Contrast of Plans

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVI, Issue 80, 26 August 1914, Page 8

Contrast of Plans

GERMAN AND » :> RI'.NCII. AX EXPERT'S ANTICIPATIONS. REM.UtKABLE FULFILMENT. "Initiative and Power af Manoeuvre," was the subject) of a lecture by Brida-dicr-llcneral 11. W. Wilson, C.8., D.5.0., Director of Military Operations, War C'll'ic.e, to an assembly of officers, nearly four rears ago. The well-known expert in tactics discussed the German •ind French plans of war—-the plana which have been used in the present epochal (tost THE GERMAN GREED, "ATTACK ALWAYS." "We all know," said General Wilson, "that there are two schools of thought as regards the exercise of initiative. There is the German school, which preaches and .rmiotieos the initiative of attack. To attack always, to attack at •all times, to at/tack every where, and cm attack -everybody. There is a treed. There is something grand in the siin : pli<-ity of this doctrine, a simplicity which goes a long way towards ensuring success. Then there is the French school, which, preaches the attack just as wshemenllv.

Which is just as scathing oil all forms of defence, unless they are merely a period of incubation for a proximnte attack; but which also Jffcachca that to attack always, to 'attack at all times, to attack everywhere, and to attack everybody may 'load to a great waste ■of power,-and possibly to disaster. TURNING MOVEMENTS. "ffjie German plan secflns to work out : r«ttghly aa follows: —Possibly the area >oi' the'enemy's concentration can be fix<ecl, in which case the initial forward movement is made against an area, and j r.ot against troops. Possibly the position of the hostile troops cam be approxi•rnatelv determined, in which case _tlic forward movement is made against them, lint whether against an area, or against troops, itlu- course pursued is always the same. It is a full oxtensio'. l and a convergent advance, the. wild! l -" force to bring -is weight jto bear at once, and always and ever by an overJapping of the planks and 'by an >rre- ! siistible initiative to deprive 'the cnctmy ; of all power of offence, and to throw liim ; from tlie outset on the defensive. Such j&n open deployment means no general ' reserve, and no power to alter plans and no power ctf manoeuvre." I The events of the past twenty days iave shown db J. the German attack vas against an siea. The leaders hopid to sweep through Belgium and to strike France foc'ore mobilisation was :cmplete on a very important concentration area.

DISADVANTAGES OF RUSH TACTICS (After a reference to the advantages of the German scheme —"a-bold advance, an enveloping movement, or attack and full initiative" —General Wilson mentioned three counterbalancing disadvantages:—(l) The whole movement may miscarry owing to a faulty calculation |of the. area or of the position of the [ enemy's troops to be enveloped. (2) l There is small chance of changing the. plan, when once committed to it. (3) the Commander-in-Chief has little power over the fortunes of his army. The check suffered by the in tin; vicinity of Liege is impressive evidence that they did miscalculate the defensive strength of that area. The plan presumed a rapid passage by a fierce onset, hut this necessary advantage was not gained. Subsequent reports mentioned that much confusion resulted from thin unexpected setvback. INITIATIVE .FOR EVERYBODY—EXCEPT THE CHIEF.

The lecturer gave some dry liumor ' on the "cult of the initiative," an absoI Into fetish among the Germans. If the | humblest private has not a marshal's | baton in his knapsack, he at least has scope for initiative.' "All are full of In- ! telligencc," the General remarked playi fully. "All are full of individuality. All are full of initiative, all, indeed, except the hapless Comnunder-in-Cluef. He alone, though it is conceivable he may have intelligence and possible individuality, can obviously have no initiative. He alone is an onlooker. The whole picture reminds me of a number of men in 'calccons' drawn up on the edge of a j bathing-pond, when suddenly one of the [junior members (taking the initiative) rushes down the spring-board and I plunges in. He is followed by all the j others until finally thb only .man left ion the bank is the senior member of the ! party. In a fit of desperation he, too, | races down the plank, and goes headj long into the pond. Is this an exaggeration? Perhaps it is. But look hack at 1564, 1860, 1.570, and all the German teaching since, and £ell me if it is very far from the truth." Other writers have asserted a "lack of initiative," anil have alleged that the German soldier is a clockwork unit, j moving by force of a hidden spring, of which he'is ignorant. THE MORE CAUTIOUS FREXCII.

"As I understand the French "theory, it in this,'' continued the General. "They are inclined -to favor manoeuvre in the early phases of an action in preference to "deployment; they therefore _ favor large reserves, and they believe in the action being fought- 'by the Conamandw-ill-Chief, and not by some subordinate leader. They therefore restrict initiative to purely local and tactical operaarid have neither tflie desire nor I the intention of allowing an action to ibe brought on by some irresponsible | punier "person. This scheme alro isi per- ; fectly logical. They intend to pause j a moment until they see what their enemy is doing, and W|«n brin;? the bulk | of their troops to some weak point. In I order to do this, two things are necessary: (1) They must obtain carlv in- ! formation of the enemy'?' line, of advance and deployment. (2) They must keen vthebulkof their force in ; a formation which lends itself to rapid movement in any direction, so that 0,1 the infermaJtion being received they can move to and fall upon, the enomy n weak point. They intend to carry out the first 'by' a >l.rong mixed force in front. Fome pe > pie soiietimcs call this a strategic advanced guard. To carry out the second they propose to keep a large fom>. possibly Ih-alf, or even the bulk, of their force as a waiting- force; _a striking fo-rce, remember, but a waiting force, which some -"ople Mmetimes will a reserve." According 'to the information cabled to date, the French plan has not varied appreciably from tne anticipation of General Wilson.