"ADVANCE TO WIN."

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVI, Issue 81, 31 August 1914, Page 7

"ADVANCE TO WIN."

JHSITONS IN ATTACK.

GAINING GROUND UNDER FIRE.

MOW IT IS DONE.

I'or three •weeks huge armies of Ger emus have worked through Belgium 'lhc invaders Mad hoped to hurl them pelves against the French frontier, and to break through by weight of numbers scientifically directed. Swift conquest I was the prime purpose, but the Germans, with all tlheir sublime confidence in their carefully prepared plans of a"' gressive war, have not overlooked the possibility of a reveT.se and a compulsion to retreat. Some of the cable messages have indicated that Hie Kaiser's legions have taken precautions against a set-back in important engagements. Thus the Allies in their advance wall havo to reckon with numbers of points d'appui (points of support), strategic localities Which the Germans will have fortified hurriedly, but strongly. Assaults on such positions require a good co-operation of all arms of the service —especially the artillery, infantry and engineers. The methods of attack were , described by Lieutenant-Colonel Camphell, D.5.0., Chief Instructor, Hythe/ in a lecture to a distinguished company of, officers at Aldersihot.

"In order that advances under fire may be successfully carried out," he eaid, "two important principles should be thoroughly grasped: (1) The principle that to advance is to win; and (2) the necessity for reconnaissance before movement." In this cautious survey of the ground to be covered engineers have an important part.

WHEN TO BEGIN FIRE. "The guiding principle," continued the lecturer, "is that tire should not be opened by infantry in attack until it is required 'to assist the advance, it has been well said by a foreign military writer that if fire is opened at long ranges in the attack, t'hc men think more of firing than getting forward, and the attack fails, It should seldom be necessary to open fire beyond 1400 yards, and, if possible, not beyond 1000 yards, and this is confirmed by experience in the Manchurian campaign. . ... As regards the formations, they may be small columns in fours or files to make the best use of the accidents of the ground, or extended order to offer ah unfavorable target and minimise loss'.

COVERING FIRE

(While infantry, reserving fire, are forging ahead, till a suitable range for tilie rifle is rained, they have the pleasant music of the shells whirling over i their heads fromi supporting guns. The covering fire from- artillery continues Jill the gunners consider that further I bombardment anight smash up. their I own comrades. During the Manchurian leampaign, the Japanese infantry arranged occasionally with the artillery to have the covering lire maintained till the attacking lines had almost reached the Russian entrenchments; the argument wan Unit the credit-balance in I such t-ircuiiHtances 'would be largely Jin favor of the assailants, as,the proI portion of .'a;iaiicse killed or wounded iby tin; fir- :' -iipporttng artillery would I be relath ~ small.

Covering lire may also be given by s]W'C.ially detaolcd bodies of infantry oi by machine guns. Also one portion of a line, may cover the advance of another section.

"Responsibility for initiating the attacks rests with the .superior comnnandere," wud Colonel Campbell, "but the responsibility of carrying it through is constantly shifting from senior commanders to junior officers and fire-unit commanders, and finally from these commanders to the private soldier. Tims, when action is taken on the orders of the brigadier, he loses control of the battalions of his brigade, and can only influence the course of the action by the use of liis reserve. Similarly commanding ollieers lose control of their own companies. Company commanders, as the action progresses, can no longer command their companies, and thus the control passes to halfcompany eii.nunanders, then to section and stp'iad commanders, and finally it devolve* upon the private soldier to carry on the fight on his own initiative if control becomes no longer possible."

AGAINST LONG BOWLS. The speaker's main point was that the deciding factor in a battle would lx> ultimately the charge of men with the baronet after the enemy had 'belli pounded the artillery and machine guns. Jn the subsequent discussion one er;itie disputed the advisablencss «f advances "against "sheets of had," but this opinion found no support. "1 say,'' declared Brigadier-General Simpson, "that we cannot hope to win a kittle, 'by playing at long bowk. To succeed' 'in an attack it must be pushed home, and this can be done by combining fire with movement in si'u'li a way as to gain and keep i-upcrioritv of (ire over the (forte attacked (while c(ontiiuiing the advance, if superiority of lire cannot be maintained on one line of advance, another line nwy be attempted—which leads U> the attack against a Hank or a turning movement."