthlessly to destroy the submarine will be manifested. A touch from a snip's stem will send her to the, bottom. The entry of a single small shell-—and tlhe destroyer can lire one 'hundred in a minute—would render the submarine helpless. The submarine, if she is to attempt any offensive action,' must iiequentiy rise to the surface, may then os drenched with small projectiles, and 10-; c licr periscope, and may, in addition, be liable to. aeroplane attack.''

KNTItEXCIIIIENTS.

Rifle bullets audi shrapnel assail the soldier for the greater part of tile tinw he is in the field during the active process of a:i engagement. .It is the duty of artillery, broadly speaking, to utter the lirst loud words of battle, and tile argument is continued with the rille. Cavalry and the. bayonets a v.: the conciudin;;' remarks. "\\ li'de, 'lun, these long preliminaries and discusi-iims in lead and iron are in progress, where is the soldier's refuge? It has often been said thai a man never known until he has been in action what a trifling smelter will hide him. In the midst of an apparently level plain, a good officer will find cover for his troops behind natural out, scarcely visible obstacles; and seemingly minute undulations will cover even mounted soldiers. But while these indeiinabic slopes will hide iliroops from view, they will not protect them l'roi:i the terrible scourge of a searching lire, an,! tlhey will further keep the hidden men from being themselves on th.> cliensive Entrenchments are the cove- of the oclivu soldier.

the u:ssox zabkux

The Germans are. frequently deas a peaceful nation (writes .1. Kllis Barker, in the Nineteenth Centur..' and After). They would more cor-ivc'.-lv bo described 'as a well-drilled and well-disciplined nation:. They a-', firmly ruled iby a small class through an ail-iv)>'(rful bureaucracy, anmy. and ponce. A.) olute obedience to official orders is the first duty of ihe citizen and the first law of the .State, The well-drilled Germans are a law-abiding people, and their obedience is absolute. Orderly grumbling, if done in moderation, is permitted Hence, if the people are dissatisfied with fbeir rulers or disapprove of their policy, bhey may protest, but they will obey. That was seen in 1866. Tflen. tihe I'ru-isiaus passionately protested against; the ''Bruderkrieg," " Hie fratricidal war against Austria. Yet they iclbeyed and fought. The Government Bia» crashed tlic spir

j»f tie people. iThis lade of spirit constitutes Germany's strengui, but also lluir weakness. German enthusiasts always greatly admired' democratic gov- . cvumunt, bat, unliKe frenchmen, Englishmen, lAmcrwans, Italians 1 , Swiss, and Dutch they have never seriously fought for it. They were at best bait-hearted supporters of revolution. The nation ' r«se only, as in 1813 against Napoleon, wnen loadered by the Government. In Gewnany the Government does not <..■!■,. out lac will of the people but uie peoplo execute the will of the Government, and Uuose who lay to prow that Germany is peaceful because the German merchants, clergymen and work-ing-men do not wish, for war, only show that they are unacquainted with ■Germany's political character and organisation, and with, the elementary

facts of German, 'history, The majority ol Germans are undoubtedly .peaceful, but Hint peaceful majority will go to > war with, alacrity as soon as the ruling minority gives the signal. There is a great dilferenoa ■between' democratic and autocratic Germany, a difference • which is not sufficiently appreciated in ! other countries. Democratic Germany , talks much but dioes not act; autoI critic Germany acts but doles not talk. Democratic Germany filled the nows- , Ijapcr s with loud complaints about the Zabeni incident; autocratic Germany did not talk at Zazern, but acted, and the incident closed with the victory of 'autocratic Germany. Herein lies the lesson of Zabern.