War Notes

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVI, Issue 69, 11 August 1914, Page 3

War Notes

' TKST OF THE OIPr.OMATIST OF TO-DAY. SIR EDWARD GREY ON THE SUBJECT. "What is at the root of most troubl in'the world is mJsunderstanding," eai< Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary recently in a on diplomacy as th chief guest at the annual dinner ol th' Foreign Press Association in London M. J. Condurier de Chassigne (presiden of' the association), proposing Sir Ed ward Grey's health, described him a 1 ( having always played fairly in every filing and having one great aim, t( xflfifttain the'peace of tihe world, Sft ttfWard Grey compared the worl of ifce to that of the corrcs pondent of tie foreign press, for deal :ng with foreign affairs was in many re epects akin to the work of diplomacy What, he asked, was the teat of tlii diplomatist of to-day? H was to up hold the interest of his own conntrj and to Teaoncile them with the preservation of peace. If the interest oJ a foreign country could not be rccon ciled wi;ih pence it was not because diplomacy had been at work but because diplomacy had failed. To preserve peace and to uphold the interests of (his country a diplomat had first to explain the view whidh his country took on a particular point. If thej took the great body of opinion in any of the great countries of Europe thej would find it was quite easy to reconcile their own pom: of view with the point of view of the otter country. A great deal depended upon the way in which the point of view was stated. The work of the diplomatist was to put it forth in conciliator}' and persuasive language and to convey to his own country the point of view of the other country. The perspective became distorted if the two countries did not try to understand each other. If countries would only concentrate on their points of agreement instead of their points of difference they would get a much truer perspective. It was in the pr ■, ;r of the press to create the diplomatic atmosphere and to •ay how much shoUd be possible and how much impossible. THE KIEL CANAL. The Kiel Canal, winch 11,e German Fleet is reported to have just left is an important strategic link between Germany's two great naval liases—the Baltic base at Kiel, and the North Sea base at Wilhilmshaven. .So long as i. it kept open the German fleet lhay pass fiom the Baltic to the North Sea, O'vice versa, without evu- being beyond the projection of the Gcnr. \n coastal defences. Should the canal be blockaded, however,, winch has frequently been discussed as a possibility, the only Outlet for the German fleet from the Baltic would be round the Danish eoas: anil through the Skager Rak, between Denmark and Sweden. At the same time, the Laval buses of Kiel and Wilhelnishaven, from tieing within something under SO miles' communication of each other by wa.cr, would be placed at a distance of over 400 miles from each other by sea. Tbe canal, which was constructed between 1887 ai.d 1895, ; s 61 miles long. Originally it had a depth' of 20ft. Gin., and a width at the bottom of 72ft., but in 100S work was begun for doubling the bottom width and increasing the depth to :10ft for the ac- I commodation of Dreadnoughts. This wor); lias recently been completed. I

Till-: lIKLCIAN FRONTIER. The reported movements of the Germans on the Belgian frontier near Lie;?" and Arlon, bring .tihe scene of the eonIhfi. towards historic erritory. Arlon is due mist of Sedan, where a French army was captured in 1870, thus opening the way to the German march on Paris. Arlon is an unimportant town, but Liege a city of great strategic and commercial importance. It supflies firearms to marly all the Governments in the world, and near bv arc large coal mines. It is on the left bank of the Mouse, just about the point where the hills on its left bank come to an eud Immediately below the place where the valleys of the Vesrdc and Gurthe on the ri#ht bairk afford routes for roads and railways, one east to Ynrvicrs, w nd the other south through the Ardennes. The German statement that the French weire preparing to opiate from Givet against Namur, sugges-s another Important strategic line. Givet is a strong French fortress at the end of an elevated tongue of land running into Belgian territory. Namur is it the confluence of the Men-e and Sanvbre. whose valleys form the main lines of communication with the nort'h-east, south and south-west. The German lintof advance would intercept this .movement—if it. were intended. Namur has undergone many sieges. It was taken by the French in lfi!)2, by the English and FreiKflr in l\i!)s, and again by the French i:i 1701 and 1746.

FORTS J4AHT | Away back in 1871, when Bismarck i imposed his humiliating conditions on (fallen France, M. Thiers employed Ins I highest gilts of eloquence to induce the j German Chancellor to Ifeava Metz in po* session of France. He promised to deprive it of Its character as a fortress—to raze all tho military works, and te give guarantees against their restoration, but Bismarck would listen to no such compromise. To-day, the debatable line of demarcation is sprinkled with fortresses, some German, flome French, On the eastern frontier are the fortresses 6i Panzic, Jionigsberg, Grandean, Thorn, Posen, Glogau, and Glatz. Beyond this boundary (which is only. miles from Berlin) arc the Vistula fortified towns—lvangorod, Warsaw, and Ivovo-Geftrgewflki, supported by the entrenched camp of Brest-Lifcfiwski. Germany's objective in tlie I'iKt is of less concern at the present m&iient than hei objective in the west, Apptoantly she is aiming at a coneelitrat'i'iW of Icr forces in and about Belgrunt l in l order to engage the French line bevoTfd Verdua. But before this can be accomplished, the frontier fortresses which have to be accounted for an actual engagement between the field forces can bo expected, and sieges are protracted affairs. Under any circumstances, even supposing mobilisation having been begun, say, a week ago, it is probable that that mobilisation will not be complete enough to justify a set action jußt now. French concentration must necessarily be behind her rival's, since the latter , has had several days' start, but in any ease, the Germans mobilise more expeditiously. Germany, who has planned a coup of the present sort for years past, could throw her first line army (625,001) men) from a given spot in about a week. RUSSIA'S MOBILISING POWERS And -what about Russia's capacity to mobilise? Colonel Boucher, in a book entitled, "La France Victorieuse dan la Guerre de Domain," discusses the possibility of a German invasion of Franca, to bo followed bv a Russian invasion of Germany, if the Teuton was not immediately successful in smashing his enemy. The commentator's idea is as follows.— "The army of Vilna, four corps, could invade east PrussiA about the twentieth day after mobilisation. The army of Warsaw, five corps, will arrive on the frontier, advancing in the direction of Berlin, about the thirtieth day. This will be followed at a distance of a few days' march by the army of St. Petersburg, four corps. To sum up . . . . Germany might see her territory invaded by no fewer than thirteen Russian army sorps on the thirty-fourth day or thirtyftfth day. By the twentieth day, the action of Russia should make itself felt on the French frontier. By the thirtieth day, the situation for Germany would be very serious indeed, Unless she lias by that' time inflicted a crushing defeat on the French armies. Up till the twentieth day France must rely mainly the moral effect of the Russian cavxlry." It i s a theoretical working out )f a problem which is attractive, if langerous. But what is Russia doing in the eastern frontier? Meanwhile, when the experts have oaUsed a while in their conjecturing, the outside world hears less of war than •umors of war.