Germany's Mistake

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVI, Issue 72, 14 August 1914, Page 2

Germany's Mistake

HER SINISTER POLICY. RECKONED WITHOUT ENGLAND. It is obvious that Germany made a mistake. Of this, there cannot be the slightest doubt, says the Auckland Herald in the following illuminative article:—lt is not conceivable that the calculating military group which forms the true government of the great military organisation known as the Germau Empire would have precipitated a Continental war under the conditions that have developed if they had estimated correctly the opposition Germany would arouse. They must have known that they were accepting risks, but every gambler anticipates the best, or there would be no gambling; and this must be said for the German rulers that they have taken very similar risks over and over again and have hitherto won the hazard. The attack of Prussia and Austria upon Denmark was a case of international highway robbery, which the other Powers >.of Europe should have combined to prevent and punish. Britain grumbled but refused to fight against the spoliation of little Denmark. Russia was bribed. France had her own international plans. Then came, in 1866, the sudden and daring turning of Prussia upon her Austrian ally, a coop which succeeded because France hesitated and Russia was unconcerned. In 1870, Prussia sprang upon France, carrying with her all the states of the North German Federation and trusting again to the reconciliation of Austria, the aloofness of Russia and the traditional reluctance of Britain for continental adventure. The crafty diplomacy of Bismarck made it appear to the world that the French Emperor provoked Prussian action but published me'moiip have since made clear the fact that France wag deliberately tricked into her challenge. Some years later, Prussianised Germany, offended by the rapid recovery of republican France, prepared to again and finally crush her innocent neighbor, but the personal appeal of Queen Victoria to the Czar drew Russian intervention and gave France a breathing space which was prolonged by the Franeh-Russiah alliance. During the past generation, Germany has several times employed her military strength to terrify Iher neighbors into submission to unjust demands. Had it ::ot been for Britain she would have browbeaten France in the Agadir incident and she did actually compel Russia to submit to the annexation of BosniaHerzegovina by her Austrian ally. This long series of successes and repeated territorial acquisitions by taking risks and trusting to the non-intervention of ether Powers must be considered in order to understand how it became possible for her rulers to place Germany in Iher present predicament. Prussianised Germany has thus acquired the habit of thinking that anything is possible to the bold, that scruples are proof of timidity and cowardice and that by taking advantage of opportunity she can detach her neighbors from one another and deal with them in scqueneo at her convenience. Th» ultimate German aim is a vast oceai. > empire based upon a great continental military and naval establishment. Every German writer upon "world-politics" treats of Belgium and Holland as future German provinces and the Scandinavian peoples are generally convinced that Germany will endeavour to annex them when she is ready for the attempt. France stands in the way of German designs upon the Dutch and Belgian coasts';' for it would be fatal to France to have on b,er frontier such a colossal power as this aggrandised Germany would be. To cripple France would greatly Jacilitate the schemes of the German military group, for this would deprive Russia of a continental ally and would leave Britain without a powerful ally in Western Europe. The wall of fortresses recently roared on the eastern frontier of Germany indicates that the plan was to [l'old Russia at bay while France was being beaten to the ground, and this is corroborated by the present military tactics of Germany as far as thav can be seen through the veil of censorship. -Vo serious attempt seems to be made to penetrate Russian territory, but everything is risked for the movement upon France. To make this movement final and crushing Belgian neutrality n violated, British intervention is risked and defied. It is reported that Germany offered Britain a pledge not to annex any territory in France as a result of the war; which means that Germany would strip Franco of her colonies, a I tack her battleships, and reduce her to international impotence. Germany would then be free to devote her energies to the North Sea, to absorb Belgium, Holland and Denmark and meet on advantageous terms the sea-power of Britain. This was beyond all question the general purpose of German plans nnd movements. A week ago these Ger- • "an plans seemed quite in train for possible accomplishment. The entire situation ihas changed because the German rulers made a mistake. The Ger- ' man mistake arose from miscomprehen- ! «on of the character of the British and \ from inability to forecast the effect of British influence upon the whole peonies < •of Europe. The dual-nationality of'the J I "'ted Kingdom gives it «„ ' elemeut , that is Teutonic in the steadiness of •fa national policy and an element that '* tieltio in the fervor with which it rises against manifest wrong. While the Teutonic Anglo-Saxon has generally had ■his eyes fixed upon the Gorman menace, the BntWh Celt Jlag been preoccupied with domestic questions that touched I'm. very deeply. When Luxemburg a "'■"t-ral state, was rudely scize d xfpon unpawn in the German war game, the smouldermg embers and the ready tinder came together i„ the composite British character. When neutral Belgium was

threatened and a brutal international outrage commenced, Britain was sot aflame. The unexpected happened. Very visibly, the German .rulers had calculated upon the/domestic broils of Britain, the loudly expressed. animosity to foreign complications, the known disinclination oi' the Asquith Cabinet for war, enabling them to carry out theirplans uninterrupted. Belgium neutrality must be violated because the easiest path to Paris lay through that peaceful state and it is imperative to strike France to the heart 'before she could rally all her resources. Britain would protest, of course, possibly would talk truculently, but Britain' would not fight, and unless Britain fought, Belgium would submit. This was the expectation, the expectation of men trained in the practice and policy which has been successful so often and had given Germany such huge results. Germany made a mistake—for Britain fights, Belgian courage rises, and Europe thinks at last of being freed from this German menace that has,troubled its peace so Ion".